DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
JUL 28 1936
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
JUL 29 1936
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1—1336

FROM

GENEVA (part air)

Dated July 23,1936,

Rec'd July 25, 5:20 a.m.

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

767.68119/951

Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JUL 27 1936
DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

298, July 23, 5p.m.

(GRAY) One. Regime of the Straits: Transmitting text of the convention and will report on such details of significance as I may obtain (END GRAY). I am told that Australia which participated has undertaken formally to furnish the other Dominions with a commentary, a copy of which if I can not obtain it here, the Department might procure in a Dominion capital.

FILED
JUL 30 1936

(GRAY). Delegates and naval experts coming to Geneva have characterized the results of the conference as follows. Reaffirmation of the principle of liberty of passage in Article I is regarded as important in affording platform for positions which may be desired to be taken by any maritime power. Turkey was, however, successful in resisting inclusion of similar principle respecting air navigation, adducing its incompatibility

with

with refortification. While the international commission is eliminated commercial passage is safeguarded by various provisions which are regarded as substantially in line with existing practices. Russia won most of her points against Great Britain in respect of transit of war vessels; comment on this centers on why the British permitted an aspect of defeat to be presented by not immediately accepting what was apparent from the outset, that is that unless London were ready to employ definite material pressure the desires of Russia due to its geographical position must prevail. Evaluation of these points is seen, nevertheless, to rest on their practical application. Remilitarization, however, places Turkey in a new and stronger political position and her friendship thus becomes the realistic factor in privileges respecting the straits. From the point of view in its immediate aspects the outcome is seen as a British victory, British-Turkish "alliace".

In as much as, with the exception of Litvinoff, the great powers were not represented by officials with general responsibilities it would appear that no political determinations

determinations were reqched on the margin of the conference as once forecast. There occurred, nevertheless, informative political discussions concernin_ which I report on two points (END GRAY).

Two. Danzig: The question of Danzig is seen as progressing generally along the lines of the private arrangements which I discussed in my number 285, July 4, 10 p.m. Poland, as was expected, is employing her special position to seek a quid pro quo in certain particulars. The adjustments Warsaw is endeavoring to obtain are Polish control or controlling participation in (1) postal service, (2) customs and port regulations, (3) the Bank of Issue, these being construed as pertaining to the external affairs of the free city, and also (4) minimum participation in police matters as necessary to the safeguarding of her rights under the foregoing and as symbolic of the Polish national element in Danzig. Should these adjustments be effected it is anticipated that a more general settlement along the lines discussed in my telegram under reference will follows:

Three. European situation: The position of Berlin with

with certain understandings with Rome is seen as a refusal to participate in general European arrangements which are in any way based on the war or subsequent status quo settlements. It is expected that shortly following the Olympic Games Germany will propose a great power conference to consider the European situation on a new basis to be participated in by Great Britain, France, Germany, Poland and Italy. Hitler is determined that Russia should not be invited and contemplates launching such a conference as a move for a peaceful European readjustment and will likewise endeavor to associate with it a united effort to combat Communism. France in its external policy emphasized by the position of its present government is opposed to such a project and Mussolini is said to regard the participation of Russia as essential. It is generally felt that a conference without Russia would be impossible. It is believed that this will form a background in the current discussions of the three Locarno powers.

Note 740.00 740.0011 Mutual assurance (Locarno)

The recent German-Italian arrangements respecting Austria are interpreted as reaching at least on a modus vivendi basis adjustments of outstanding questions between the two powers as anticipatory to such a general conference and as

863.01

and as in particular affording them both greater freedom of action. The attempted German-Polish arrangements respecting Danzig are viewed as having the same end.

The smaller Eastern and Southeastern European states are apprehensive of a "disposal" of Europe by the great powers which in view of the role Germany would play is seen either by bringing pressure or by example as setting in motions general revision agreement.

GILBERT.

WWC.

(X) (X) apparent omissions.

767.68119/951

SEE COPY OF TELEGRAM NO.298 FROM GENEVA OF

7-23-36 ATTACHED TO 740.00/53

RESTRICTED
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
6-4 2657-T-478
5
WAR DEPARTMENT
AUG 18 1936
3600

G-2 Report

TURKEY (Political)

Subject: Political Issues and Problems.
Remilitarization of The Straits.

All Turkey is exulting today. The Kemalist Republic is celebrating as it might a military victory what it is pleased to call "the re-establishment of Turkish national sovereignty" and also the triumph of what it regards as a new principle in the adjustment of European international differences. For it is in this sense that M. Etem Izzet Benice, for instance, writing in the "Açik Söz", describes the accomplishments of Dr. Aras' delegation at Montreux and the signing there on July 20, 1936, the new Straits Agreement.

In a press absolutely controlled, all this is natural enough. More noteworthy among the peans of praise going forth to the Montreux delegation as a whole and to the Gazi in particular are the compliments being paid to all the other Powers participating and especially to Great Britain.

To cite but one of the instances typical of this policy, the editor of the "Tan" writes:

"For years it was a principle of Turkish patriots to believe in the word of the English. Everything pertaining to loyalty and right it was current to call 'English' and daily language frequently carried such expressions as 'If you must hang someone, do it with an English rope'. At the conclusion of the Armistice it was remarkable to note war-returning Turks and Britons shaking hands in mutual respect. We Turks always recall how the British were wont to speak of the fact that Turks fought always as gentlemen and of their own wish to be friends with us.

"The British Government at that time was not always disposed to follow this attitude. It issued strict instructions forbidding British officers to have relations with us and recommended them to frequent the minorities. The British intelligence service, relying upon information which happily was incorrect, inclined toward support of the bureaucrasy, ignorance and fanaticism of the Palace in an attempt to quash the seeds of development and life in Turkey.

"Such a policy naturally led to coolness. For years both parties regarded one another with suspicion. The British had scarcely any confidence in us and we were disposed to see the British finger in everything. One day an unimportant incident occurred. British officers had been encouraged to study foreign languages, pay increases being allowed to those who became proficient. One of these tongues was Turkish and many officers preparing to serve in British intelligence were pursuing courses in Turkish at English universities. All at once the credits for this instruction were abolished and the Turkish language studies, until then most popular, were suddenly deserted.

707.6819/951 1
2

From: M.A. Istanbul Report No. 6657 July 25, 1936

"This trifling incident served to show how England was beginning to ignore us. Some time after, however, this complete indifference gave way to an increasingly friendly interest toward Turkey. Recent experiences have shown us that the League of Nations rests upon a collaboration which is neither general nor supple, practical nor durable. If the idea of peace and security is to develop, it is necessary to reinforce at all costs local friendships, the outgrowth of a community of interests. And of the elements in this domain Anglo-Turkish friendship is one of the most important."

Since the above was followed the next day by an equally pleasant tribute to the U.S.S.R., with others to France and Bulgaria, the above is not to be taken too seriously, but the Lion's share of them has gone to Albion, which may well indicate a still more definite rapprochement with England.

The essentials of the new agreement as finally determined by the Montreux Conference are as follows:

1. Commercial Vessels.

a. Complete freedom of passage for all commercial vessels in peace or in war without distinction as to flags or cargoes.

b. Considerable reduction in taxes and port charges on commercial vessels imposed by the Turkish authorities.

c. Obligatory pilotage through mine fields in the event of war or the threat of war.

2. Warships.

a. All warships of non-belligerent states shall have freedom of passage both in peace and war when Turkey remains neutral.

b. To all belligerent warships the Straits are closed, except when charged with missions in execution of a mandate from the League of Nations or in case of a regional accord to which Turkey is a party. Moreover, Turkey may pronounce the same interdiction in case of a threat of war.

c. Submarines and aircraft carriers of states not contiguous to the Black Sea are prohibited, except when in need of repairs or in the case of the purchase of such vessels by outside states.

d. Foreign naval tonnage in the Straits and the Black Sea is limited to a maximum of 30,000 tons.

e. Tonnage at any one time is limited to 15,000 tons.

f. For humanitarian reasons (earthquakes or similar disasters) tonnage limitations may be increased not over 8,000 tons.

g. Advance notice of eight (8) days shall be given the Turkish authorities for the passage of all vessels whether of commerce or war. The maximum stay in the Straits or in the Black Sea is limited to one month.

3. The Straits Commission.

The International Straits Commission is abolished, its function being transferred to the Turkish Government.

4. Remilitarization.

The agreement becomes effective immediately upon ratification. By a special protocol, however, Turkey is authorized to remilitarize the Straits upon the signing of the convention.

5. Duration of the Convention.

The convention holds for twenty (20) years. Revision of certain clauses, by Article 26 of the agreement, are provided for upon request of one of the contracting parties supported by one other. If unanimity is not attained in adjudication of such a demand, the decision shall rest with the vote of a three-fourths majority of the contracting parties, including three-fourths of the states, Turkey included, bordering on the Black Sea.

In other words, Turkey by this abrogation of the old convention regains the right to militarize the Straits.

Commercial vessels have the right of navigation and transit by day and by night in peace and in war as long as Turkey remains neutral. In case Turkey herself is a belligerent, such right is accorded to vessels flying neutral flags.

Any single state may send a fleet comprised of light surface vessels, small warships and fleet auxiliaries, not exceeding a total of nine (9) units and 15,000 tons, through by day upon giving one week's notice. By "light surface vessels" is meant, as per Appendix 3 of the new convention, those of not more than 10,000 tons and with guns not exceeding 8-inch. Fleet auxiliaries specially constructed for the transportation of combustibles either liquid or solid and not carrying heavy armaments are exempt from the restrictions on tonnage and the obligation to give notice.

Submarines and military aircraft, as well as aircraft carriers, are excluded.

Within these limits, the right to send through 15,000 tons of warships is further conditioned by the restrictions on foreign naval vessels in the Black Sea. Such forces are limited to a total of 30,000 tons, to wit: the present naval strength in those waters of the U.S.S.R. When the Soviet's Black Sea fleet is increased by 10,000 tons, the total

allowance of foreign tonnage shall be increased by a like amount, viz: 45,000 tons. Twice yearly for purposes of commutation the Black Sea Powers will report their naval strengths to the Turkish Government which, in turn, will transmit this information to the other signatories and to the League of Nations.

Not more than two-thirds of the 30,000-45,000 tons may be sent into the Black Sea by any one Power and then only for a stay of not more than three (3) weeks. However, outside Powers, for purposes of humanity, may send in with Turkish authorization up to 8,000 tons of war vessels. In case of the arrival of such a force would fill up or exceed the maximum tonnage permitted in the Black Sea, consent of the other Black Sea Powers as well as that of Turkey would be required within 48 hours.

Turkey being neutral, the Straits are closed completely to belligerent naval forces. The only exception to this rule is when such forces are engaged on missions ordered by the League against an aggressor nation or are going to the aid of a victim of aggression, the League having failed to act.

In any war in which Turkey is a belligerent or upon a threat of war where she feels herself menaced, she enjoys complete discretion to close the Straits. In the case of a threat of war, however, she must revoke such closure if the League Council by a two-thirds vote rules such a measure unwarranted, a majority of the signatories of the new convention sharing in this view.

In availing herself of her right to remilitarize, Turkey has not lost a minute's time. Troop movements toward both the Dardanelles and and the Bosphorus began promptly on July 21st, the day following the signing of the new convention. A detachment of troops debarked on the island of Tenedos, while another landed from the cruiser "Hamidiye" on Imbros. Both of these are included in the scheme of fortification which will be done by a commission under the direction of the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, who already is making a tour of the entire region.

At Çanakkale, near the entrance to the Dardanelles, where it is purposed locating an army corps, the first detachment arrived at 11:00 a.m. It was accompanied by the Turkish fleet under command of Admiral Şükrü and consisting of the battle cruiser "Yavuz", formerly the German cruiser "Goeben"; the light cruiser "Hamidiye"; the destroyers "Zafer", "Tinaz Tepe", "Koca Tepe", "Raşit", and "Hisir Reis"; and the submarines "Inönü I", "Inönü II", and the "Gür", all of these vessels anchoring off the port and landing a detachment of marines to welcome the army.

Reoccupation of the demilitarized zone of the Bosphorus began on the same day. Detachments of infantry, artillery and machine gun units, coming from Anatolia, embarked at Üsküdar and sailing up that

waterway moved into garrison of the old fortresses of the Bosphorus defenses under the eye of General Izzettin, Inspector General of the Army. A force of airplanes flew over the Strait to illumine the movement with their projectors.

These military activities were accompanied by enthusiastic demonstrations on the part of the civilian authorities and the public. Patriotic addresses, distribution of flowers, cigarettes and refreshments welcomed the troops in every town and village, the population singing the national anthem. The manifestations organized in Istanbul and other of the larger centers were most elaborate.

That these demonstrations were staged by order is well known. That the Montreux delegation might be fittingly welcomed upon their arrival in Istanbul, the police made a house to house call ordering the inhabitants to turn out and greet them at suburb railway stations although their train passed in the early hours of the morning. Nevertheless, national exultation has been sincere and general, whether it was spontaneous or not.

On the other hand, the possibility of the Turkish Army garrisoning the Dardanelles with a force as large as an army corps, with headquarters at Çanakkale, is open to much doubt, for it is not believed that it has the troops available, and to do so would involve a radical change in the present order of battle. True, the Gendarmerie School, hitherto established there, has been removed to make room for the headquarters of General Hussein Hüsnü, commanding the Bayramiç Brigade, but that he will be given a force as large as a corps and with the staff required to handle it is extremely doubtful. In the opinion of my more experienced colleagues here, the new Dardanelles garrison will probably be for some time to come not more than a skeletonized division.

ROYDEN WILLIAMSON,
Major, (Cav.), Acting G.S.,
Military Attache.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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JUN 22 1936
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

6-3 MIL. INTEL. DIV. 2044-347

G-2 Report

DEPARTMENT OF STATE WAR DEPARTMENT 8900
JUN 18 1936
DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

TURKEY (Combat)

Subject: National Defense; Policy Pertaining to Army, Navy and Air - General. The Straits Situation.

867.68119/952

In a conversation I had yesterday, June 16th, with Captain Leleu, French Assistant Military Attache, at which his chief was present, the Captain gave me a resumé of his personal estimate concerning the Straits situation.

He stated his conviction that Great Britain was playing Turkey as an offset to Italy; that if a complacent attitude on the part of London toward the rearmament of the Straits meets with Turkish gratitude, it will result in a growing British domination with a consequent diminution of Soviet influence in this part of the world.

I asked Captain Leleu if he felt that the successful accomplishment of such a British policy was likely to result in an increase in air development by the Turks. He stated definitely "yes"; that he thought a strong flanking by Turkey of the Dodecanese Island possessions of Italy would largely tend to neutralize the fact that Malta has now ceased to possess any value to the British as a base in the Mediterranean, and that such an increase would serve to the advantage of British interests in Egypt.

In reply to my raising the point as to what France's policy might be in the event of developments along this line, the Captain stated that French influence in the eastern Mediterranean was dimishing, whereas that of Germany was in the ascendant. It may be assumed, therefore, that France will follow Great Britain's lead.

ROYDEN WILLIAMSON,
Major, (Cav.), Actg.G.S.,
Military Attache.

From: M.A. Istanbul Report No. 6641 June 17, 1936.

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Riga, July 9, 1936.

No. 9

Subject: Moscow Comment on Turkish Dardanelles Proposal.

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
AUG 25 1936
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
AUG 5 - 1936
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AUG 19 1936

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JUL 29 1936
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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

FILED
AUG 26 1936

767.68119/953

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to enclose a copy of a letter, which I have today sent to the American Ambassador in Istanbul, concerning certain comment in the Moscow press relative to the Turkish proposal for the transit of war vessels through the Straits.

Respectfully yours,

Arthur Bliss Lane

Arthur Bliss Lane.

Enclosure

Enclosure:
1. Copy of letter of July 9, 1936, to American Ambassador, Istambul, Turkey.

(In quintuplicate)
Two copies to Embassy, Moscow

710-R-Tur.

FC:p

cc to A-M

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 9 dated JUL - 9 1936
from American Legation, Riga.

767.68119/953

Riga, July 9, 1936.

The Honorable

J. V. A. MacMurray,

American Ambassador,

Istanbul, Turkey.

Sir:

Knowing your interest in the current negotiations concerning the fortification of the Dardanelles and the rights of passage through them for men-of-war, negotiations in which the Soviet Union is participating, I venture to quote below a passage from the Moscow IZVESTIYA, No. 152, Thursday, July 2, 1936, for what interest it may present to you, and without knowing what information has been sent to you from Moscow.

This excerpt, the entire latter portion of an editorial in the official organ of the Soviet Government, is also of considerable interest in another connection. It is the first statement in the Soviet press noted by this Legation even indirectly or by implication criticising Turkey. As you are aware, ever since the earliest days of the Soviet Union,

support

support for Turkey, friendship for that country, and the cultivation of the closest possible economic relations have been perhaps the most consistent lines of Kremlin policy.

The newspaper said:

> .....
>
> The draft of the new Straits treaty proposed by the Turkish delegation cannot, unfortunately, be called friendly to the U.S.S.R., since it does not take into account the most legitimate interests of our country. The frontiers of the Soviet Union not only run through the Black Sea but also through the Baltic, and through the Pacific and Arctic Oceans. It follows from this that the interests of the Military defense of the U.S.S.R. demand that it should be able to move its fleet from one sea to another according to necessity. This does not contravene the interests of Turkish security since, in the first place, Turkey knows that one of the fundamentals of Soviet foreign policy is not only its refusal to entertain any expansionist intentions, but its special friendship for those peoples who up to that time (sic) were the objects of an imperialistic policy and may still become the objects of such a policy. Further, the Soviet Union recognizes without reserve the rights of Turkey to such a fortification of the Dardanelles and the Bosporus as is required by Turkish security. There is nothing in common between setting up any sort of difficulties in the way of the transit of Soviet ships-of-war from one sea to the other, and the interests of Turkey in the defense of its security.

Thus

Thus, these hindrances /can only be/ in the interests of the imperialistic powers hostile to the U.S.S.R. The Japanese delegate showed this openly at the conference in Montreux. Japan, having no special interests in the Black or the Mediterranean seas, opposes the legitimate rights of the U.S.S.R. to move its fleets from one sea to the other. The German imperialist press also shows this in its statement that the U.S.S.R. is demanding special privileges for itself in the Black Sea. The Turkish attitude, which cannot be understood from the point of view of the military defense of Turkey itself, can only be understood as the result of pressure (brought to bear on Turkey) by powers inimical to the U.S.S.R. In this context, it is worth while to point out that--as we know from information received--one of the imperialistic powers has already received from Turkey the order for the construction of fortifications along the Straits which is an expression of an increased influence exercised by that state on Turkey.

Only the presence of such influence can explain the attempt to treat the U.S.S.R. and its interests in the Black Sea on a par with the interests of non-Black Sea powers. What interests of the non-Black Sea powers is Turkey trying to protect when it mentions in its draft that the non-Black Sea powers are to be permitted to send exactly the same tonnage into the Black Sea as (it proposes) the Soviet Union can send out? The question is, for the Soviet Union, one of safety of its frontiers. In speaking of the non-Black Sea powers, the Turkish project has so called "visits of courtesy" in view. We are very strong for courtesy in international relations, but how can such diverse things as courtesy and international

security

security be put on a par? We will not raise here the spiteful question as to where and in what ports the lovers of courtesy are to make these visits. It is enough to point to this "putting on a par" to understand that what we have here is not a matter of courtesy but something entirely different.

A number of imperialistic newspapers, for instance, the LONDON DAILY EXPRESS, maintained that the Turkish proposal is a great victory for the U.S.S.R. This statement is intended to pull the wool over certain people's eyes. The Soviet Union considers that the Turkish project does not in any way satisfy its interests. The problem of the Straits can be settled either by declaring the Black Sea closed or open. In the first case, no non-Black Sea power can have the right to introduce its vessels into that sea. In the second case, non-Black Sea powers would have to be given the right to introduce their fleets into the Black Sea. If that be done, then the Black Sea powers cannot be forbidden the free movement of their fleets out of the Black Sea and in again. This can be arranged without doing violence either to Turkish interests or to the execution of the (parts of the) Covenant of the League of Nations providing for mutual assistance by all members of the League of Nations in the case of an aggression.

The French press and a part of the English press recognize this. It is enough to point out that one of the organs of the English Conservatives, THE MORNING POST, wrote on June 25th: "It is easy to understand the desire of the U.S.S.R. to be free to move its naval units into the

Mediterranean.

Mediterranean. Our country has no interest in opposing this demand." Such a position on the part of the English Conservative newspapers is based on the understanding that the U.S.S.R., in defending its own interests, is also struggling for the maintenance of universal peace. If all countries understand this, countries whose policies will determine the results of the new attempt to settle the Straits problem, an agreement can easily be reached, an agreement which will protect the security of all Black Sea powers and one which will be in accord with the interests of universal peace. The attainment of such a result will most accord with the interests of Turkey itself, interests, which, in our opinion, are closely bound up with the reinforcement of universal peace.

The editorial on the same subject in LE JOURNAL DE MOSCOU, No. 26, of June 30, 1936, discusses the matter in a most general way and without in any way reproaching Turkey. The JOURNAL DE MOSCOU, it will be remembered, began publication in Moscow at the very beginning of the Franco-Soviet rapprochement and even before the negotiation of the Franco-Soviet Pact, and is intended primarily to appeal to French public opinion.

Respectfully yours,

Arthur Bliss Lane,
American Minister.

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Istanbul, Turkey, July 13, 1936.

No. 70

SUBJECT: Turkish Press Comment on Montreux Conference.

CONFIDENTIAL

DIVISION OF EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS AUG 10 1936 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS AUG 5 1936 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE AUG 7 - 1936

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DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

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AUG 8 - 1936

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE JUL 29 1936 DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

767.68119/954

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

Sir:

1/ I enclose a summary of Turkish Press comment on the Montreux Conference prepared by Ali Nur Bey of the Embassy staff. These comments, it will be observed, at the outset strike a note of optimism not to say self-righteousness. The procedure initiated by the Turks for abrogating the Lausanne Straits Convention, it was felt, could not fail to elicit an unusually conciliatory attitude on the part of the signatory powers, although, of course, a certain amount of trouble was anticipated from the U.S.S.R. and Italy. Within the past week there has been a sharp change in the tone of the Press, and the idea which is now being assidiously played up is that Turkey is fully justified in going ahead with the re-arming of the Straits if the conclusion of the proceedings at

Montreux

FILED AUG 18 1936

Montreux is to be unduly delayed by differences on matters concerning which Turkey is not primarily interested. General Inönü has recently on several occasions flown down from Ankara for consultation with the President of the Republic who is at present at his Florya villa, and within the past four days there has been a long meeting of the Council of Ministers. This activity may well indicate the preliminaries to a decision to re-arm the Straits in case a real impasse is reached at Montreux. The re-arming is after all the essential in the eyes of the Turks and if the attaining of this objective can be achieved, they would, I believe, be quite prepared to let the Anglo-Russian difference simmer indefinitely, particularly as in following this course it would be easier to avoid too close an alignment with either Power: whatever happens or does not happen, one thing is quite certain, that Turkey will spare no pains to avoid making a choice between the U.S.S.R. and England. A country which sincerely desires to be on friendly terms with all the great Powers but in close alliance with none of them is something of an anomaly in international affairs, but this is the program which Turkey has steadily pursued and which she is pursuing today.

Respectfully yours,

J. V. A. MacMurray

Enclosure:
1/ Summary of Turkish Press Comment.

J. V. A. MacMurray.

CC to A-M

4 Carbon Copies

Received

720
GHS:mej

Copies sent to Embassies in Berlin, London, Moscow, Paris, Rome, Tokyo; Legations in Athens, Belgrade, Bucharest, Sofia; and Consulate in Geneva.

Enclosure to Despatch No. 70 dated July 13, 1936, from the American Embassy at Istanbul, Turkey.

TURKISH PRESS COMMENT ON THE MONTREUX CONFERENCE

Complete optimism and absolute faith in the successful outcome of the Montreux Conference have been the characteristic features of the initial series of leading articles which appeared in the Turkish Press on the subject of the modification of the regime of the Straits. Undoubtedly, this boundless optimism, refusing to foresee even the slightest difficulty, was primarily due to the Turkish Press representatives at Montreux who in their daily reports somewhat overestimated the atmosphere of "sincere cordiality and understanding" in which the conference had opened. "No international conference has ever been characterized before by such a degree of benevolence and mutual accord" state practically all Turkish papers of June 22 and 23, and without exception all find this situation most natural since "no sound person can insist on a continuation of the present unprotected status of the Straits at a time when every nation is bound to rely on its own force and strength for its territorial safety and integrity." (CUMHURIYET - June 22)

"Not even the Straits Convention of Lausanne" states the SON POSTA of June 22, "meant to leave the Straits without protection....In fact France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan collectively took upon themselves the task of insuring the safety of the demilitarized zones along the Straits against all acts and threats of war.... But recent developments have clearly shown that this collective guarantee is no longer operative."

No doubt inspired by the note of the Turkish Government requesting a modification of the regime of the Straits, the above argument constitutes the leitmotiv of all articles expounding the reasons for the remilitarization of the Straits. It is a remarkable fact that this point which at the present time constitutes the principal basis on which Turkey's claim is founded, had never before been utilized by the Turkish Press among the many arguments brought forward in the past in favor of the fortification of the Straits.

"The Manchurian affair and the recent Abyssinian conflict" points out the CUMHURIYET of June 22, "totally
2) preclude any effective collaboration between the four great powers which undertook at Lausanne to defend the demilitarized Straits against all aggression... Hence the remilitarization of these zones has become imperative. But a fortification of the Straits should not be misconstrued as their closure... On the contrary Turkey is far from desiring to check in any way freedom of transit and navigation....but it is obvious that this freedom can better be insured if the Straits are well protected rather than if they are exposed to the mercy of the first aggressor...." Referring especially to the latest developments in military aviation and the establishment and extension of certain naval bases in the Mediterranean, the SON POSTA also considers the fortification of the Straits as an imperative need "both for the

safety

safety of the freedom of passage as well as for the safety of Turkey".

On June 23, the leading article of the CUMHURIYET draws a parallel between the conferences at Montreux and the meeting of the League of Nations at Geneva taking place simultaneously. "Nothing" states the editor of this journal, "proves more convincingly and eloquently the justness and timeliness of Turkey's claim...than the desperate efforts of the League aiming at liquidating and disentangling the present chaotic international situation...and nothing contributes more to international conflicts than the existence of weak states... Consequently a strong and invulnerable Turkey is undoubtedly an addition to world peace....". (3)

Falih Rifki Atay, in the ULUS of June 23, expresses a more or less similar opinion. He, namely, states in the leading article of this journal: "The important role which the Near East plays in the peace of the world is generally conceded... The security of the Straits constitutes one of the fundamental pillars of peace and order in the Near East.... Recent international developments which have cost the independence of a whole country have clearly shown that the guarantees given at Lausanne regarding the safety of the Straits are purely hypothetical... Turkey's desire now is to render the security of the Straits real and concrete...."

The course which Turkey took in order to obtain a change in the regime of the Straits laid down at Lausanne, also constitutes one of the main points brought out with strength by the entire Turkish Press. All papers uniformly point out that by not following the method of unilaterally denouncing international agreements, "a policy very much in fashion nowadays", Turkey has given conclusive proof of its faithful adherence to international pacts and obligations. The firm conviction is generally expressed in this connection that this correct attitude of Turkey will favorably influence the development of negotiations at Montreux. (4)

The atmosphere of boundless optimism which prevailed throughout the Turkish Press at the beginning of the Conference received its first setback about June 26, when more definite news was received concerning Italy's attitude towards the Conference and the criticisms formulated especially by Soviet Russia on the Turkish project which formed the basis of deliberations during the first part of the Conference.

Falih Rifki Atay in the ULUS of June 26, commenting on Italy's attitude states: "The contentions of certain Italian newspapers to the effect that Turkey desires to fortify the Straits merely because she apprehends - without any grounds - an attack coming from a Mediterranean country, is totally devoid of foundation...

Turkey has seriously brought up the question of the Straits only after the recent incidents which clearly show that much faith can not be placed on international guarantees... As far as Italy's unwillingness to participate in the Montreux Conference is concerned, we can only express the sincere desire to see Italy represented at this important international meeting as soon as practicable...but we wish to remind this country of the irrefutable fact that the Turkish nation will absolutely stand no delay and procrastination in a vital question such as the safety of the Straits."

(5) Replying in greater detail to the Italian objections, Abidin Daver in the CUMHURIYET of June 27, states as follows: "Firstly, the Montreux Conference is not premature as claimed by the Italian Press. The fact that eight of the nine states have accepted the invitation to Montreux constitutes in our mind a conclusive reply to the above objection. Furthermore, the question of the Straits, constituting a problem which concerns Turkey more than any other country, we are in a better situation than Italy to decide when this question should be settled. Unfortunately we can not wait, as suggested by the Italians, for a clarification of the international situation...because of the complications which at any moment may come up during this process of clarification..."

"Secondly, it is obviously true that an important Mediterranean question should not be discussed and settled without the participation of one of the principal Mediterranean powers...but what prevents Italy from taking part in the Montreux Conference? There exists hardly any connection between Montreux and Geneva. Furthermore, there is no Abyssinian delegate sitting at Montreux... Obstruction in such an important question is hardly admissible..."

"Thirdly, Italy intimates that she is not going to recognize the final decisions of a conference in which she does not participate... As pointed out above Italy's non-participation is entirely due to her... On the other hand, there can be hardly anything unacceptable to Italy in the resolutions of a conference attended by France, Great Britain, Greece, et cetera..."

"Finally, Turkey's desire to see the Straits fortified is not due to a fear of an attack from Italy. In fact, the militarization of the Straits is not directed against any specific country... The reasons for which Turkey wishes to modify the regime of the Straits have been clearly exposed in the Turkish note... May we remind our Italian colleagues that the Italian reply to this note was not negative...?"

The TAN of June 26, likewise points out that there exists no direct relation whatsoever between the Montreux Conference and the meetings at Geneva and states:

"Japan

"Japan is taking an active part in the Montreux Conference despite the fact that she is no longer a member of the League of Nations...why should therefore Italy not participate in this Conference....?"

All articles commenting on the above matter point out, however, without using too strong a language, that Italy's attitude towards the Montreux Conference is hardly fair and just...but that it will in no way keep Turkey from following the definite course which she has taken in the question of the Straits.

With reference to the objections of the Russian delegate "wishing to make of the Black Sea a closed inland sea while assuring the Russian fleet full liberty of passage" and to certain articles in the Russian Press accusing Turkey of neglecting Russian interests in the elaboration of the project presented to the Conference, the Turkish papers more or less uniformly express the following opinion: "The Russian accusation is certainly not justified... Turkey's principal aim in modifying the regime of the Straits is to obtain its remilitarization and thus to insure the safety of the country.... While advancing this point she would have hardly committed the mistake of taking an impartial stand... In fact, certain privileges have been accorded in the Turkish project to the countries bordering the Black Sea... The principal question, however, is the fortification of the Straits, and there can not be the slightest doubt that Turco-Russian relations will benefit by it...."

The ULUS of July 4, uses more or less a similar language: "There exists no Straits question between Turkey and Soviet Russia.... What is being discussed at Montreux are questions of detail... Both Turkey and Russia have in the near past bitterly suffered from the consequences of unfortified Straits... It is therefore to the interest of both countries that a definite and firm control be established over these waterways... Questions of detail should therefore not be misconstrued to make them look like differences of major importance."

In fact as days go by and the news from Montreux becomes less encouraging principally due to the impossibility of reconciling Anglo-Soviet views concerning the passage of warships, the Turkish Press seems to be more and more inclined to make a distinct difference between (a) the fortification of the Straits and (b) the modalities of passage through the Straits.

In the CUMHURIYET of July 5, Yunus Nadi openly states: "The question which interests Turkey primarily and principally is the remilitarization of the Straits... and this necessity has been publicly admitted by the interested States by accepting the invitation to Montreux... and by adopting the Turkish project as the basis of discussions at the Conference...Consequently the two major difficulties, namely, the free passage of warships and the non-recognition by Italy of the final resolutions, can in no way affect Turkey's legitimate right to fortify and defend the Straits... Should the delegates at Montreux fail to come to an understanding in the matter of the tonnage of warships which may freely pass

the

the Straits, there is no reason to delay the fortification of the now demilitarized zones... Both questions should be separated..."

Manifesting irritation and impatience at the presentation of a new project by Great Britain and the inability of the powers to come to an agreement in the matter of determining the tonnage of war vessels which are to enjoy free passage, "a question which interests Turkey in a secondary degree..." the CUMHURIYET of July 7, in a more or less threatening tone states: "We can fortify the Straits and without detriment to the peace of the world regulate ourselves the passage of warships better than any treaty... Nevertheless, although absolutely reasonable and fully justified, we do not desire that the labyrinth of negotiations at Montreux should lead to such a one-sided solution of the matter..."

Another article in the same journal gravely declares: "We hope that the Powers will not oblige us to depart from the correct course which we have taken for the solution of such a vital questiom..."

In another page of the CUMHURIYET of June 5, Abidin Daver expresses doubt as to the practicability of the policy followed by Turkey in the Straits question. "The difficulties shown to us at Montreux" states Abidin Daver, "would seem to indicate that the most practical course to be adopted for the solution of such questions..is the policy followed successfully by Germany..."

The SON POSTA of June 9, in prominent headings asks: "Are We Being Penalized For Our Gentlemanlike Action?" and goes on as follows: "If the Powers interpret as a sign of weakness our desire to have the Straits question settled by an international conference...they are greatly mistaken. The Turkish soldier who has torn to pieces the Treaty of Sevres, is today stronger than ever before..."

The CUMHURIYET of July 10, bitterly complains about the slow progress of the Conference and states: "The delegates at Montreux have successfully managed to transform the Straits question, which essentially is a question of the security of the Turkish State, into a 'Black Sea Question'... Who is to rule over the Black Sea...? An endless question which since 1700 has undergone various phases and never found a solution... Since the Conference has now assumed the nature of a struggle between Great Britain and Soviet Russia for the hegemony of the Black Sea...its outcome is most doubtful. Under these circumstances there is only one thing left for us: Fortify the Straits and let our friends Great Britain and Soviet Russia leisurely continue their fight..."

"We wish to point out again that the most vital point for us in the Straits question is the full and unlimited recognition of Turkish sovereignty over the zone of the Straits, namely the abolition of the demilitarized zones... If they refuse to grant us this legitimate demand...we can follow in the footsteps of the Germans."

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The only article of consequence which appeared in the Turkish Press on the future of the Straits Commission was a reply by Abidin Daver (CUMHURIYET - July 3) to certain articles in the British Press in favor of the maintenance of the above commission: "The principal function of the Straits Commission" states this author, "is to insure the non-violation of especially the provisions of the Straits Convention of Lausanne relating to the passage of war vessels and aircraft, Turkey having refused to assume any responsibility in this matter, the Straits having been demilitarized. Since the Straits will now be fortified it will be Turkey's task to see that the provisions of the new agreement are not violated by any state."

"As for the second function of the Straits Commission, namely that of reporting eventual changes in the tonnage of the fleets of the Black Sea States, such reporting will no longer be necessary since according to the project for the new Convention the limit of the tonnage of war vessels which may freely pass the Straits will no longer be variable but will remain fixed."

"It will be easily realized from the foregoing that the Straits Commission forms an integral part of the Straits Convention of Lausanne and that consequently it will normally have to cease to exist with the abrogation of the said Convention.

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LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Bucharest, July 13, 1936.

No. 110

Subject: Titulescu and the Balkan Pact with Reference to the Straits Problem.

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
JAN 3 1938
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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JAN 3 - 1938
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1936 JUL 28

FOR DISTRIBUTION - CHECK Yes No
To the Field
In U. S. A.

767.68119/955

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JUL 29 1936
DIVISION OF
NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

767.68119

Sir:

500.C/815

If Mr. Titulescu's speech at Geneva (despatch No. 109 of July 10, 1936) won generous applause in his home press, his speech at the Straits Conference at Montreux on July 9, 1936, seems, I have the honor to report, to have virtually "brought down the house." One may naturally assume that the press has had its promptings from the Foreign Office, but the apparent tone of spontaneity and the varied methods of expression indicate whole-hearted approval and genuine praise in the different sections of the press.

Mr. Titulescu's opportunity came when the British delegate opposed the draft of Article XXIII of the new

Straits

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Straits Convention proposed by Mr. Litvinov whereby the Convention would be interpreted as in no way interfering with passage of ships of war through the Straits in fulfillment of regional pacts of assistance concluded within the framework of the League of Nations, that is, as supplements to the League Covenant.

Seeing in the British proposal a threat to his system of alliances whereby Rumania would receive aid in case of war, Mr. Titulescu, posing a future situation in which the Council might be divided on the question as to who was the aggressor, asked the British delegation where his Balkan Pact would stand, with special reference to Turkey and Rumania, if regional accords were not taken into consideration. He asked for a definite statement as to Great Britain's position in regard to such accords and stated that this point was one of vital interest to Rumania. Making particularly warm reference to "his friend," Rustu Arras, he spoke of Rumania and Turkey as forming, today, one country.

1/ A full translation of Mr. Titulescu's remarks as given in the French-language newspaper L'INDÉPENDANCE ROUMAINE (Bucharest) of July 11, 1936, is attached hereto.

From among the numerous enthusiastic commentaries appearing in the local press the following excerpts may be quoted as being exemplary:

> "This was not only an oratorical duel, but it was one of the most beautiful that we have ever witnessed, one of the duels in which the subtle dialectics of Mr. N. Titulescu, coupled with his profound knowledge of the problems which he attacks and his excellent mastery of the rostrum, have made of him, once again, the victor of the day.
>
> "If Mr. Titulescu had needed to put himself in the limelight, his speech of yesterday would have sufficed. A single discourse like

that

that pronounced yesterday by Mr. Titulescu would amply suffice to place a statesman in the first ranks. And for our compatriot this is not the first one!" LE MOMENT (independent, in French), July 12, 1936.

"The debate at Montreux brought forth yesterday, on the part of Mr. N. Titulescu, a spirited intervention marked by a judicial and political subtlety of great significance. . .

"This was a success not only for Mr. Titulescu but for all the work for peace that Rumania and her allies have followed so perseveringly and with so much sacrifice." L'INDÉPENDANCE ROUMAINE (French official organ of National Liberal Party), July 11, 1936.

" Once again it has been proved, at Montreux, that the diplomatic and oratorical genius of Mr. Titulescu is equaled only by the authority with which he defends the interests of the country and the cause of international peace." LUPTA (National Peasant), as quoted in AGENCE RADOR of July 11, 1936.

"The British press is. . .full of admiration for the manner in which our delegate defended the interests of his country." EPOCA (official organ of Conservative Party of Gr. Filipescu), as quoted in AGENCE RADOR of July 11, 1936.

An article in THE TIMES (London) of July 10th refers to the incident at Montreux on the preceding day as a "breeze" and outlines the British position as follows:

"These criticisms of the British attitude seem to be based on the idea that Great Britain last year specifically approved the Franco-Soviet Pact, agreed that it was consonant with the League Covenant, and also approved of a decision of The Hague Court being sought if necessary, while she has at Geneva supported the theory of regional and mutual assistance pacts.

"The British contention is that the overriding obligations of the Covenant should not be extended to pacts concluded within the framework of the League that would operate in advance of the decision of the League Council, especially pacts to which Turkey is not a party. If Turkey had to discriminate between belligerents under some agreement to which she was not a party, and even between belligerents who were not signatories

of

of the new Straits Convention, her position--this is the British view--would be extremely difficult."

Respectfully yours,

Leland Harrison.

Enclosure:
1. Full translation of Mr. Titulescu's remarks at Straits Conference at Montreux on July 9, 1936 as given in L'INDEPENDANCE ROUMAINE of July 11, 1936.

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In Translation from L'Independence Roumain (French Official Organ of Liberal Party) of July 11, 1936.

Enclosure No.1 to Despatch No. 110 dated July 13,1936 from the American Legation at Bucharest, Rumania.

FULL TRANSLATION

Titulescu's Speech at Montreux, July 9, 1936
Regarding British Stand on Litvinov Proposal.

-ooo-

I have come among you to support the draft prepared by the Soviet delegation and to say that in the special case of Rumania there exist special reasons why this draft should be accepted.

If I refer to the text presented by the British delegation, I find that all assistance arising by virtue of a regional pact is excluded and I must look at things from the point of view of assistance prescribed, by unanimous vote, by the League of Nations: In other words, I must contemplate a theoretical case, because if unanimity has worked once in the Italo-Ethiopian case, I do not know if it will work a second time. I fear that we might find ourselves faced with divided voices in the bosom of the League of Nations.

The problem I place before you I present directly, with all the responsibility which accrues to my mission.

I am supposing that the council is divided on the question as to who is the aggressor. Do you believe that I would encounter the least difficulty in asking my friend Rustu Arras to respect his regional engagements? Leaving aside the friendship of Rustu Arras, --- prime regional engagement -- the British delegation sets aside the Balkan Pact and that I am unable to accept. By virtue of the Balkan Pact Turkey owes me assistance,

whatever

whatever country might attack me conjointly with a Balkan country, and you desire, Gentlemen, of the British delegation, that I renounce today the fruits of a labor which is my own labor, along with the great labor of my colleagues, a labor on which I pride myself in international life? What rank would the Balkan Pact hold between Turkey and myself if you set aside the other regional accords?

I put this question clearly to the British delegation.

But aside from the Balkan Pact, I have also pacts of mutual assistance, registered with the League of Nations, and a pact between France and Rumania. Can you imagine for an instant that Turkey would be able to assume the responsibility of rendering this pact of alliance between France and Rumania ineffective?

It is my opinion that when there is question of an act of the League of Nations, it is your duty to place on an equal basis all acts that the Covenant envisages: that which Article XVI prescribes, that is to say, that which requires unanimity of voices in the Council, that which arises by virtue of a regional accord (Art.XXIII) and, since all regional accords are made chiefly in the light of paragraph 7 of Article XV, all existing regional assistance, for the reason that you would not be able to apply the Covenant of the League of Nations in its entirety if you apply only Article XVI, leaving aside Articles XXIII and XV, paragraph 7.

The reform of the League of Nations has been mentioned. I have accepted it in a limited fashion and

my

my colleagues will bear witness that I did so only in order that this action be limited. But the question of regionalism, of mutual assistance, was raised.

This is a British idea, very British. I pose to you, then, the question: How can this British regionalism be reconciled with the right that you give to a country to exclude it?

It is readily understood that if I were ever to adopt a policy against Turkey, if my allies were not also the allies of Turkey, the latter would have every right to prevent my allies from coming to my aid.

But as I could not conceive a future in which Rumania will not be linked with Turkey, I ask the British representatives: By what right do you at Montreux prevent the operation of the regional security which you extolled at Geneva?

That is the question which I ask. I await your response.

(The British delegate replied promptly that he had not wished to discuss at that time the details of the Litvinov amendment but that by way of courtesy for the Rumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, he was able to indicate that Great Britain is ready to take under consideration any formula that might enlarge the scope of application of Article XXIII of the Covenant so as to safeguard Turkey's obligations under the Balkan Pact. Mr. Titulesco again took the floor.)

I wish to thank the British delegate for his statement but I permit myself to express surprise that he has not

based

based it on something other than the courtesy which we owe to each other when I am expressing here a vital interest, so vital that my country can not overlook it.

Let us k not forget that our war of 1916 was hindered by the closing of the Straits. It is true that when Turkey was not in our camp I did everything possible to bring Rumania and Turkey together and I am able to affirm conscientiously that today Turkey and Rumania form but a single country.

But, if one speaks of courtesy when it is a question of a vital interest, it seems to me that the reference is inadequate when we are called here to achieve a general entente.

If I have correctly followed the thought of the British delegate it seems that he has proposed that we except, or rather add an exception to, these articles of the pact of assistance of Turkey. That would cover the Balkan Pact.

But there are other pacts of assistance concluded among the reparian States to which Turkey is not a party. I have mentioned especially the pact which binds me to France. Never will Rumania accept a decision which would put an end to French assistance coming by land or by sea in view of a convention concluded between us.

For this reason you will allow me to conclude with a word of appreciation addressed to my friend Rustu Arras. He was much more considerate (large, desireux) than the representative of Great Britain. He did not invoke reasons of courtesy.

He said that everything which concerns my country will be given special consideration.

Dear

Dear Arras, I thank you with all my heart. I leave Montreux at this time carrying to my country this word of friendship from you.

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DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 841.00 P. R./448 FOR Despatch #2346

FROM Great Britain (Johnson) DATED July13,1936

TO NAME 1—1127

REGARDING: The Dardanelles. The Dardanelles did not afford such plain sailing to the Montreux Conference as was predicted. That was shown by the differences which appeared between Great Britain and Russia.

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The Dardanelles.

The Dardanelles did not afford such plain sailing to the Montreux Conference as was prophesied. That optimism had been excessive was shown by the differences which appeared between Great Britain and Russia. They arose out of the proposals for the passage of the Straits by warships in war-time, and for the use of the Black Sea by warships in peace-time. The debated points were complicated by the principles

they/

they represented. While the British delegation stood for the right of a belligerent to find his enemy where he could and go for him, the Russian wanted to keep out belligerents altogether. Other trouble concerned the status of the Franco-Soviet Pact. From Angora meanwhile came reports of Turkish dissatisfaction with the British Draft Convention. A serious drawback to progress was the absence from the Conference of Germany and Italy. It is understood that the British delegation has been seeking fresh instructions over the past weekend; and this afternoon in the House of Commons Mr. Baldwin stated that, in the opinion of the British Government, there was no reason why the speedy conclusion of a new Straits Convention need be prejudiced in any way by the unilateral and provisional assurances recently given to certain Mediterranean Powers.

(See Embassy's despatches Nos. 2349, July 11, and 2350, July 13, 1936).

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 500.A 15 A 5/810 FOR Despatch #1936

FROM Japan (Grew) DATED July 9, 1936

TO NAME 1—1127 GPO

REGARDING: At the Montreux Conference, Japan was reported to have refused to enter into any agreement concerning the Dardanelles which also involves the League. Japan desires that countries be allowed equal naval tonnage for passage through the Straits in normal times. Japan rejects Turkish proposal relating to use of the Straits by submarines.

767.68119/957 957

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No. 1783 Political

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Geneva, Switzerland, July 24, 1936

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1936 AUG 3 PM 1 26
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS PUBLICATIONS SECTION
AUG 4 1936
Copy of accompanying documents stamped to be ... DCR
DIVISION OF EURO...
AUG 1 1 1936
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUBJECT: Transmission of Text of Montreux Convention concerning the Straits.

DIVISION OF EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
AUG 14 1936
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AUG 4 1936
DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

767.68119/958

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

SIR:

767.68119/951

I have the honor to refer to paragraph 1 of my telegram No. 298 of July 23, 5 p.m. in regard to the Montreux Conference
1/ on the régime of the Straits, and to enclose a copy in French of the Convention which was signed on July 20 at Montreux as
2/ well as a corrigendum of this document. The Convention is at present available in Geneva only in French, and the enclosed copy is the only one I have so far been able to procure. The text will presumably shortly be published in English by the British and possibly other governments.

FILED AUG 1 1 1936

Respectfully yours,

Prentiss B. Gilbert

Prentiss B. Gilbert,
American Consul.

Enclosures:

No. 1 - Copy of Straits Convention (French text)
No. 2 - Corrigendum to above.

Original and five copies to the Department of State
One copy to the American Legation, Bern

EPL/IS

Enclosure No 1
with No 1783 Pol
July 24, 1936

CONVENTION

CONCERNANT

LE RÉGIME DES DÉTROITS

SIGNÉE A MONTREUX

LE VINGT JUILLET 1936

LAUSANNE

IMPRIMERIES RÉUNIES S. A.

1936

761.68119/358

CONVENTION
CONCERNANT LE RÉGIME DES DÉTROITS, SIGNÉE A MONTREUX, LE VINGT JUILLET 1936

SA MAJESTÉ LE ROI DES BULGARES, LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE, SA MAJESTÉ LE ROI DE GRANDE-BRETAGNE, D'IRLANDE ET DES TERRITOIRES BRITANNIQUES AU DELÀ DES MERS, EMPEREUR DES INDES, SA MAJESTÉ LE ROI DES HELLÈNES, SA MAJESTÉ L'EMPEREUR DU JAPON, SA MAJESTÉ LE ROI DE ROUMANIE, LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE TURQUE, LE COMITÉ CENTRAL EXÉCUTIF DE L'UNION DES RÉPUBLIQUES SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES, ET SA MAJESTÉ LE ROI DE YOUGOSLAVIE ;

Animés du désir de régler le passage et la navigation dans le détroit des Dardanelles, la Mer de Marmara et le Bosphore, compris sous la dénomination générale de « Détroits », de manière à sauvegarder, dans le cadre de la sécurité de la Turquie et de la sécurité, dans la Mer Noire, des Etats riverains, le principe consacré par l'article 23 du Traité de paix signé à Lausanne le 24 juillet 1923 ;

Ont résolu de substituer la présente Convention à la Convention signée à Lausanne le 24 juillet 1923 et ont désigné pour leurs Plénipotentiaires, savoir :

SA MAJESTÉ LE ROI DES BULGARES :

M. le Docteur Nicolas P. NICOLAEV, Ministre plénipotentiaire, Secrétaire général du Ministère des Affaires étrangères et des Cultes ;

M. Pierre NEÏCOV, Ministre plénipotentiaire, Directeur des Affaires politiques au Ministère des Affaires étrangères et des Cultes.

LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE :

M. PAUL-BONCOUR, Sénateur, Délégué permanent de la France à la Société des Nations, Chevalier de la Légion d'Honneur ;

M. Henri PONSOT, Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire de la République française à Ankara, Grand Officier de la Légion d'Honneur.

SA MAJESTÉ LE ROI DE GRANDE BRETAGNE, D'IRLANDE ET DES TERRITOIRES BRITANNIQUES AU DELA DES MERS, EMPEREUR DES INDES :

POUR LA GRANDE BRETAGNE ET L'IRLANDE DU NORD ET TOUTES LES PARTIES DE L'EMPIRE BRITANNIQUE QUI NE SONT PAS INDIVIDUELLEMENT MEMBRES DE LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS :

Le Très Honorable Lord STANLEY, M.C., M.P., Secrétaire parlementaire à Son Amirauté ;

POUR LE COMMONWEALTH D'AUSTRALIE :

Le Très Honorable Stanley Melbourne BRUCE, C.H., M.C., Haut-Commissaire du Commonwealth d'Australie à Londres ;

SA MAJESTÉ LE ROI DES HELLÈNES :

M. Nicolas POLITIS, Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire de Grèce à Paris, ancien Ministre des Affaires étrangères ;

SA MAJESTÉ L'EMPEREUR DU JAPON :

M. Naotake SATO, Jusammi, Grand-Cordon de l'Ordre du Soleil-Levant, Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire à Paris ;

M. Masa-aki HOTTA, Jushii, Deuxième Classe de l'Ordre du Soleil-Levant, Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire à Berne ;

SA MAJESTÉ LE ROI DE ROUMANIE :

M. Nicolas TITULESCO, Ministre Secrétaire d'Etat au Département des Affaires étrangères ;

M. Constantin CONTZESCO, Ministre plénipotentiaire, Délégué de la Roumanie aux Commissions européenne et internationale du Danube ;

M. Vespasien PELLA, Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire à La Haye ;

LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE TURQUE :

M. RÜSTÜ ARAS, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, député d'Izmir ;

M. Suad DAVAS, Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire de la République turque à Paris ;

M. Numan MENEMENCIOGLU, Ambassadeur de Turquie, Secrétaire général du Ministère des Affaires étrangères ;

M. Asim GUNDUZ, Général de Corps d'Armée, Sous-Chef de l'Etat-Major général ;

M. Necmeddin SADAK, Délégué permanent de Turquie auprès de la Société des Nations, Député de Sivas ;

LE COMITÉ CENTRAL EXÉCUTIF DE L'UNION DES RÉPUBLIQUES SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES :

M. Maxime LITVINOFF, Membre du Comité Central Exécutif de l'Union des Républiques soviétiques socialistes, Commissaire du Peuple aux Affaires étrangères.

SA MAJESTÉ LE ROI DE YOUGOSLAVIE :

M. le Docteur Ivan SOUBBOTITCH, Délégué permanent du Royaume de Yougoslavie près la Société des Nations.

Lesquels, après avoir exhibé leurs pleins pouvoirs, reconnus en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes :

Article premier.

Les Hautes Parties contractantes reconnaissent et affirment le principe de la liberté de passage et de navigation par mer dans les Détroits.

L'usage de ladite liberté est dorénavant réglé par les dispositions de la présente convention.

Section I.

NAVIRES DE COMMERCE

Article 2.

En temps de paix, les navires de commerce jouiront de la complète liberté de passage et de navigation dans les Détroits, de jour et de nuit, quels que soient le pavillon et le chargement, sans aucune formalité, sous réserve des dispositions de l'article 3 ci-après. Aucune taxe ou charge autre que celles dont la perception est prévue par l'annexe I à la présente convention ne sera prélevée

par les autorités turques sur ces navires lorsqu'ils passeront en transit sans faire escale dans un port des Détroits.

Afin de faciliter la perception de ces taxes ou charges, les navires de commerce qui franchiront les Détroits feront connaître aux agents du poste visé à l'article 3 leurs nom, nationalité, tonnage, destination et provenance.

Le pilotage et le remorquage restent facultatifs.

Article 3.

Tout navire qui pénètre dans les Détroits par la Mer Egée ou par la Mer Noire s'arrêtera à un poste sanitaire près de l'entrée des Détroits aux fins du contrôle sanitaire établi par les règlements turcs dans le cadre des prescriptions sanitaires internationales. Ce contrôle, dans le cas de navires possédant une patente nette de santé ou présentant une déclaration de santé attestant qu'ils ne tombent pas sous le coup des dispositions de l'alinéa 2 du présent article, s'effectuera de jour et de nuit, avec le plus de rapidité possible, et ces navires ne devront être astreints à aucun autre arrêt au cours de leur passage dans les Détroits.

Les navires qui ont à bord des cas de peste, de choléra, de fièvre jaune, de typhus exanthématique ou de variole, ou qui en ont eu moins de sept jours auparavant, ainsi que les navires qui ont quitté un port contaminé depuis moins de cinq fois vingt-quatre heures, s'arrêteront au poste sanitaire indiqué à l'alinéa précédent pour y embarquer les gardes sanitaires que les autorités turques pourraient désigner. Il ne sera, à ce titre, prélevé aucune taxe ou charge et les gardes devront être débarqués à un poste sanitaire à la sortie des Détroits.

Article 4.

En temps de guerre, la Turquie n'étant pas belligérante, les navires de commerce, quels que soient le pavillon et le chargement, jouiront de la liberté de passage et de navigation dans les Détroits dans les conditions prévues aux articles 2 et 3.

Le pilotage et le remorquage restent facultatifs.

Article 5.

En temps de guerre, la Turquie étant belligérante, les navires de commerce n'appartenant pas à un pays en guerre avec la Turquie jouiront de la liberté de passage et de navigation dans les Détroits à condition de n'assister en aucune façon l'ennemi.

Ces navires entreront de jour dans les Détroits et le passage devra s'effectuer par la route qui sera, dans chaque cas, indiquée par les autorités turques.

Article 6.

Au cas où la Turquie s'estimerait menacée d'un danger de guerre imminent, il continuerait néanmoins à être fait application des dispositions de l'article 2 sauf que les navires devraient entrer de jour dans les Détroits et le passage devrait s'effectuer par la route qui serait, dans chaque cas, indiquée par les autorités turques.

Le pilotage pourrait, dans ce cas, être rendu obligatoire, mais sans rétribution.

Article 7.

Le terme « navires de commerce » s'applique à tous les navires qui ne sont pas visés par la Section II de la présente Convention.

Section II.

BATIMENTS DE GUERRE

Article 8.

Aux fins de la présente Convention, la définition applicable aux bâtiments de guerre et à leurs spécifications ainsi qu'au calcul des tonnages est celle qui figure dans l'annexe III à la présente Convention.

Article 9.

Les bâtiments auxiliaires de la marine militaire spécifiquement conçus pour le transport des combustibles, liquides ou non, ne seront pas astreints au préavis et n'entreront pas dans le calcul du tonnage soumis à limitation à condition de traverser les Détroits isolément. Toutefois ils demeureront assimilés aux bâtiments de guerre en ce qui concerne les autres conditions de passage.

Les bâtiments auxiliaires visés au précédent alinéa ne pourront bénéficier de la dérogation envisagée que si leur armement ne comporte pas :

Comme artillerie contre objectifs flottants — plus de deux pièces d'un calibre de 105 mm. au maximum ;

Comme artillerie contre objectifs aériens — plus de deux matériels d'un calibre de 75 mm. au maximum.

Article 10.

En temps de paix, les bâtiments légers de surface, les petits navires de combat et les navires auxiliaires, qu'ils appartiennent à des Puissances riveraines ou non de la Mer Noire, quel que soit leur pavillon, jouiront de la liberté de passage dans les Détroits sans aucune taxe ou charge quelconque, pourvu qu'ils y pénètrent de jour et dans les conditions prévues aux articles 13 et suivants ci-après.

Les bâtiments de guerre autres que ceux rentrant dans les classes visées à l'alinéa précédent n'auront le droit de passage que dans les conditions spéciales prévues aux articles 11 et 12.

Article 11.

Les Puissances riveraines de la Mer Noire sont autorisées à faire passer par les Détroits leurs bâtiments de ligne d'un tonnage supérieur à celui prévu à l'alinéa premier de l'article 14 à la condition que ces bâtiments ne franchissent les Détroits qu'un à un, escortés au plus de deux torpilleurs.

Article 12.

Les Puissances riveraines de la Mer Noire auront le droit de faire passer par les Détroits, en vue de rallier leur base, leurs sous-marins construits ou achetés en dehors de cette mer, si un avis de mise en chantier ou d'achat a été donné en temps utile à la Turquie.

Les sous-marins appartenant auxdites Puissances pourront également traverser les Détroits pour être réparés dans des chantiers situés hors de cette mer à la condition de donner en temps utile à la Turquie des précisions à ce sujet.

Dans l'un et l'autre cas, les sous-marins devront naviguer de jour et en surface et traverser les Détroits isolément.

Article 13.

Pour le passage dans les Détroits des bâtiments de guerre, un préavis devra être donné au Gouvernement turc par la voie diplomatique. La durée normale du préavis sera de huit jours ; mais il est désirable que, pour les Puissances non riveraines de la Mer Noire, elle soit portée à quinze jours. Il sera indiqué dans le préavis la destination, le nom, le type et le nombre des bâtiments ainsi que la date de passage pour l'aller et, s'il y a lieu, pour le retour. Tout changement de date devra faire l'objet d'un préavis de trois jours.

L'entrée dans les Détroits pour le passage d'aller devra avoir lieu dans un délai de cinq jours à partir de la date indiquée dans le préavis initial. Après l'expiration de ce délai, il devra être donné un nouveau préavis, dans les mêmes conditions que pour le préavis initial.

Lors du passage, le commandant de la force navale communiquera, sans avoir à s'arrêter, à une station de signaux à l'entrée des Dardanelles ou du Bosphore, la composition exacte de la force se trouvant sous ses ordres.

Article 14.

Le tonnage global maximum de toutes les forces navales étrangères pouvant se trouver en cours de transit dans les

Détroits ne devra pas dépasser 15.000 tonnes, sauf dans les cas prévus à l'article 11 et à l'annexe IV.

Toutefois, les forces visées à l'alinéa précédent ne devront pas comprendre plus de neuf bâtiments.

Ne seront pas compris dans ce tonnage les bâtiments appartenant à des Puissances riveraines ou non riveraines de la Mer Noire qui, conformément aux dispositions de l'article 17, rendent visite à un port des Détroits.

Ne seront pas davantage compris dans ce tonnage les bâtiments de guerre qui auraient subi une avarie lors de la traversée ; ces bâtiments se soumettront, pendant les réparations, aux dispositions spéciales de sécurité édictées par la Turquie.

Article 15.

Les bâtiments de guerre en transit dans les Détroits ne pourront, en aucun cas, utiliser les aéronefs dont ils seraient éventuellement porteurs.

Article 16.

Les bâtiments de guerre en transit dans les Détroits ne devront, sauf en cas d'avarie ou de fortune de mer, y séjourner au delà du temps nécessaire pour effectuer leur passage.

Article 17.

Les dispositions des articles précédents ne sauraient en aucune manière empêcher une force navale d'un tonnage et d'une composition quelconques de rendre, dans un port des Détroits, sur l'invitation du Gouvernement turc, une visite de courtoisie d'une durée limitée. Cette force devra quitter les Détroits par la même route que celle suivie pour l'entrée, à moins qu'elle ne soit dans les conditions voulues pour passer en transit dans les Détroits, conformément aux dispositions des articles 10, 14 et 18.

Article 18.

Le tonnage global que les Puissances non riveraines de la Mer Noire peuvent avoir dans cette mer en temps de paix est limité de la façon suivante :

a) Sauf dans le cas prévu au paragraphe *b)* du présent article, le tonnage global desdites Puissances n'excédera pas un total de 30.000 tonnes ;

b) Au cas où, à un moment quelconque, le tonnage de la flotte la plus forte de la Mer Noire viendrait à dépasser d'au moins 10.000 tonnes celui de la flotte la plus forte en cette mer à la date de la signature de la présente Convention, le tonnage global de 30.000 tonnes mentionné au paragraphe *a)* sera majoré d'autant, jusqu'à concurrence d'un maximum de 45.000 tonnes. A cette fin, chaque Puissance riveraine communiquera, conformément à l'annexe II, au Gouvernement turc, le 1er janvier et le 1er juillet de chaque année, le tonnage global de sa flotte en Mer Noire, et le Gouvernement turc transmettra cette information aux autres Hautes Parties contractantes ainsi qu'au Secrétaire général de la Société des Nations ;

c) Le tonnage que l'une quelconque des Puissances non riveraines aura la faculté d'avoir en Mer Noire sera limité aux deux tiers du tonnage global visé aux paragraphes *a)* et *b)* ci-dessus ;

d) Toutefois, au cas où une ou plusieurs Puissances non riveraines de la Mer Noire désireraient y envoyer, dans un but humanitaire, des forces navales, ces forces, dont l'ensemble ne devra en aucune hypothèse excéder 8.000 tonnes, seront admises à pénétrer dans la Mer Noire, sans le préavis prévu à l'article 13 de la présente Convention, moyennant une autorisation obtenue du Gouvernement turc dans les conditions suivantes : si le tonnage global visé aux paragraphes *a)* et *b)* ci-dessus n'est pas atteint et ne doit pas être dépassé par les forces dont l'envoi est demandé, le Gouvernement turc accordera ladite autorisation dans le plus bref délai après la réception de la demande dont il aura été saisi ; si ledit tonnage global se trouve être déjà utilisé ou s'il devait

être dépassé par les forces dont l'envoi est demandé, le Gouvernement turc donnera immédiatement connaissance de la demande d'autorisation aux autres Puissances riveraines de la Mer Noire et si ces Puissances, vingt-quatre heures après en avoir été informées, n'y font pas d'objection, il fera savoir aux Puissances intéressées, au plus tard dans un délai utile de quarante-huit heures, la suite qu'il aura décidé de donner à leur demande.

Toute entrée ultérieure en Mer Noire de forces navales des Puissances non riveraines ne s'effectuera que dans les limites disponibles du tonnage global visé aux paragraphes *a)* et *b)* ci-dessus ;

e) Quel que soit l'objet de leur présence en Mer Noire, les bâtiments de guerre des Puissances non riveraines ne pourront pas y rester plus de vingt et un jours ;

Article 19.

En temps de guerre, la Turquie n'étant pas belligérante, les bâtiments de guerre jouiront d'une complète liberté de passage et de navigation dans les Détroits dans des conditions identiques à celles qui sont stipulées aux articles 10 à 18.

Toutefois il sera interdit aux bâtiments de guerre de toute Puissance belligérante de passer à travers les Détroits, sauf dans les cas rentrant dans l'application de l'article 25 de la présente Convention, ainsi que dans le cas d'assistance prêtée à un Etat victime d'une agression en vertu d'un pacte d'assistance mutuelle engageant la Turquie, conclu dans le cadre du Pacte de la Société des Nations, enregistré et publié conformément aux dispositions de l'article 18 dudit Pacte.

Dans les cas exceptionnels visés ci-dessus, ne seront pas applicables les limitations indiquées dans les articles 10 à 18.

Malgré l'interdiction de passage édictée dans l'alinéa 2 ci-dessus, les bâtiments de guerre des Puissances belligérantes riveraines ou non de la Mer Noire, séparés de leurs ports d'attache, sont autorisés à rallier ces ports.

Il est interdit aux bâtiments de guerre belligérants de procéder à toute capture, d'exercer le droit de visite et de se livrer à un acte hostile quelconque dans les Détroits.

Article 20.

En temps de guerre, la Turquie étant belligérante, les dispositions des articles 10 à 18 ne seront pas applicables ; le passage des bâtiments de guerre est entièrement laissé à la discrétion du Gouvernement turc.

Article 21.

Au cas où la Turquie s'estimerait menacée d'un danger de guerre imminent, elle aurait le droit d'appliquer les dispositions de l'article 20 de la présente Convention.

Les bâtiments de guerre qui, après avoir passé par les Détroits antérieurement à l'usage par la Turquie de la faculté que lui confère l'alinéa précédent, se trouveraient ainsi séparés de leurs ports d'attache, seront autorisés à rallier ces ports. Il est cependant entendu que la Turquie pourra ne pas faire bénéficier de ce droit les bâtiments de l'Etat dont l'attitude aurait motivé l'application du présent article.

Si le Gouvernement turc fait usage de la faculté que lui confère l'alinéa premier ci-dessus, il adressera une notification à cet effet aux Hautes Parties contractantes ainsi qu'au Secrétaire général de la Société des Nations.

Si le Conseil de la Société des Nations, par une majorité des deux tiers, décide que les mesures ainsi prises par la Turquie ne sont pas justifiées et si tel est également l'avis de la majorité des Hautes Parties contractantes signataires de la présente Convention, le Gouvernement turc s'engage à rapporter les mesures en question ainsi que celles qui auraient été prises en vertu de l'article 6 de la présente Convention.

Article 22.

Les bâtiments de guerre qui ont à bord des cas de peste, de choléra, de fièvre jaune, de typhus exanthématique ou de variole, ou qui en ont eu moins de sept jours auparavant, ainsi que les bâtiments qui ont quitté un port contaminé depuis moins

de cinq fois vingt-quatre heures devront passer les Détroits en quarantaine et appliquer par les moyens du bord les mesures prophylactiques nécessaires pour éviter toute possibilité de contamination des Détroits.

Section III.

AÉRONEFS

Article 23.

En vue d'assurer le passage des aéronefs civils entre la Méditerranée et la Mer Noire, la Turquie indiquera, en dehors des zones interdites des Détroits, les routes aériennes destinées à ce passage ; les aéronefs civils pourront utiliser ces routes en donnant au Gouvernement turc, pour les survols occasionnels, un préavis de trois jours et, pour les survols de services réguliers, un préavis général des dates de passage.

D'autre part, nonobstant la remilitarisation des Détroits, le Gouvernement turc fournira les facilités nécessaires pour le passage en toute sécurité des aéronefs civils, autorisés d'après la réglementation aérienne en vigueur en Turquie à survoler le territoire turc entre l'Europe et l'Asie. Pour les cas où une autorisation de survol aurait été accordée, la route à suivre dans la zone des Détroits sera périodiquement indiquée.

Section IV.

DISPOSITIONS GÉNÉRALES

Article 24.

Les attributions de la Commission internationale constituée en vertu de la Convention concernant le régime des Détroits en date du 24 juillet 1923 sont transférées au Gouvernement turc.

Le Gouvernement turc s'engage à réunir les statistiques et à fournir les renseignements relatifs à l'application des articles 11, 12, 14 et 18.

Le Gouvernement turc doit veiller à l'exécution de toute disposition de la présente Convention ayant trait au passage des bâtiments de guerre dans les Détroits.

Dès qu'il aura été avisé du prochain passage dans les Détroits d'une force navale étrangère, le Gouvernement turc fera connaître aux représentants à Ankara des Hautes Parties contractantes, la composition de cette force, son tonnage, la date prévue pour son entrée dans les Détroits et, s'il y a lieu, la date probable de son retour.

Le Gouvernement turc adressera au Secrétaire général de la Société des Nations ainsi qu'aux Hautes Parties contractantes un rapport annuel indiquant les mouvements des bâtiments de guerre étrangers dans les Détroits et fournissant tous renseignements utiles pour le commerce et la navigation maritime et aérienne envisagée dans la présente Convention.

Article 25.

Aucune disposition de la présente Convention ne porte atteinte aux droits et obligations découlant du Pacte de la Société des Nations pour la Turquie ou pour toute autre Haute Partie contractante.

Article 26.

La présente Convention sera ratifiée dans le plus court délai possible.

Les ratifications seront déposées aux archives du Gouvernement de la République française à Paris.

Le Gouvernement japonais aura la faculté de se borner à faire connaître au Gouvernement de la République française, par son représentant diplomatique à Paris, que la ratification a été donnée et, dans ce cas, il devra transmettre l'instrument aussitôt que faire se pourra.

Un procès-verbal de dépôt sera dressé dès que six instruments

de ratification, y compris celui de la Turquie, auront été déposés. A cette fin, la notification prévue à l'alinéa précédent équivaudra au dépôt de l'instrument de ratification.

La présente Convention entrera en vigueur à la date de ce procès-verbal.

Le Gouvernement français remettra à toutes les Hautes Parties contractantes une copie authentique du procès-verbal visé à l'alinéa précédent et des procès-verbaux de dépôt des ratifications ultérieures.

Article 27.

A partir de son entrée en vigueur, la présente Convention sera ouverte à l'adhésion de toute Puissance signataire du Traité de Paix de Lausanne du 24 juillet 1923.

Toute adhésion sera signifiée par la voie diplomatique au Gouvernement de la République française et, par celui-ci, à toutes les Hautes Parties contractantes.

Elle portera effet à dater du jour de la signification au Gouvernement français.

Article 28.

La présente Convention aura une durée de vingt ans à dater de son entrée en vigueur.

Toutefois, le principe de la liberté de passage et de navigation affirmé à l'article premier de la présente Convention aura une durée illimitée.

Si, deux ans avant l'expiration de ladite période de vingt ans, aucune Haute Partie contractante n'a donné un préavis de dénonciation au Gouvernement français, la présente Convention demeurera en vigueur jusqu'à ce que deux années se soient écoulées après l'envoi d'un préavis de dénonciation. Ce préavis sera notifié par le Gouvernement français aux Hautes Parties contractantes.

Si la présente Convention venait à être dénoncée conformément aux dispositions du présent article, les Hautes Parties

contractantes conviennent de se faire représenter à une conférence en vue d'arrêter les termes d'une nouvelle convention.

Article 29.

A l'expiration de chaque période quinquennale à compter de la mise en vigueur de la présente Convention, chacune des Hautes Parties contractantes pourra prendre l'initiative de proposer des amendements à une ou plusieurs dispositions de la présente Convention.

Pour être valable, la demande de revision formulée par une des Hautes Parties contractantes doit être appuyée, s'il s'agit de modifications à l'article 14, à l'article 18 ou à l'annexe I, par une autre Haute Partie contractante et, s'il s'agit de modifications à tout autre article, par deux autres Hautes Parties contractantes.

La demande de revision ainsi appuyée devra être notifiée à toutes les Hautes Parties contractantes trois mois avant l'expiration de la période quinquennale en cours. Ce préavis contiendra l'indication des amendements désirés ainsi que les motifs de ces propositions.

S'il est impossible d'aboutir sur cette proposition par la voie diplomatique, les Hautes Parties contractantes se feront représenter à une conférence convoquée à cet effet.

Cette conférence ne pourra statuer qu'à l'unanimité, à l'exception des cas de revision relatifs à l'article 14, à l'article 18 et à l'annexe I, pour lesquels il suffira d'une majorité des trois quarts des Hautes Parties contractantes.

Textes alternatifs

1. Cette majorité sera calculée, dans les cas de l'article 14 et de l'annexe I, en y comprenant la voix de la Turquie et, dans le cas de l'article 18, en y comprenant les trois quarts des Hautes Parties contractantes riveraines de la Mer Noire, y compris la Turquie.

2. Cette majorité sera calculée en y comprenant les trois quarts des Hautes Parties contractantes riveraines de la Mer Noire, y compris la Turquie.

EN FOI DE QUOI, les Plénipotentiaires susnommés ont signé la présente Convention.

FAIT à Montreux, le vingt juillet mil neuf cent trente-six, en onze exemplaires, dont le premier, revêtu des sceaux des Plénipotentiaires, sera déposé dans les archives du Gouvernement de la République française et dont les autres ont été remis un à chacune des Puissances signataires.

ANNEXE I

1. Les taxes et charges qui peuvent être prélevées conformément à l'article 2 de la présente Convention seront celles qui sont indiquées dans le tableau ci-après. Les réductions éventuelles que le Gouvernement turc déciderait de ces taxes et charges seront appliquées à tous les pavillons.

Nature du service rendu	Montant de la taxe ou de la charge à percevoir sur chaque tonne de jauge nette *Francs français (or)*
a) Contrôle sanitaire	0,075
b) Phares, bouées lumineuses et bouées de chenaux et autres :	
Jusqu'à 800 tonnes	0,42
Au-dessus de 800 tonnes	0,21
c) Service de sauvetage, y compris les canots de sauvetage, les postes de fusées porte-amarres, les sirènes de brume, les radiophares, ainsi que les bouées lumineuses non comprises sous *b)*, ou autres installations du même genre	0,10

Note. — 100 piastres équivalent à environ 2 francs 50 centimes or.

2. Les taxes et charges définies au tableau annexé au paragraphe premier de la présente annexe s'appliqueront à une double traversée des Détroits (c'est-à-dire à un passage de la Mer Egée à la Mer Noire et au voyage de retour vers la Mer Egée ou bien à une traversée des Détroits de la Mer Noire à la Mer Egée suivie du retour en Mer Noire) ; toutefois, si un navire de commerce franchit à nouveau les Détroits en vue de retourner en Mer Egée ou en Mer Noire, selon le cas, plus de six mois après la date d'entrée dans les Détroits pour le voyage

d'aller, le navire pourra être appelé, sans distinction de pavillon, à acquitter une seconde fois ces taxes et charges.

3. Si, à la traversée d'aller, un navire de commerce déclare ne pas devoir revenir, il n'aura à acquitter, quant aux taxes et charges visées aux alinéas *b)* et *c)* du paragraphe premier de la présente annexe, que la moitié du tarif.

4. Les taxes et charges définies au tableau annexé au paragraphe premier de la présente annexe et qui ne seront pas plus élevées qu'il n'est indispensable pour couvrir les frais occasionnés par les services en question et pour conserver un fonds de réserve ou un fonds de roulement raisonnable ne seront augmentées ou complétées que par application des dispositions de l'article 29 de la présente Convention. Elles seront acquittées en francs français (or) ou en monnaie turque d'après le cours des changes pratiqué à la date du paiement.

5. Les navires de commerce pourront être tenus d'acquitter des taxes et des charges pour les services facultatifs tels que le pilotage et le remorquage lorsqu'un tel service aura été dûment rendu par les autorités turques à la demande de l'agent ou du capitaine du navire en question. Le Gouvernement turc publiera de temps à autre, le tarif des taxes et charges qui seront perçues au titre de ces services facultatifs.

6. Ces tarifs ne seront pas augmentés dans les cas où lesdits services seront rendus obligatoires par application de l'article 5.

ANNEXE II

1. Les classes et sous-classes de bâtiments à comprendre dans le calcul du tonnage global des flottes des Puissances riveraines de la Mer Noire, visé à l'article 18 de la présente Convention sont les suivantes :

Bâtiments de ligne :

sous-classe *(a)*
sous-classe *(b)*

Bâtiments porte-aéronefs :

sous-classe *(a)*
sous-classe *(b)*

Bâtiments légers de surface :

sous-classe *(a)*
sous-classe *(b)*
sous-classe *(c)*

Sous-marins

suivant les définitions de l'annexe III à la présente Convention.

Le déplacement dont il doit être tenu compte dans le calcul du tonnage global est le déplacement type, tel qu'il est défini à l'annexe III. Ne seront pris en considération que les bâtiments qui ne sont pas « hors d'âge », tels qu'ils sont définis à ladite annexe.

2. La communication prévue à l'article 18, alinéa *b)*, doit comprendre en outre le tonnage global des bâtiments des classes et sous-classes mentionnées au paragraphe premier de la présente annexe.

ANNEXE III[1]

A. Déplacement type.

1. Le déplacement type d'un bâtiment de surface est le déplacement du bâtiment achevé, avec son équipage complet, ses machines et chaudières, prêt à prendre la mer, ayant tout son armement et toutes ses munitions, ses installations, équipements, vivres, eau douce pour l'équipage, approvisionnements divers, outillages et rechanges de toute nature qu'il doit emporter en temps de guerre, mais sans combustible et sans eau de réserve pour l'alimentation des machines et chaudières.

2. Le déplacement type d'un sous-marin est le déplacement en surface du bâtiment achevé (non compris l'eau des compartiments non étanches), avec son équipage complet, son appareil moteur, prêt à prendre la mer, ayant tout son armement et toutes ses munitions, ses intallations, équipements, vivres pour l'équipage, outillages divers et rechanges de toute nature qu'il doit emporter en temps de guerre, mais sans combustible, huile lubrifiante, eau douce ou eau de ballast de toute sorte.

3. Le mot « tonne », sauf dans l'expression « tonnes métriques », désigne une tonne de 1.016 kilogrammes (2.240 lbs.).

B. Classes.

1. Les *bâtiments de ligne* sont des bâtiments de guerre de surface appartenant à l'une des deux sous-classes suivantes :

a) bâtiments de guerre de surface, autres que les bâtiments porte-aéronefs, les bâtiments auxiliaires ou les bâtiments de ligne de la sous-classe *b)*, dont le déplacement type est supérieur à 10.000 tonnes (10.160 tonnes métriques) ou qui portent un canon d'un calibre supérieur à 203 millimètres (8 pouces) ;

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[1] Les textes de la présente annexe ont été empruntés au Traité naval de Londres du 25 mars 1936.

b) bâtiments de guerre de surface, autres que les bâtiments porte-aéronefs, dont le déplacement type n'est pas supérieur à 8.000 tonnes (8.128 tonnes métriques) et qui portent un canon d'un calibre supérieur à 203 millimètres (8 pouces).

2. Les *bâtiments porte-aéronefs* sont des bâtiments de guerre de surface qui, quel que soit leur déplacement, sont conçus ou aménagés principalement pour transporter et mettre en action des aéronefs en mer. Si un bâtiment de guerre n'a pas été conçu ou aménagé principalement pour transporter et mettre en action des aéronefs en mer, l'installation sur ce bâtiment d'un pont d'atterrissage ou d'envol n'aura pas pour effet de le faire entrer dans la classe des bâtiments porte-aéronefs.

La classe des bâtiments porte-aéronefs se subdivise en deux sous-classes, à savoir :

a) bâtiments pourvus d'un pont tel que les aéronefs puissent y prendre leur vol ou s'y poser ;

b) bâtiments non pourvus du pont décrit au paragraphe *a)* ci-dessus.

3. Les *bâtiments légers de surface* sont des bâtiments de guerre de surface, autres que les bâtiments porte-aéronefs, les petits navires de combat ou les bâtiments auxiliaires, dont le déplacement type est supérieur à 100 tonnes (102 tonnes métriques), sans dépasser 10.000 tonnes (10.160 tonnes métriques), et qui ne portent pas de canon d'un calibre supérieur à 203 millimètres (8 pouces).

La classe des bâtiments légers de surface se subdivise en trois sous-classes, à savoir :

a) bâtiments portant un canon d'un calibre supérieur à 155 millimètres (6,1 pouces) ;

b) bâtiments qui ne portent pas de canon d'un calibre supérieur à 155 millimètres (6,1 pouces), et dont le déplacement type est supérieur à 3.000 tonnes (3.048 tonnes métriques) ;

c) bâtiments qui ne portent pas de canon d'un calibre supérieur à 155 millimètres (6,1 pouces), et dont le déplace-

ment type n'est pas supérieur à 3.000 tonnes (3.048 tonnes métriques).

4. Les *sous-marins* sont tous les bâtiments conçus pour naviguer au-dessous de la surface de la mer.

5. Les *petits navires de combat* sont des bâtiments de guerre de surface, autres que les bâtiments auxiliaires, dont le déplacement type est supérieur à 100 tonnes (102 tonnes métriques), sans dépasser 2.000 tonnes (2.032 tonnes métriques), et qui n'ont aucune des caractéristiques suivantes :

a) être armés d'un canon d'un calibre supérieur à 155 millimètres (6,1 pouces) ;

b) être conçus ou équipés pour lancer des torpilles ;

c) être conçus pour atteindre une vitesse supérieure à vingt nœuds.

6. Les *bâtiments auxiliaires* sont des bâtiments de surface fais ant partie de la flotte militaire, dont le déplacement type est supérieur à 100 tonnes (102 tonnes métriques), qui sont normalement utilisés pour le service de la flotte, ou comme transports de troupes, ou pour tout emploi autre que celui de bâtiments combattants, qui ne sont pas spécialement construits pour être des bâtiments combattants, et qui n'ont aucune des caractéristiques suivantes :

a) être armés d'un canon d'un calibre supérieur à 155 millimètres (6,1 pouces) ;

b) être armés de plus de huit canons d'un calibre supérieur à 76 millimètres (3 pouces) ;

c) être conçus ou équipés pour lancer des torpilles ;

d) être conçus pour être protégés par des plaques de blindage ;

e) être conçus pour atteindre une vitesse supérieure à vingt-huit nœuds ;

f) être conçus ou aménagés principalement pour mettre en action des aéronefs en mer ;

g) être équipés de plus de deux appareils à lancer des aéronefs.

C. BATIMENTS HORS D'AGE.

Les bâtiments des classes et sous-classes suivantes seront considérés comme « hors d'âge » lorsque, depuis leur achèvement, se sera écoulé le nombre d'années indiqué ci-dessous :

a) pour un bâtiment de ligne . . . . . 26 ans ;

b) pour un bâtiment porte-aéronefs . . . . . 20 ans ;

c) pour un bâtiment léger de surface des sous-classes *(a)* et *(b)* :

i) s'il a été mis sur cale avant le 1er janvier 1920 . . . . . 16 ans ;

ii) s'il a été mis sur cale après le 31 décembre 1919 . . . . . 20 ans ;

d) pour un bâtiment léger de surface de la sous-classe *(c)* . . . . . 16 ans ;

e) pour un sous-marin . . . . . 13 ans.

ANNEXE IV

Il est convenu que, parmi les trois navires-écoles hors d'âge ci-dessous désignés de la marine japonaise, deux unités seront admises à visiter les ports des Détroits ensemble.

Le tonnage global de ces deux navires sera, dans ce cas, considéré comme équivalent à 15.000 tonnes.

	Date de la mise en chantier	Date de l'entrée en service	Déplacement type (tonnes)	Armement
Asama	1896–10–20	1899–3–18	9,240	200 mm. × 4 150 mm. × 12
Yakumo	1898– 9– 1	1900–6–20	9,010	200 mm. × 4 150 mm. × 12
Iwate	1898–11–11	1901–3–18	9,180	200 mm. × 4 150 mm. × 14

PROTOCOLE.

Au moment de signer la Convention portant la date de ce jour, les plénipotentiaires soussignés sont convenus, au nom de leurs gouvernements respectifs, des dispositions ci-après :

1. La Turquie aura immédiatement le droit de remilitariser la zone des Détroits telle qu'elle est définie dans le préambule de ladite Convention.

2. A partir du 15 août 1936, le Gouvernement turc appliquera provisoirement le régime spécifié dans ladite Convention.

3. Le présent Protocole prendra effet entre les Puissances signataires de la Convention à dater de ce jour.

Enclosure No 2
with No 1783/30/M
July 24, 1936

C.M. 39

Montreux, le 18 juillet 1936.

CONFERENCE DE MONTREUX.

CONVENTION CONCERNANT LE REGIME DES DETROITS

Signée à Montreux, le juillet 1936.

Corrections apportées par le Comité de rédaction

le 18 juillet (matin) au texte imprimé de la Convention.

Page 5.

Après M. Nicolas POLITIS, ajouter :

M. Raoul BIBICA ROSETTI, Délégué permanent de la Grèce auprès de la Société des Nations.

Page 6.

Dernier alinéa du préambule, lire "LESQUELS" (en majuscules)

Page 8.

Article 6. Troisième ligne, mettre une virgule après "de".

Quatrième ligne, lire "entrer de jour dans les Détroits et que..."

Cinquième ligne, lire "par la route indiquée, dans chaque cas, par les autorités turques."

Article 8. Deuxième ligne, ajouter une virgule après "spécifications".

Troisième ligne, lire "annexe II" au lieu de III.

767.68 119/958

Page 9.

Premier alinéa :

Article 9. Troisième ligne, ajouter les mots "visé à l'article 13" après le mot "préavis".

Quatrième ligne, lire " le calcul des tonnages soumis à limitation en vertu des articles 14 et 18, à condition...".

Troisième alinéa :
Supprimer le tiret et le remplacer par une virgule.

Quatrième alinéa : idem

Article 10. Deuxième alinéa : remplacer le mot "rentrant" par les mots "qui entrent".

Article 11. Troisième ligne : lire "tonnage supérieur au tonnage prévu, et mettre une virgule après "14".

Page 10.

Article 12. Deuxième alinéa.
Modifier comme suit les deux dernières lignes : "..à la condition que des précisions à ce sujet soient données en temps utile à la Turquie".

Article 13. Septième ligne, ajouter une virgule après "bâtiments".

Page 11.

Deuxième ligne, lire "annexe III à la présente Convention" au lieu de "IV".

Troisième ligne, supprimer la virgule après "Toutefois".

Article 15. Supprimer le mot "éventuellement."

Article 17. Sixième ligne : supprimer les mots "celle suivie".

Page 12.

Article 18. Au début du premier alinéa, ajouter "1.".

Paragraphe a) : première ligne, remplacer les mots "du présent article," par "ci-après".

deuxième ligne, lire "n'excédera pas 30.000 tonnes".

Paragraphe b) : lire la deuxième phrase comme suit : "A cette fin, chaque Puissance riveraine fera connaître, conformément à l'annexe IV à la présente Convention, au Gouvernement turc, le 1er janvier et le 1er juillet de chaque année, le tonnage total de sa flotte...".

Paragraphe d) : première ligne, supprimer la virgule après "Toutefois".

quatrième ligne, ajouter une virgule après les mots "devra" et "hypothèse".

Page 13.

Deuxième alinéa : remplacer les deux points (:) par un point (.)

remplacer "e)" par "2."

Article 19.

Deuxième alinéa, cinquième ligne : lire "en vertu d'un traité d'assistance".

Troisième alinéa, première ligne : remplacer les mots "ci-dessus" par "à l'alinéa précédent,"

Page 14.

Article 20. Troisième ligne : remplacer "est" par "sera"

Article 21. Deuxième alinéa, quatrième ligne : remplacer "seront autorisés à " par "pourront "

Page 15.

Article 23. Deuxième ligne : remplacer " la Turquie" par "le Gouvernement turc".

Deuxième alinéa, troisième ligne : supprimer la virgule après "civils".

Page 16.

Deuxième alinéa, remplacer "Le Gouvernement turc" par "Il".

Troisième alinéa, quatrième ligne, supprimer la virgule après "contractantes".

Article 26. Ajouter à la fin : "Membre de la Société des Nations".

Ajouter entre les articles 25 et 26 : " SECTION V. Dispositions générales".

Page 17.

Article 28. Deuxième alinéa : supprimer la virgule après "Toutefois".

Page 18.

Article 29. Deuxième alinéa : remplacer "valable" par "recevable".

Troisième ligne, lire :" à l'article 14 ou à l'article 18, par une autre..." (supprimer "ou à l'annexe I")

Troisième alinéa : quatrième ligne, lire : "contiendra l'indication et les motifs des amendements proposés."

Quatrième alinéa : première ligne, lire " sur ces propositions..."

Cinquième alinéa : deuxième ligne, lire " à l'article 14 et à l'article 18, pour lesquels..."

troisième ligne, supprimer "et à l'annexe I".

Supprimer le texte alternatif No 1.

Supprimer le chiffre "2." au début du deuxième paragraphe.

Page 19.

Dernière ligne, remplacer "un à chacune des" par "aux"

Page 21.

Paragraphe 1. Quatrième ligne, supprimer "que le Gouvernement turc déciderait"

Cinquième ligne, lire :" et charges que le Gouvernement turc admettrait seront appliquées sans distinction de pavillon".

Ajouter, après "sur chaque tonne de jauge nette" : "net register tonnage".

Paragraphe b)lire :" Phares, bouées lumineuses et bouées de chenaux ou autres".

Page 23. L'annexe II devient "Annexe IV".

Paragraphe 1. Deuxième ligne, remplacer "global" par "total".

Quatrième ligne, mettre une virgule après "Convention.

Dernière ligne du premier alinéa, lire "suivant les définitions de l'annexe II "

Deuxième alinéa, deuxième ligne : remplacer "global" par "total" .

Troisième ligne : lire "à l'annexe II"

Paragraphe 2. Deuxième ligne, remplacer "global" par "total".

Page 24.

L'annexe III devient "Annexe II".

Page 28.

L'annexe IV devient "Annexe III".

Lire les chiffres du tableau comme suit :

Asama	20 - X - 1896	18 - III - 1899	9,240	IV x 200 mm XII x 150 mm
Yakumo	1 - IX - 1898	20 - VI - 1900	9,010	IV x 200 mm XII x 150 mm
Iwate	11 - XI - 1898	18 - III - 1901	9,180	IV x 200 mm XIV x 150 mm

Protocole.

Premier alinéa, deuxième ligne, lire : "les plénipotentiaires soussignés, engageant leurs gouvernements respectifs, sont convenus des dispositions ci-après :"

Paragraphe 3. Supprimer "entre les Puissances signataires de la Convention".

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

767.68119/959

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TO NAME

REGARDING: British claims that the Montreux Conference is to be hailed as the first successful example of peaceful revision of a post-war treaty is gently scoffed at, the point being made that Turkey would have refortified the Straits in any event.

British claims that the Montreux Conference is to be hailed as the first successful example of peaceful revision of a post-war treaty is gently scoffed at, the point being made that Turkey would have refortified the Straits in any event, and that the final results of the Conference furnish small cause for rejoicing in that they represent a definite Soviet victory.

fp

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
AUG 17 1936
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

London, July 28, 1936.

No. 2387

SUBJECT: Montreux Convention.

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The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a British White Paper entitled TURKEY NO. 1 (1936) CONVENTION regarding the RÉGIME OF THE STRAITS WITH CORRESPONDENCE RELATING THERETO, MONTREUX, JULY 20, 1936.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

Herschel V. Johnson

Herschel V. Johnson
First Secretary of Embassy.

Enclosure:
1. Cmd. 5249.
(in quintuplicate)

HM/WJK

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 2387 of JUL 28 1936
from the Embassy at London, England.

Turkey No. 1 (1936)

CONVENTION

regarding the

RÉGIME OF THE STRAITS

With Correspondence relating thereto

Montreux, July 20, 1936

[The Convention has not been ratified by His Majesty]

Presented by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
to Parliament by Command of His Majesty

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

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Convention concernant le Régime des Détroits.

Montreux, le vingt juillet 1936.

Sa Majesté le Roi des Bulgares, le Président de la République française, Sa Majesté le Roi de Grande-Bretagne, d'Irlande et des Territoires britanniques au delà des mers, Empereur des Indes, Sa Majesté le Roi des Hellènes, Sa Majesté l'Empereur du Japon, Sa Majesté le Roi de Roumanie, le Président de la République turque, le Comité central exécutif de l'Union des Républiques soviétiques socialistes et Sa Majesté le Roi de Yougoslavie;

Animés du désir de régler le passage et la navigation dans le détroit des Dardanelles, la Mer de Marmara et le Bosphore, compris sous la dénomination générale de "Détroits," de manière à sauvegarder, dans le cadre de la sécurité de la Turquie et de la sécurité, dans la Mer Noire, des États riverains, le principe consacré par l'article 23 du Traité de Paix signé à Lausanne, le 24 juillet 1923;

Ont résolu de substituer la présente Convention à la Convention signée à Lausanne le 24 juillet 1923 et ont désigné pour leurs plénipotentiaires, savoir:

Sa Majesté le Roi des Bulgares:

M. le Docteur Nicolas P. Nicolaev, Ministre plénipotentiaire, Secrétaire général du Ministère des Affaires étrangères et des Cultes;

M. Pierre Neïcov, Ministre plénipotentiaire, Directeur des Affaires politiques au Ministère des Affaires étrangères et des Cultes.

Le Président de la République française:

M. Paul-Boncour, Sénateur, Délégué permanent de la France à la Société des Nations, ancien Président du Conseil, ancien Ministre des Affaires étrangères, Chevalier de la Légion d'Honneur, Croix de Guerre;

M. Henri Ponsot, Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire de la République française à Ankara, Grand Officier de la Légion d'Honneur.

Sa Majesté le Roi de Grande-Bretagne, d'Irlande et des Territoires britanniques au delà des mers, Empereur des Indes:

Pour la Grande-Bretagne et l'Irlande du Nord et toutes les parties de l'Empire britannique qui ne sont pas individuellement Membres de la Société des Nations:

Le Très Honorable Lord Stanley, P.C., M.C., M.P., Secrétaire parlementaire à Son Amirauté;

TRANSLATION.

CONVENTION REGARDING THE RÉGIME OF THE STRAITS, SIGNED AT MONTREUX JULY 20, 1936.

HIS Majesty the King of the Bulgarians, the President of the French Republic, His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, His Majesty the King of the Hellenes, His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, His Majesty the King of Roumania, the President of the Turkish Republic, the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and His Majesty the King of Yugoslavia;

Desiring to regulate transit and navigation in the Straits of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus comprised under the general term "Straits" in such manner as to safeguard, within the framework of Turkish security and of the security, in the Black Sea, of the riparian States, the principle enshrined in article 23 of the Treaty of Peace signed at Lausanne on the 24th July, 1923;

Have resolved to replace by the present Convention the Convention signed at Lausanne on the 24th July, 1923,(1) and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

His Majesty the King of the Bulgarians:

Dr. Nicolas P. Nicolaev, Minister Plenipotentiary, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of Cults;

M. Pierre Neïcov, Minister Plenipotentiary, Director of Political Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of Cults.

The President of the French Republic:

M. Paul-Boncour, Senator, Permanent Delegate of France to the League of Nations, former President of the Council, former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Chevalier of the Legion of Honour, Croix de Guerre;

M. Henri Ponsot, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the French Republic at Angora, Grand Officer of the Legion of Honour.

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India:

For Great Britain and Northern Ireland and all parts of the British Empire which are not Separate Members of the League of Nations:

The Right Honourable Lord Stanley, P.C., M.C., M.P., Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty;

(1) "Treaty Series No. 16 (1923)," Cmd. 1929, p. 109.

Pour le Commonwealth d'Australie :

Le Très Honorable Stanley Melbourne Bruce, C.H., M.C., Haut-Commissaire du Commonwealth d'Australie à Londres ;

Sa Majesté le Roi des Hellènes :

M. Nicolas Politis, Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire de Grèce à Paris, ancien Ministre des Affaires étrangères ;

M. Raoul Bibica Rosetti, Délégué permanent de la Grèce auprès de la Société des Nations ;

Sa Majesté l'Empereur du Japon :

M. Naotake Sato, Jusammi, Grand-Cordon de l'Ordre du Soleil-Levant, Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire à Paris ;

M. Masa-aki Hotta, Jushii, Deuxième Classe de l'Ordre du Soleil-Levant, Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire à Berne ;

Sa Majesté le Roi de Roumanie :

M. Nicolas Titulesco, Ministre Secrétaire d'État au Département des Affaires étrangères ;

M. Constantin Contzesco, Ministre plénipotentiaire, Délégué de la Roumanie aux Commissions européenne et internationale du Danube ;

M. Vespasien Pella, Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire à La Haye ;

Le Président de la République turque :

M. le Docteur Rüştü Aras, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, Député d'Izmir ;

M. Suad Davas, Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire de la République turque à Paris ;

M. Numan Menemencioglu, Ambassadeur de Turquie, Secrétaire général du Ministère des Affaires étrangères ;

M. Asim Gündüz, Général de Corps d'Armée, Sous-Chef de l'État-Major général ;

M. Necmeddin Sadak, Délégué permanent de Turquie auprès de la Société des Nations, Député de Sivas, Rapporteur à la Commission des Affaires étrangères ;

Le Comité central exécutif de l'Union des Républiques soviétiques socialistes :

M. Maxime Litvinoff, Membre du Comité central exécutif de l'Union des Républiques soviétiques socialistes, Commissaire du Peuple aux Affaires étrangères ;

For the Commonwealth of Australia :

The Right Honourable Stanley Melbourne Bruce, C.H., M.C., High Commissioner for the Commonwealth of Australia in London;

His Majesty the King of the Hellenes :

M. Nicolas Politis, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Greece in Paris, former Minister for Foreign Affairs;

M. Raoul Bibica Rosetti, Permanent Delegate of Greece to the League of Nations;

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan :

M. Naotake Sato, Jusammi, Grand-Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in Paris;

M. Massa-aki Hotta, Jushii, Second Class of the Order of the Rising Sun, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Berne;

His Majesty the King of Roumania :

M. Nicolas Titulesco, Minister Secretary of State for the Department of Foreign Affairs;

M. Constantin Contzesco, Minister Plenipotentiary, Delegate of Roumania to the European and International Commissions of the Danube;

M. Vespasien Pella, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at The Hague;

The President of the Turkish Republic :

Dr. Rüştü Aras, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Deputy for Smyrna;

M. Suad Davaz, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Turkish Republic in Paris;

M. Numan Menemençioğlu, Ambassador of Turkey, Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs;

M. Asim Gündüz, General Commanding an Army Corps, Deputy Chief of the General Staff;

M. Necmeddin Sadak, Permanent Delegate of Turkey to the League of Nations, Deputy for Sivas, *Rapporteur* for the Committee of Foreign Affairs;

The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics :

M. Maxime Litvinoff, Member of the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs;

Sa Majesté le Roi de Yougoslavie :

M. Ivan Soubbotitch, Délégué permanent du Royaume de Yougoslavie près la Société des Nations;

Lesquels, après avoir exhibé leurs pleins pouvoirs, reconnus en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes :

Article 1er.

Les Hautes Parties contractantes reconnaissent et affirment le principe de la liberté de passage et de navigation par mer dans les Détroits.

L'usage de ladite liberté est dorénavant réglé par les dispositions de la présente Convention.

Section I.—*Navires de Commerce.*

Article 2.

En temps de paix, les navires de commerce jouiront de la complète liberté de passage et de navigation dans les Détroits, de jour et de nuit, quels que soient le pavillon et le chargement, sans aucune formalité, sous réserve des dispositions de l'article 3 ci-après. Aucune taxe ou charge autres que celles dont la perception est prévue par l'annexe 1 à la présente Convention ne sera prélevée par les autorités turques sur ces navires lorsqu'ils passeront en transit sans faire escale dans un port des Détroits.

Afin de faciliter la perception de ces taxes ou charges, les navires de commerce qui franchiront les Détroits feront connaître aux agents du poste visé à l'article 3 leurs nom, nationalité, tonnage, destination et provenance.

Le pilotage et le remorquage restent facultatifs.

Article 3.

Tout navire qui pénètre dans les Détroits par la Mer Égée ou par la Mer Noire s'arrêtera à un poste sanitaire près de l'entrée des Détroits aux fins du contrôle sanitaire établi par les règlements turcs dans le cadre des prescriptions sanitaires internationales. Ce contrôle, dans le cas de navires possédant une patente nette de santé ou présentant une déclaration de santé attestant qu'ils ne tombent pas sous le coup des dispositions d'alinéa 2 du présent article, s'effectuera de jour et de nuit, avec le plus de rapidité possible, et ces navires ne devront être astreints à aucun autre arrêt au cours de leur passage dans les Détroits.

Les navires qui ont à bord des cas de peste, de choléra, de fièvre jaune, de typhus exanthématique ou de variole, ou qui en ont eu moins de sept jours auparavant, ainsi que les navires qui ont quitté un port contaminé depuis moins de cinq fois vingt-quatre heures,

His Majesty the King of Yugoslavia :

M. Ivan Soubbotitch, Permanent Delegate of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia to the League of Nations;

Who, after having exhibited their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following provisions :—

Article 1.

The High Contracting Parties recognise and affirm the principle of freedom of transit and navigation by sea in the Straits.

The exercise of this freedom shall henceforth be regulated by the provisions of the present Convention.

Section I.—*Merchant Vessels.*

Article 2.

In time of peace, merchant vessels shall enjoy complete freedom of transit and navigation in the Straits, by day and by night, under any flag and with any kind of cargo, without any formalities, except as provided in article 3 below. No taxes or charges other than those authorised by Annex I to the present Convention shall be levied by the Turkish authorities on these vessels when passing in transit without calling at a port in the Straits.

In order to facilitate the collection of these taxes or charges merchant vessels passing through the Straits shall communicate to the officials at the stations referred to in article 3 their name, nationality, tonnage, destination and last port of call (provenance).

Pilotage and towage remain optional.

Article 3.

All ships entering the Straits by the Ægean Sea or by the Black Sea shall stop at a sanitary station near the entrance to the Straits for the purposes of the sanitary control prescribed by Turkish law within the framework of international sanitary regulations. This control, in the case of ships possessing a clean bill of health or presenting a declaration of health testifying that they do not fall within the scope of the provisions of the second paragraph of the present article, shall be carried out by day and by night with all possible speed, and the vessels in question shall not be required to make any other stop during their passage through the Straits.

Vessels which have on board cases of plague, cholera, yellow fever, exanthematic typhus or smallpox, or which have had such cases on board during the previous seven days, and vessels which have left an infected port within less than five times twenty-four hours shall stop

s'arrêteront au poste sanitaire indiqué à l'alinéa précédent pour y embarquer les gardes sanitaires que les autorités turques pourraient désigner. Il ne sera à ce titre prélevé aucune taxe ou charge et les gardes devront être débarqués à un poste sanitaire à la sortie des Détroits.

ARTICLE 4.

En temps de guerre, la Turquie n'étant pas belligérante, les navires de commerce, quels que soient le pavillon et le chargement, jouiront de la liberté de passage et de navigation dans les Détroits dans les conditions prévues aux articles 2 et 3.

Le pilotage et le remorquage restent facultatifs.

ARTICLE 5.

En temps de guerre, la Turquie étant belligérante, les navires de commerce n'appartenant pas à un pays en guerre avec la Turquie jouiront de la liberté de passage et de navigation dans les Détroits à condition de n'assister en aucune façon l'ennemi.

Ces navires entreront de jour dans les Détroits et le passage devra s'effectuer par la route qui sera, dans chaque cas, indiquée par les autorités turques.

ARTICLE 6.

Au cas où la Turquie s'estimerait menacée d'un danger de guerre imminent, il continuerait néanmoins à être fait application des dispositions de l'article 2, sauf que les navires devraient entrer de jour dans les Détroits et que le passage devrait s'effectuer par la route indiquée, dans chaque cas, par les autorités turques.

Le pilotage pourrait, dans ce cas, être rendu obligatoire, mais sans rétribution.

ARTICLE 7.

Le terme "navires de commerce" s'applique à tous les navires qui ne sont pas visés par la Section II de la présente Convention.

Section II.—*Bâtiments de Guerre.*

ARTICLE 8.

Aux fins de la présente Convention, la définition applicable aux bâtiments de guerre et à leurs spécifications, ainsi qu'au calcul des tonnages est celle qui figure dans l'annexe II à la présente Convention.

ARTICLE 9.

Les bâtiments auxiliaires de la marine militaire spécifiquement conçus pour le transport des combustibles, liquides ou non, ne seront pas astreints au préavis visé à l'article 13 et n'entreront pas dans le calcul des tonnages soumis à limitation en vertu des articles 14 et 18,

at the sanitary stations indicated in the preceding paragraph in order to embark such sanitary guards as the Turkish authorities may direct. No tax or charge shall be levied in respect of these sanitary guards and they shall be disembarked at a sanitary station on departure from the Straits.

ARTICLE 4.

In time of war, Turkey not being belligerent, merchant vessels, under any flag or with any kind of cargo, shall enjoy freedom of transit and navigation in the Straits subject to the provisions of articles 2 and 3.

Pilotage and towage remain optional.

ARTICLE 5.

In time of war, Turkey being belligerent, merchant vessels not belonging to a country at war with Turkey shall enjoy freedom of transit and navigation in the Straits on condition that they do not in any way assist the enemy.

Such vessels shall enter the Straits by day and their transit shall be effected by the route which shall in each case be indicated by the Turkish authorities.

ARTICLE 6.

Should Turkey consider herself to be threatened with imminent danger of war, the provisions of article 2 shall nevertheless continue to be applied except that vessels must enter the Straits by day and that their transit must be effected by the route which shall, in each case, be indicated by the Turkish authorities.

Pilotage may, in this case, be made obligatory, but no charge shall be levied.

ARTICLE 7.

The term " merchant vessels " applies to all vessels which are not covered by Section II of the present Convention.

Section II.—*Vessels of War.*

ARTICLE 8.

For the purposes of the present Convention, the definitions of vessels of war and of their specification together with those relating to the calculation of tonnage shall be as set forth in Annex II to the present Convention.

ARTICLE 9.

Naval auxiliary vessels specifically designed for the carriage of fuel, liquid or non-liquid, shall not be subject to the provisions of article 18 regarding notification, nor shall they be counted for the purpose of calculating the tonnage which is subject to limitation

à condition de traverser les Détroits isolément. Toutefois ils demeureront assimilés aux bâtiments de guerre en ce qui concerne les autres conditions de passage.

Les bâtiments auxiliaires visés au précédent alinéa ne pourront bénéficier de la dérogation envisagée que si leur armement ne comporte pas : comme artillerie contre objectifs flottants, plus de deux pièces d'un calibre de 105 mm. au maximum ; comme artillerie contre objectifs aériens, plus de deux matériels d'un calibre de 75 mm. au maximum.

ARTICLE 10.

En temps de paix, les bâtiments légers de surface, les petits navires de combat et les navires auxiliaires, qu'ils appartiennent à des Puissances riveraines ou non de la Mer Noire, quel que soit leur pavillon, jouiront de la liberté de passage dans les Détroits sans aucune taxe ou charge quelconque, pourvu qu'ils y pénètrent de jour et dans les conditions prévues aux articles 13 et suivants ci-après.

Les bâtiments de guerre autres que ceux qui entrent dans les classes visées à l'alinéa précédent n'auront le droit de passage que dans les conditions spéciales prévues aux articles 11 et 12.

ARTICLE 11.

Les Puissances riveraines de la Mer Noire sont autorisées à faire passer par les Détroits leurs bâtiments de ligne d'un tonnage supérieur au tonnage prévu à l'alinéa premier de l'article 14, à la condition que ces bâtiments ne franchissent les Détroits qu'un à un, escortés au plus de deux torpilleurs.

ARTICLE 12.

Les Puissances riveraines de la Mer Noire auront le droit de faire passer par les Détroits, en vue de rallier leur base, leurs sous-marins construits ou achetés en dehors de cette mer, si un avis de mise en chantier ou d'achat a été donné en temps utile à la Turquie.

Les sous-marins appartenant auxdites Puissances pourront également traverser les Détroits pour être réparés dans des chantiers situés hors de cette mer à la condition que des précisions à ce sujet soient données à la Turquie.

Dans l'un et l'autre cas, les sous-marins devront naviguer de jour et en surface et traverser les Détroits isolément.

ARTICLE 13.

Pour le passage dans les Détroits des bâtiments de guerre, un préavis devra être donné au Gouvernement turc par la voie diplomatique. La durée normale du préavis sera de huit jours ; mais il est désirable que, pour les Puissances non riveraines de la Mer Noire, elle

under articles 14 and 18, on condition that they shall pass through the Straits singly. They shall, however, continue to be on the same footing as vessels of war for the purpose of the remaining provisions governing transit.

The auxiliary vessels specified in the preceding paragraph shall only be entitled to benefit by the exceptional status therein contemplated if their armament does not include: for use against floating targets, more than two guns of a maximum calibre of 105 millimetres; for use against aerial targets, more than two guns of a maximum calibre of 75 millimetres.

ARTICLE 10.

In time of peace, light surface vessels, minor war vessels and auxiliary vessels, whether belonging to Black Sea or non-Black Sea Powers, and whatever their flag, shall enjoy freedom of transit through the Straits without any taxes or charges whatever, provided that such transit is begun during daylight and subject to the conditions laid down in article 13 and the articles following thereafter.

Vessels of war other than those which fall within the categories specified in the preceding paragraph shall only enjoy a right of transit under the special conditions provided by articles 11 and 12.

ARTICLE 11.

Black Sea Powers may send through the Straits capital ships of a tonnage greater than that laid down in the first paragraph of article 14, on condition that these vessels pass through the Straits singly, escorted by not more than two destroyers.

ARTICLE 12.

Black Sea Powers shall have the right to send through the Straits, for the purpose of rejoining their base, submarines constructed or purchased outside the Black Sea, provided that adequate notice of the laying down or purchase of such submarines shall have been given to Turkey.

Submarines belonging to the said Powers shall also be entitled to pass through the Straits to be repaired in dockyards outside the Black Sea on condition that detailed information on the matter is given to Turkey.

In either case, the said submarines must travel by day and on the surface, and must pass through the Straits singly.

ARTICLE 13.

The transit of vessels of war through the Straits shall be preceded by a notification given to the Turkish Government through the diplomatic channel. The normal period of notice shall be eight days; but it is desirable that in the case of non-Black Sea Powers this period

soit portée à quinze jours. Il sera indiqué dans le préavis la destination, le nom, le type et le nombre des bâtiments, ainsi que la date de passage pour l'aller et, s'il y a lieu, pour le retour. Tout changement de date devra faire l'objet d'un préavis de trois jours.

L'entrée dans les Détroits pour le passage d'aller devra avoir lieu dans un délai de cinq jours à partir de la date indiquée dans le préavis initial. Après l'expiration de ce délai, il devra être donné un nouveau préavis, dans les mêmes conditions que pour le préavis initial.

Lors du passage, le commandant de la force navale communiquera, sans avoir à s'arrêter, à une station de signaux à l'entrée des Dardanelles ou du Bosphore, la composition exacte de la force se trouvant sous ses ordres.

Article 14.

Le tonnage global maximum de toutes les forces navales étrangères pouvant se trouver en cours de transit dans les Détroits ne devra pas dépasser 15,000 tonnes, sauf dans les cas prévus à l'article 11 et à l'annexe III à la présente Convention.

Toutefois les forces visées à l'alinéa précédent ne devront pas comprendre plus de neuf bâtiments.

Ne seront pas compris dans ce tonnage les bâtiments appartenant à des Puissances riveraines ou non riveraines de la Mer Noire qui, conformément aux dispositions de l'article 17, rendent visite à un port des Détroits.

Ne seront pas davantage compris dans ce tonnage les bâtiments de guerre qui auraient subi une avarie lors de la traversée; ces bâtiments se soumettront, pendant les réparations, aux dispositions spéciales de sécurité édictées par la Turquie.

Article 15.

Les bâtiments de guerre en transit dans les Détroits ne pourront, en aucun cas, utiliser les aéronefs dont ils seraient porteurs.

Article 16.

Les bâtiments de guerre en transit dans les Détroits ne devront, sauf en cas d'avarie ou de fortune de mer, y séjourner au delà du temps nécessaire pour effecteur leur passage.

Article 17.

Les dispositions des articles précédents ne sauraient en aucune manière empêcher une force navale d'un tonnage et d'une composition quelconques de rendre, dans un port des Détroits, sur l'invitation du Gouvernement turc, une visite de courtoisie d'une durée limitée. Cette force devra quitter les Détroits par la même route que pour l'entrée, à moins qu'elle ne soit dans les conditions voulues pour passer en transit dans les Détroits, conformément aux dispositions des articles 10, 14 et 18.

should be increased to fifteen days. The notification shall specify the destination, name, type and number of the vessels, as also the date of entry for the outward passage and, if necessary, for the return journey. Any change of date shall be subject to three days' notice.

Entry into the Straits for the outward passage shall take place within a period of five days from the date given in the original notification. After the expiry of this period, a new notification shall be given under the same conditions as for the original notification.

When effecting transit, the commander of the naval force shall, without being under any obligation to stop, communicate to a signal station at the entrance to the Dardanelles or the Bosphorus the exact composition of the force under his orders.

Article 14.

The maximum aggregate tonnage of all foreign naval forces which may be in course of transit through the Straits shall not exceed 15,000 tons, except in the cases provided for in article 11 and in Annex III to the present Convention.

The forces specified in the preceding paragraph shall not, however, comprise more than nine vessels.

Vessels, whether belonging to Black Sea or non-Black Sea Powers, paying visits to a port in the Straits, in accordance with the provisions of article 17, shall not be included in this tonnage.

Neither shall vessels of war which have suffered damage during their passage through the Straits be included in this tonnage; such vessels, while undergoing repair, shall be subject to any special provisions relating to security laid down by Turkey.

Article 15.

Vessels of war in transit through the Straits shall in no circumstances make use of any aircraft which they may be carrying.

Article 16.

Vessels of war in transit through the Straits shall not, except in the event of damage or peril of the sea, remain therein longer than is necessary for them to effect the passage.

Article 17.

Nothing in the provisions of the preceding articles shall prevent a naval force of any tonnage or composition from paying a courtesy visit of limited duration to a port in the Straits, at the invitation of the Turkish Government. Any such force must leave the Straits by the same route as that by which it entered, unless it fulfils the conditions required for passage in transit through the Straits as laid down by articles 10, 14 and 18.

ARTICLE 18.

1. Le tonnage global que les Puissances non riveraines de la Mer Noire peuvent avoir dans cette mer en temps de paix est limité de la façon suivante :

(*a*) Sauf dans le cas prévu au paragraphe (*b*) ci-après, le tonnage global desdites Puissances n'excédera pas 30,000 tonnes;

(*b*) Au cas où, à un moment quelconque, le tonnage de la flotte la plus forte de la Mer Noire viendrait à dépasser d'au moins 10,000 tonnes celui de la flotte la plus forte en cette mer à la date de la signature de la présente Convention, le tonnage global de 30,000 tonnes mentionné au paragraphe (*a*) sera majoré d'autant, jusqu'à concurrence d'un maximum de 45,000 tonnes. A cette fin, chaque Puissance riveraine fera connaître, conformément à l'annexe IV à la présente Convention, au Gouvernement turc, le 1er janvier et le 1er juillet de chaque année, le tonnage total de sa flotte en Mer Noire, et le Gouvernement turc transmettra cette information aux autres Hautes Parties contractantes ainsi qu'au Secrétaire général de la Société des Nations;

(*c*) Le tonnage que l'une quelconque des Puissances non riveraines aura la faculté d'avoir en Mer Noire sera limité aux deux tiers du tonnage global visé aux paragraphes (*a*) et (*b*) ci-dessus;

(*d*) Toutefois au cas où une ou plusieurs Puissances non riveraines de la Mer Noire désireraient y envoyer, dans un but humanitaire, des forces navales, ces forces, dont l'ensemble ne devra, en aucune hypothèse, excéder 8,000 tonnes, seront admises à pénétrer dans la Mer Noire, sans le préavis prévu à l'article 13 de la présente Convention, moyennant une autorisation obtenue du Gouvernement turc dans les conditions suivantes : si le tonnage global visé aux paragraphes (*a*) et (*b*) ci-dessus n'est pas atteint et ne doit pas être dépassé par les forces dont l'envoi est demandé, le Gouvernement turc accordera ladite autorisation dans le plus bref délai après la réception de la demande dont il aura été saisi; si ledit tonnage global se trouve être déjà utilisé ou s'il devait être dépassé par les forces dont l'envoi est demandé, le Gouvernement turc donnera immédiatement connaissance de la demande d'autorisation aux autres Puissances riveraines de la Mer Noire et si ces Puissances, vingt-quatre heures après en avoir été informées, n'y font pas d'objection, il fera savoir aux Puissances intéressées, au plus tard dans un délai utile de quarante-huit heures, la suite qu'il aura décidé de donner à leur demande.

Toute entrée ultérieure en Mer Noire de forces navales des Puissances non riveraines ne s'effectuera que dans les limites disponibles du tonnage global visé aux paragraphes (*a*) et (*b*) ci-dessus.

2. Quel que soit l'objet de leur présence en Mer Noire, les bâtiments de guerre des Puissances non riveraines ne pourront pas y rester plus de vingt et un jours.

ARTICLE 18.

(1) The aggregate tonnage which non-Black Sea Powers may have in that sea in time of peace shall be limited as follows :—

(*a*) Except as provided in paragraph (*b*) below, the aggregate tonnage of the said Powers shall not exceed 30,000 tons;

(*b*) If at any time the tonnage of the strongest fleet in the Black Sea shall exceed by at least 10,000 tons the tonnage of the strongest fleet in that sea at the date of the signature of the present Convention, the aggregate tonnage of 30,000 tons mentioned in paragraph (*a*) shall be increased by the same amount, up to a maximum of 45,000 tons. For this purpose, each Black Sea Power shall, in conformity with Annex IV to the present Convention, inform the Turkish Government, on the 1st January and the 1st July of each year, of the total tonnage of its fleet in the Black Sea; and the Turkish Government shall transmit this information to the other High Contracting Parties and to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations.

(*c*) The tonnage which any one non-Black Sea Power may have in the Black Sea shall be limited to two-thirds of the aggregate tonnage provided for in paragraphs (*a*) and (*b*) above;

(*d*) In the event, however, of one or more non-Black Sea Powers desiring to send naval forces into the Black Sea, for a humanitarian purpose, the said forces, which shall in no case exceed 8,000 tons altogether, shall be allowed to enter the Black Sea without having to give the notification provided for in article 13 of the present Convention, provided an authorisation is obtained from the Turkish Government in the following circumstances: if the figure of the aggregate tonnage specified in paragraphs (*a*) and (*b*) above has not been reached and will not be exceeded by the despatch of the forces which it is desired to send, the Turkish Government shall grant the said authorisation within the shortest possible time after receiving the request which has been addressed to it; if the said figure has already been reached or if the despatch of the forces which it is desired to send will cause it to be exceeded, the Turkish Government will immediately inform the other Black Sea Powers of the request for authorisation, and if the said Powers make no objection within twenty-four hours of having received this information, the Turkish Government shall, within forty-eight hours at the latest, inform the interested Powers of the reply which it has decided to make to their request.

Any further entry into the Black Sea of naval forces of non-Black Sea Powers shall only be effected within the available limits of the aggregate tonnage provided for in paragraphs (*a*) and (*b*) above.

(2) Vessels of war belonging to non-Black Sea Powers shall not remain in the Black Sea more than twenty-one days, whatever be the object of their presence there.

ARTICLE 19.

En temps de guerre, la Turquie n'étant pas belligérante, les bâtiments de guerre jouiront d'une complète liberté de passage et de navigation dans les Détroits dans des conditions identiques à celles qui sont stipulées aux articles 10 à 18.

Toutefois il sera interdit aux bâtiments de guerre de toute Puissance belligérante de passer à travers les Détroits, sauf dans les cas rentrant dans l'application de l'article 25 de la présente Convention, ainsi que dans le cas d'assistance prêtée à un État victime d'une agression en vertu d'un traité d'assistance mutuelle engageant la Turquie, conclu dans le cadre du Pacte de la Société des Nations, enregistré et publié conformément aux dispositions de l'article 18 dudit Pacte.

Dans les cas exceptionnels visés à l'alinéa précédent, ne seront pas applicables les limitations indiquées dans les articles 10 à 18.

Malgré l'interdiction de passage édictée dans l'alinéa 2 ci-dessus, les bâtiments de guerre des Puissances belligérantes riveraines ou non de la Mer Noire, séparés de leurs ports d'attache, sont autorisés à rallier ces ports.

Il est interdit aux bâtiments de guerre belligérants de procéder à toute capture, d'exercer le droit de visite et de se livrer à un acte hostile quelconque dans les Détroits.

ARTICLE 20.

En temps de guerre, la Turquie étant belligérante, les dispositions des articles 10 à 18 ne seront pas applicables; le passage des bâtiments de guerre sera entièrement laissé à la discrétion du Gouvernement turc.

ARTICLE 21.

Au cas où la Turquie s'estimerait menacée d'un danger de guerre imminent, elle aurait le droit d'appliquer les dispositions de l'article 20 de la présente Convention.

Les bâtiments de guerre qui, après avoir passé par les Détroits antérieurement à l'usage par la Turquie de la faculté que lui confère l'alinéa précédent, se trouveraient ainsi séparés de leurs ports d'attache, pourront rallier ces ports. Il est cependant entendu que la Turquie pourra ne pas faire bénéficier de ce droit les bâtiments de l'État dont l'attitude aurait motivé l'application du présent article.

Si le Gouvernement turc fait usage de la faculté que lui confère l'alinéa premier ci-dessus, il adressera une notification à cet effet aux Hautes Parties contractantes ainsi qu'au Secrétaire général de la Société des Nations.

Si le Conseil de la Société des Nations, par une majorité des deux tiers, décide que les mesures ainsi prises par la Turquie ne sont pas justifiées et si tel est également l'avis de la majorité des Hautes Parties contractantes signataires de la présente Convention, le

ARTICLE 19.

In time of war, Turkey not being belligerent, warships shall enjoy complete freedom of transit and navigation through the Straits under the same conditions as those laid down in articles 10 to 18.

Vessels of war belonging to belligerent Powers shall not, however, pass through the Straits except in cases arising out of the application of article 25 of the present Convention, and in cases of assistance rendered to a State victim of aggression in virtue of a treaty of mutual assistance binding Turkey, concluded within the framework of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and registered and published in accordance with the provisions of article 18 of the Covenant.

In the exceptional cases provided for in the preceding paragraph, the limitations laid down in articles 10 to 18 of the present Convention shall not be applicable.

Notwithstanding the prohibition of passage laid down in paragraph 2 above, vessels of war belonging to belligerent Powers, whether they are Black Sea Powers or not, which have become separated from their bases, may return thereto.

Vessels of war belonging to belligerent Powers shall not make any capture, exercise the right of visit and search, or carry out any hostile act in the Straits.

ARTICLE 20.

In time of war, Turkey being belligerent, the provisions of articles 10 to 18 shall not be applicable; the passage of warships shall be left entirely to the discretion of the Turkish Government.

ARTICLE 21.

Should Turkey consider herself to be threatened with imminent danger of war she shall have the right to apply the provisions of article 20 of the present Convention.

Vessels which have passed through the Straits before Turkey has made use of the powers conferred upon her by the preceding paragraph, and which thus find themselves separated from their bases, may return thereto. It is, however, understood that Turkey may deny this right to vessels of war belonging to the State whose attitude has given rise to the application of the present article.

Should the Turkish Government make use of the powers conferred by the first paragraph of the present article, a notification to that effect shall be addressed to the High Contracting Parties and to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations.

If the Council of the League of Nations decide by a majority of two-thirds that the measures thus taken by Turkey are not justified, and if such should also be the opinion of the majority of the High Contracting Parties signatories to the present Convention, the Turkish

Gouvernement turc s'engage à rapporter les mesures en question ainsi que celles qui auraient été prises en vertu de l'article 6 de la présente Convention.

ARTICLE 22.

Les bâtiments de guerre qui ont à bord des cas de peste, de choléra, de fièvre jaune, de typhus exanthématique ou de variole, ou qui en ont eu moins de sept jours auparavant, ainsi que les bâtiments qui ont quitté un port contaminé depuis moins de cinq fois vingt-quatre heures devront passer les Détroits en quarantaine et appliquer par les moyens du bord les mesures prophylactiques nécessaires pour éviter toute possibilité de contamination des Détroits.

Section III.—*Aéronefs.*

ARTICLE 23.

En vue d'assurer le passage des aéronefs civils entre la Méditerranée et la Mer Noire, le Gouvernement turc indiquera, en dehors des zones interdites des Détroits, les routes aériennes destinées à ce passage ; les aéronefs civils pourront utiliser ces routes en donnant au Gouvernement turc, pour les survols occasionnels, un préavis de trois jours et, pour les survols de services réguliers, un préavis général des dates de passage.

D'autre part, nonobstant la remilitarisation des Détroits, le Gouvernement turc fournira les facilités nécessaires pour le passage en toute sécurité des aéronefs civils autorisés d'après la réglementation aérienne en vigueur en Turquie à survoler le territoire turc entre l'Europe et l'Asie. Pour les cas où une autorisation de survol aurait été accordée, la route à suivre dans la zone des Détroits sera périodiquement indiquée.

Section IV.—*Dispositions générales.*

ARTICLE 24.

Les attributions de la Commission internationale constituée en vertu de la Convention concernant le régime des Détroits en date du 24 juillet 1923 sont transférées au Gouvernement turc.

Le Gouvernement turc s'engage à réunir les statistiques et à fournir les renseignements relatifs à l'application des articles 11, 12, 14 et 18.

Il doit veiller à l'exécution de toute disposition de la présente Convention ayant trait au passage des bâtiments de guerre dans les Détroits.

Dès qu'il aura été avisé du prochain passage dans les Détroits d'une force navale étrangère, le Gouvernement turc fera connaître aux représentants à Ankara des Hautes Parties contractantes la composition de cette force, son tonnage, la date prévue pour son entrée dans les Détroits et, s'il y a lieu, la date probable de son retour.

Government undertakes to discontinue the measures in question as also any measures which may have been taken under article 6 of the present Convention.

ARTICLE 22.

Vessels of war which have on board cases of plague, cholera, yellow fever, exanthematic typhus or smallpox or which have had such cases on board within the last seven days and vessels of war which have left an infected port within less than five times twenty-four hours must pass through the Straits in quarantine and apply by the means on board such prophylactic measures as are necessary in order to prevent any possibility of the Straits being infected.

Section III.—*Aircraft.*

ARTICLE 23.

In order to assure the passage of civil aircraft between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, the Turkish Government will indicate the air routes available for this purpose, outside the forbidden zones which may be established in the Straits. Civil aircraft may use these routes provided that they give the Turkish Government, as regards occasional flights, a notification of three days, and as regards flights on regular services, a general notification of the dates of passage.

The Turkish Government moreover undertake, notwithstanding any remilitarisation of the Straits, to furnish the necessary facilities for the safe passage of civil aircraft authorised under the air regulations in force in Turkey to fly across Turkish territory between Europe and Asia. The route which is to be followed in the Straits zone by aircraft which have obtained an authorisation shall be indicated from time to time.

Section IV.—*General Provisions.*

ARTICLE 24.

The functions of the International Commission set up under the Convention relating to the régime of the Straits of the 24th July, 1923, are hereby transferred to the Turkish Government.

The Turkish Government undertake to collect statistics and to furnish information concerning the application of articles 11, 12, 14 and 18 of the present Convention.

They will supervise the execution of all the provisions of the present Convention relating to the passage of vessels of war through the Straits.

As soon as they have been notified of the intended passage through the Straits of a foreign naval force the Turkish Government shall inform the representatives at Angora of the High Contracting Parties of the composition of that force, its tonnage, the date fixed for its entry into the Straits, and, if necessary, the probable date of its return.

Le Gouvernement turc adressera au Secrétaire général de la Société des Nations ainsi qu'aux Hautes Parties contractantes un rapport annuel indiquant les mouvements des bâtiments de guerre étrangers dans les Détroits et fournissant tous renseignements utiles pour le commerce et la navigation maritime et aérienne envisagée dans la présente Convention.

Article 25.

Aucune disposition de la présente Convention ne porte atteinte aux droits et obligations découlant du Pacte de la Société des Nations pour la Turquie ou pour toute autre Haute Partie contractante, Membre de la Société des Nations.

Section V.—*Dispositions finales.*

Article 26.

La présente Convention sera ratifiée dans le plus court délai possible.

Les ratifications seront déposées aux archives du Gouvernement de la République française à Paris.

Le Gouvernement japonais aura la faculté de se borner à faire connaître au Gouvernement de la République française, par son représentant diplomatique à Paris, que la ratification a été donnée et, dans ce cas, il devra transmettre l'instrument aussitôt que faire se pourra.

Un procès-verbal de dépôt sera dressé dès que six instruments de ratification, y compris celui de la Turquie, auront été déposés. A cette fin, la notification prévue à l'alinéa précédent équivaudra au dépôt de l'instrument de ratification.

La présente Convention entrera en vigueur à la date de ce procès-verbal.

Le Gouvernement français remettra à toutes les Hautes Parties contractantes une copie authentique du procès-verbal visé à l'alinéa précédent et des procès-verbaux de dépôt des ratifications ultérieures.

Article 27.

A partir de son entrée en vigueur, la présente Convention sera ouverte à l'adhésion de toute Puissance signataire du Traité de Paix de Lausanne du 24 juillet 1923.

Toute adhésion sera signifiée par la voie diplomatique au Gouvernement de la République française et, par celui-ci, à toutes les Hautes Parties contractantes.

Elle portera effet à dater du jour de la signification au Gouvernement français.

The Turkish Government shall address to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations and to the High Contracting Parties an annual report giving details regarding the movements of foreign vessels of war through the Straits and furnishing all information which may be of service to commerce and navigation, both by sea and by air, for which provision is made in the present Convention.

Article 25.

Nothing in the present Convention shall prejudice the rights and obligations of Turkey, or of any of the other High Contracting Parties members of the League of Nations, arising out of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Section V.—*Final Provisions.*

Article 26.

The present Convention shall be ratified as soon as possible.

The ratifications shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the French Republic in Paris.

The Japanese Government shall be entitled to inform the Government of the French Republic through their diplomatic representative in Paris that the ratification has been given, and in that case they shall transmit the instrument of ratification as soon as possible.

A *procès-verbal* of the deposit of ratifications shall be drawn up as soon as six instruments of ratification, including that of Turkey, shall have been deposited. For this purpose the notification provided for in the preceding paragraph shall be taken as the equivalent of the deposit of an instrument of ratification.

The present Convention shall come into force on the date of the said *procès-verbal.*

The French Government will transmit to all the High Contracting Parties an authentic copy of the *procès-verbal* provided for in the preceding paragraph and of the *procès-verbaux* of the deposit of any subsequent ratifications.

Article 27.

The present Convention shall, as from the date of its entry into force, be open to accession by any Power signatory to the Treaty of Peace at Lausanne signed on the 24th July, 1923.

Each accession shall be notified, through the diplomatic channel, to the Government of the French Republic, and by the latter to all the High Contracting Parties.

Accessions shall come into force as from the date of notification to the French Government.

ARTICLE 28.

La présente Convention aura une durée de vingt ans à dater de son entrée en vigueur.

Toutefois le principe de la liberté de passage et de navigation affirmé à l'article 1er de la présente Convention aura une durée illimitée.

Si, deux ans avant l'expiration de ladite période de vingt ans, aucune Haute Partie contractante n'a donné un préavis de dénonciation au Gouvernement français, la présente Convention demeurera en vigueur jusqu'à ce que deux années se soient écoulées après l'envoi d'un préavis de dénonciation. Ce préavis sera notifié par le Gouvernement français aux Hautes Parties contractantes.

Si la présente Convention venait à être dénoncée conformément aux dispositions du présent article, les Hautes Parties contractantes conviennent de se faire représenter à une conférence en vue d'arrêter les termes d'une nouvelle convention.

ARTICLE 29.

A l'expiration de chaque période quinquennale à compter de la mise en vigueur de la présente Convention, chacune des Hautes Parties contractantes pourra prendre l'initiative de proposer des amendements à une ou plusieurs dispositions de la présente Convention.

Pour être recevable, la demande de revision formulée par une des Hautes Parties contractantes doit être appuyée, s'il s'agit de modifications à l'article 14 ou à l'article 18, par une autre Haute Partie contractante et, s'il s'agit de modifications à tout autre article, par deux autres Hautes Parties contractantes.

La demande de revision ainsi appuyée devra être notifiée à toutes les Hautes Parties contractantes trois mois avant l'expiration de la période quinquennale en cours. Ce préavis contiendra l'indication et les motifs des amendements proposés.

S'il est impossible d'aboutir sur ces propositions par la voie diplomatique, les Hautes Parties contractantes se feront représenter à une conférence convoquée à cet effet.

Cette conférence ne pourra statuer qu'à l'unanimité, à l'exception des cas de revision relatifs à l'article 14 et à l'article 18, pour lesquels il suffira d'une majorité des trois quarts des Hautes Parties contractantes.

Cette majorité sera calculée en y comprenant les trois quarts des Hautes Parties contractantes riveraines de la Mer Noire, y compris la Turquie.

En foi de quoi, les Plénipotentiaires susnommés ont signé la présente Convention.

ARTICLE 28.

The present Convention shall remain in force for twenty years from the date of its entry into force.

The principle of freedom of transit and navigation affirmed in article 1 of the present Convention shall however continue without limit of time.

If, two years prior to the expiry of the said period of twenty years, no High Contracting Party shall have given notice of denunciation to the French Government the present Convention shall continue in force until two years after such notice shall have been given. Any such notice shall be communicated by the French Government to the High Contracting Parties.

In the event of the present Convention being denounced in accordance with the provisions of the present article, the High Contracting Parties agree to be represented at a conference for the purpose of concluding a new Convention.

ARTICLE 29.

At the expiry of each period of five years from the date of the entry into force of the present Convention each of the High Contracting Parties shall be entitled to initiate a proposal for amending one or more of the provisions of the present Convention.

To be valid, any request for revision formulated by one of the High Contracting Parties must be supported, in the case of modifications to articles 14 or 18, by one other High Contracting Party, and, in the case of modifications to any other article, by two other High Contracting Parties.

Any request for revision thus supported must be notified to all the High Contracting Parties three months prior to the expiry of the current period of five years. This notification shall contain details of the proposed amendments and the reasons which have given rise to them.

Should it be found impossible to reach an agreement on these proposals through the diplomatic channel, the High Contracting Parties agree to be represented at a conference to be summoned for this purpose.

Such a conference may only take decisions by a unanimous vote, except as regards cases of revision involving articles 14 and 18, for which a majority of three-quarters of the High Contracting Parties shall be sufficient.

The said majority shall include three-quarters of the High Contracting Parties which are Black Sea Powers, including Turkey.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Convention.

Fait à Montreux, le vingt juillet mil neuf cent trente-six, en onze exemplaires, dont le premier, revêtu des sceaux des Plénipotentiaires, sera déposé dans les archives du Gouvernement de la République française et dont les autres ont été remis aux Puissances signataires.

(L.S.) N. P. NICOLAEV.
(L.S.) PIERRE NEÏCOV.
(L.S.) J. PAUL-BONCOUR.
(L.S.) H. PONSOT.
(L.S.) STANLEY.
(L.S.) S. M. BRUCE.
(L.S.) N. POLITIS.
(L.S.) RAOUL BIBICA ROSETTI.

Les soussignés, Plénipotentiaires du Japon, déclarent, au nom de leur Gouvernement, que les dispositions de la présente Convention ne modifient en rien la position du Japon comme État non membre de la Société des Nations, tant à l'égard du Pacte de la Société des Nations qu'à l'égard des traités d'assistance mutuelle conclus dans le cadre dudit Pacte, et que le Japon conserve notamment, pour ce qui concerne ce Pacte et ces traités dans les dispositions des articles 19 et 25, une pleine liberté d'appréciation.

(L.S.) N. SATO.
(L.S.) MASSA-AKI HOTTA.

(L.S.) N. TITULESCO.
(L.S.) CONS. CONTZESCO.
(L.S.) V. V. PELLA.
(L.S.) Dr. R. ARAS.
(L.S.) SUAD DAVAZ.
(L.S.) N. MENEMENCIOGLU.
(L.S.) ASIM GÜNDÜZ.
(L.S.) N. SADAK.
(L.S.) MAXIME LITVINOFF.
(L.S.) Dr. I. V. SOUBBOTITCH.

DONE at Montreux the 20th July, 1936, in eleven copies, of which the first copy, to which the seals of the Plenipotentiaries have been affixed, will be deposited in the archives of the Government of the French Republic, and of which the remaining copies have been transmitted to the signatory Powers.

(L.S.) N. P. NICOLAEV.
(L.S.) PIERRE NEÏCOV.
(L.S.) J. PAUL-BONCOUR.
(L.S.) H. PONSOT.
(L.S.) STANLEY.
(L.S.) S. M. BRUCE.
(L.S.) N. POLITIS.
(L.S.) RAOUL BIBICA ROSETTI.

The undersigned, Plenipotentiaries of Japan, declare, in the name of their Government, that the provisions of the present Convention do not in any sense modify the position of Japan as a State not a member of the League of Nations, whether in relation to the Covenant of the League of Nations or in regard to treaties of mutual assistance concluded within the framework of the said Covenant, and that in particular Japan reserves full liberty of interpretation as regards the provisions of articles 19 and 25 so far as they concern that Covenant and those treaties.

(L.S.) N. SATO.
(L.S.) MASSA-AKI HOTTA.

(L.S.) N. TITULESCO.
(L.S.) CONS. CONTZESCO.
(L.S.) V. V. PELLA.
(L.S.) DR. R. ARAS.
(L.S.) SUAD DAVAZ.
(L.S.) N. MENEMENCIOGLU.
(L.S.) ASIM GÜNDÜZ.
(L.S.) N. SADAK.
(L.S.) MAXIME LITVINOFF.
(L.S.) DR. I. V. SOUBBOTITCH.

Annexe I.

1. Les taxes et charges qui peuvent être prélevées conformément à l'article 2 de la présente Convention seront celles qui sont indiquées dans le tableau ci-après. Les réductions éventuelles de ces taxes et charges que le Gouvernement turc admettrait seront appliquées sans distinction de pavillon.

Nature du service rendu.	*Montant de la taxe ou de la charge à percevoir sur chaque tonne de jauge nette (net register tonnage). Francs or* (2).
(*a*) Contrôle sanitaire	0·075
(*b*) Phares, bouées lumineuses et bouées de chenaux ou autres :	
Jusqu'à 800 tonnes	0·42
Au-dessus de 800 tonnes ...	0·21
(*c*) Service de sauvetage, y compris les canots de sauvetage, les postes de fusées porte-amarres, les sirènes de brume, les radiophares, ainsi que les bouées lumineuses non comprises sous (*b*) ou autres installations du même genre	0·10

2. Les taxes et charges définies au tableau annexé au paragraphe premier de la présente annexe s'appliqueront à une double traversée des Détroits (c'est-à-dire à un passage de la Mer Égée à la Mer Noire et au voyage de retour vers la Mer Égée ou bien à une traversée des Détroits de la Mer Noire à la Mer Égée suivie du retour en Mer Noire); toutefois, si un navire de commerce franchit à nouveau les Détroits en vue de retourner en Mer Égée ou en Mer Noire, selon le cas, plus de six mois après la date d'entrée dans les Détroits pour le voyage d'aller, le navire pourra être appelé, sans distinction de pavillon, à acquitter une seconde fois ces taxes et charges.

3. Si, à la traversée d'aller, un navire de commerce déclare ne pas devoir revenir, il n'aura à acquitter, quant aux taxes et charges visées aux alinéas (*b*) et (*c*) du paragraphe 1er de la présente annexe, que la moitié du tarif.

4. Les taxes et charges définies au tableau annexé au paragraphe 1er de la présente annexe et qui ne seront pas plus élevées qu'il n'est indispensable pour couvrir les frais occasionnés par les services en question et pour conserver un fonds de réserve ou un fonds de roulement raisonnable ne seront augmentées ou complétées que par application des dispositions de l'article 29 de la présente Convention. Elles seront acquittées en francs or ou en monnaie turque d'après le cours des changes pratiqué à la date du paiement.

(2) Actuellement 100 piastres équivalent à environ 2 francs 50 centimes or.

ANNEX I.

The taxes and charges which may be levied in accordance with article 2 of the present Convention shall be those set forth in the following table. Any reductions in these taxes or charges which the Turkish Government may grant shall be applied without any distinction based on the flag of the vessel :—

Nature of service rendered.	*Amount of tax or charge to be levied on each ton of net register tonnage. Francs gold*[2].
(*a*) Sanitary Control Stations	0·075
(*b*) Lighthouses, Light and Channel Buoys—	
Up to 800 tons...	0·42
Above 800 tons...	0·21
(*c*) Life Saving Services, including Life-boats, Rocket Stations, Fog Sirens, Direction-finding Stations, and any Light Buoys not comprised in (*b*) above, or other similar installations	0·10

2. The taxes and charges set forth in the table attached to paragraph 1 of the present annex shall apply in respect of a return voyage through the Straits (that is to say, a voyage from the Ægean Sea to the Black Sea and return back to the Ægean Sea or else a voyage through the Straits from the Black Sea to the Ægean Sea followed by a return voyage into the Black Sea); if, however, a merchant vessel re-enters the Straits with the object of returning into the Ægean Sea or to the Black Sea, as the case may be, more than six months after the date of entry into the Straits for the outward voyage, such vessel may be called upon to pay these taxes and charges a second time, provided no distinction is made based on the flag of the vessel.

3. If, on the outward voyage, a merchant vessel declares an intention of not returning, it shall only be obliged as regards the taxes and charges provided for in paragraphs (*b*) and (*c*) of the first paragraph of the present annex, to pay half the tariff indicated.

4. The taxes and charges set forth in the table attached to the first paragraph of the present annex, which are not to be greater than is necessary to cover the cost of maintaining the services concerned and of allowing for the creation of a reasonable reserve fund or working balance, shall not be increased or added to except in accordance with the provisions of article 29 of the present Convention. They shall be payable in gold francs or in Turkish currency at the rate of exchange prevailing on the date of payment.

(2) 100 piastres at present equals 2·5 francs gold (approx.).

5. Les navires de commerce pourront être tenus d'acquitter des taxes et des charges pour les services facultatifs tels que le pilotage et le remorquage lorsqu'un tel service aura été dûment rendu par les autorités turques à la demande de l'agent ou du capitaine du navire en question. Le Gouvernement turc publiera, de temps à autre, le tarif des taxes et charges qui seront perçues au titre de ces services facultatifs.

6. Ces tarifs ne seront pas augmentés dans les cas où lesdits services seront rendus obligatoires par l'application de l'article 5.

Annexe II.(3).

A. *Déplacement type.*

1. Le déplacement type d'un bâtiment de surface est le déplacement du bâtiment achevé, avec son équipage complet, ses machines et chaudières, prêt à prendre la mer, ayant tout son armement et toutes ses munitions, ses installations, équipements, vivres, eau douce pour l'équipage, approvisionnements divers, outillages et rechanges de toute nature qu'il doit emporter en temps de guerre, mais sans combustible et sans eau de réserve pour l'alimentation des machines et chaudières.

2. Le déplacement type d'un sous-marin est le déplacement en surface du bâtiment achevé (non compris l'eau des compartiments non étanches), avec son équipage complet, son appareil moteur, prêt à prendre la mer, ayant tout son armement et toutes ses munitions, ses installations, équipements, vivres pour l'équipage, outillages divers et rechanges de toute nature qu'il doit emporter en temps de guerre, mais sans combustible, huile lubrifiante, eau douce ou eau de ballast de toute sorte.

3. Le mot " tonne," sauf dans l'expression " tonnes métriques," désigne une tonne de 1,016 kilogrammes (2,240 lbs.).

B. *Classes.*

1. Les *bâtiments de ligne* sont des bâtiments de guerre de surface appartenant à l'une des deux sous-classes suivantes :

(*a*) bâtiments de guerre de surface, autres que les bâtiments porte-aéronefs, les bâtiments auxiliaires ou les bâtiments de ligne de la sous-classe (*b*), dont le déplacement type est supérieur à 10,000 tonnes (10,160 tonnes métriques) ou qui portent un canon d'un calibre supérieur à 203 millimètres (8 pouces) ;

(*b*) bâtiments de guerre de surface, autres que les bâtiments porte-aéronefs, dont le déplacement type n'est pas supérieur à 8,000 tonnes (8,128 tonnes métriques) et qui portent un canon d'un calibre supérieur à 203 millimètres (8 pouces).

(3) Les textes de la présente annexe ont été empruntés au Traité naval de Londres du 25 mars 1936.

5. Merchant vessels may be required to pay taxes and charges for optional services, such as pilotage and towage, when any such service shall have been duly rendered by the Turkish authorities at the request of the agent or master of any such vessel. The Turkish Government will publish from time to time the tariff of the taxes and charges to be levied for such optional services.

6. These tariffs shall not be increased in cases in the event of the said services being made obligatory by reason of the application of article 5.

ANNEX II.(3)

A. *Standard Displacement.*

(1) The standard displacement of a surface vessel is the displacement of the vessel, complete, fully manned, engined, and equipped ready for sea, including all armament and ammunition, equipment, outfit, provisions and fresh water for crew, miscellaneous stores and implements of every description that are intended to be carried in war, but without fuel or reserve feed water on board.

(2) The standard displacement of a submarine is the surface displacement of the vessel complete (exclusive of the water in non-watertight structure), fully manned, engined and equipped ready for sea, including all armament and ammunition, equipment, outfit, provisions for crew, miscellaneous stores and implements of every description that are intended to be carried in war, but without fuel, lubricating oil, fresh water or ballast water of any kind on board.

(3) The word "ton" except in the expression "metric tons" denotes the ton of 2,240 lb. (1,016 kilos.).

B. *Categories.*

(1) *Capital Ships* are surface vessels of war belonging to one of the two following sub-categories :—

(*a*) surface vessels of war, other than aircraft carriers, auxiliary vessels, or capital ships of sub-category (*b*), the standard displacement of which exceeds 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) or which carry a gun with a calibre exceeding 8 in. (203 mm.);

(*b*) surface vessels of war, other than aircraft-carriers, the standard displacement of which does not exceed 8,000 tons (8,128 metric tons) and which carry a gun with a calibre exceeding 8 in. (203 mm.).

(3) The wording of the present Annex is taken from the London Naval Treaty of March 25, 1936.

2. Les *bâtiments porte-aéronefs* sont des bâtiments de guerre de surface qui, quel que soit leur déplacement, sont conçus ou aménagés principalement pour transporter et mettre en action des aéronefs en mer. Si un bâtiment de guerre n'a pas été conçu ou aménagé principalement pour transporter et mettre en action des aéronefs en mer, l'installation sur ce bâtiment d'un pont d'atterrissage ou d'envol n'aura pas pour effet de le faire entrer dans la classe des bâtiments porte-aéronefs.

La classe des bâtiments porte-aéronefs se subdivise en deux sous-classes, à savoir :

(*a*) bâtiments pourvus d'un pont tel que les aéronefs puissent y prendre leur vol ou s'y poser;
(*b*) bâtiments non pourvus du pont décrit au paragraphe (*a*) ci-dessus.

3. Les *bâtiments légers de surface* sont des bâtiments de guerre de surface, autres que les bâtiments porte-aéronefs, les petits navires de combat ou les bâtiments auxiliaires, dont le déplacement type est supérieur à 100 tonnes (102 tonnes métriques), sans dépasser 10,000 tonnes (10,160 tonnes métriques), et qui ne portent pas de canon d'un calibre supérieur à 203 millimètres (8 pouces).

La classe des bâtiments légers de surface se subdivise en trois sous-classes, à savoir :

(*a*) bâtiments portant un canon d'un calibre supérieur à 155 millimètres (6·1 pouces);
(*b*) bâtiments qui ne portent pas de canon d'un calibre supérieur à 155 millimètres (6·1 pouces), et dont le déplacement type est supérieur à 3,000 tonnes (3,048 tonnes métriques);
(*c*) bâtiments qui ne portent pas de canon d'un calibre supérieur à 155 millimètres (6·1 pouces), et dont le déplacement type n'est pas supérieur à 3,000 tonnes (3,048 tonnes métriques).

4. Les *sous-marins* sont tous les bâtiments conçus pour naviguer au-dessous de la surface de la mer.

5. Les *petits navires de combat* sont des bâtiments de guerre de surface, autres que les bâtiments auxiliaires, dont le déplacement type est supérieur à 100 tonnes (102 tonnes métriques), sans dépasser 2,000 tonnes (2,032 tonnes métriques), et qui n'ont aucune des caractéristiques suivantes :

(*a*) être armés d'un canon d'un calibre supérieur à 155 millimètres (6·1 pouces);
(*b*) être conçus ou équipés pour lancer des torpilles;
(*c*) être conçus pour atteindre une vitesse supérieure à vingt nœuds.

6. Les *bâtiments auxiliaires* sont des bâtiments de surface faisant partie de la flotte militaire, dont le déplacement type est supérieur à 100 tonnes (102 tonnes métriques), qui sont normalement utilisés

(2) *Aircraft-Carriers* are surface vessels of war, whatever their displacement, designed or adapted primarily for the purpose of carrying and operating aircraft at sea. The fitting of a landing-on or flying-off deck on any vessel of war, provided such vessel has not been designed or adapted primarily for the purpose of carrying and operating aircraft at sea, shall not cause any vessel so fitted to be classified in the category of aircraft-carriers.

The category of aircraft-carriers is divided into two sub-categories as follows :—

(*a*) vessels fitted with a flight deck, from which aircraft can take off, or on which aircraft can land from the air;
(*b*) vessels not fitted with a flight deck as described in (*a*) above.

(3) *Light Surface Vessels* are surface vessels of war other than aircraft-carriers, minor war vessels or auxiliary vessels, the standard displacement of which exceeds 100 tons (102 metric tons) and does not exceed 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons), and which do not carry a gun with a calibre exceeding 8 in. (203 mm.).

The category of light surface vessels is divided into three sub-categories as follows :—

(*a*) vessels which carry a gun with a calibre exceeding 6·1 in. (155 mm.);
(*b*) vessels which do not carry a gun with a calibre exceeding 6·1 in. (155 mm.) and the standard displacement of which exceeds 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons);
(*c*) vessels which do not carry a gun with a calibre exceeding 6·1 in. (155 mm.) and the standard displacement of which does not exceed 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons).

(4) *Submarines* are all vessels designed to operate below the surface of the sea.

(5) *Minor War Vessels* are surface vessels of war, other than auxiliary vessels, the standard displacement of which exceeds 100 tons (102 metric tons) and does not exceed 2,000 tons (2,032 metric tons), provided they have none of the following characteristics :—

(*a*) mount a gun with a calibre exceeding 6·1 in. (155 mm.);

(*b*) are designed or fitted to launch torpedoes;
(*c*) are designed for a speed greater than twenty knots.

(6) *Auxiliary Vessels* are naval surface vessels the standard displacement of which exceeds 100 tons (102 metric tons), which are normally employed on fleet duties or as troop transports, or in some

pour le service de la flotte, ou comme transports de troupes, ou pour tout emploi autre que celui de bâtiments combattants, qui ne sont pas spécialement construits pour être des bâtiments combattants, et qui n'ont aucune des caractéristiques suivantes :

(*a*) être armés d'un canon d'un calibre supérieur à 155 millimètres (6·1 pouces) ;
(*b*) être armés de plus de huit canons d'un calibre supérieur à 76 millimètres (3 pouces) ;
(*c*) être conçus ou équipés pour lancer des torpilles ;
(*d*) être conçus pour être protégés par des plaques de blindage ;
(*e*) être conçus pour atteindre une vitesse supérieure à vingt-huit nœuds ;
(*f*) être conçus ou aménagés principalement pour mettre en action des aéronefs en mer ;
(*g*) être équipés de plus de deux appareils à lancer des aéronefs.

C. *Bâtiments hors d'âge.*

Les bâtiments des classes et sous-classes suivantes seront considérés comme "hors d'âge" lorsque, depuis leur achèvement, se sera écoulé le nombre d'années indiqué ci-dessous :

(*a*) pour un bâtiment de ligne ... ... 26 ans ;
(*b*) pour un bâtiment porte-aéronefs ... ... 20 ans ;
(*c*) pour un bâtiment léger de surface des sous-classes (*a*) et (*b*) :
(i) s'il a été mis sur cale avant le 1er janvier 1920 ... ... 16 ans ;
(ii) s'il a été mis sur cale après le 31 décembre 1919 ... ... 20 ans ;
(*d*) pour un bâtiment léger de surface de la sous-classe (*c*) ... ... 16 ans ;
(*e*) pour un sous-marin ... ... 13 ans.

ANNEXE III.

Il est convenu que, parmi les trois navires-écoles hors d'âge ci-dessous désignés de la marine japonaise, deux unités seront admises à visiter les ports des Détroits ensemble.

Le tonnage global de ces deux navires sera, dans ce cas, considéré comme équivalent à 15,000 tonnes.

	Date de la mise en chantier.	*Date de l'entrée en service.*	*Déplacement type (tonnes).*	*Armement.*
Asama ...	20–X–1896	18–III–1899	9,240	IV × 200 mm. XII × 150 mm.
Yakumo ...	1–IX–1898	20–VI–1900	9,010	IV × 200 mm. XII × 150 mm.
Iwate ...	11–XI–1898	18–III–1901	9,180	IV × 200 mm. XIV × 150 mm.

other way than as fighting ships, and which are not specifically built as fighting ships, provided they have none of the following characteristics :—

(*a*) mount a gun with a calibre exceeding 6·1 in. (155 mm.);

(*b*) mount more than eight guns with a calibre exceeding 3 in. (76 mm.);

(*c*) are designed or fitted to launch torpedoes;

(*d*) are designed for protection by armour plate;

(*e*) are designed for a speed greater than twenty-eight knots;

(*f*) are designed or adapted primarily for operating aircraft at sea;

(*g*) mount more than two aircraft-launching apparatus.

C. *Over-Age.*

Vessels of the following categories and sub-categories shall be deemed to be "over-age" when the undermentioned number of years have elapsed since completion :—

(*a*) Capital ships	26 years.
(*b*) Aircraft-carriers	20 years.
(*c*) Light surface vessels, sub-categories (*a*) and (*b*)—	
(i) if laid down before 1st January, 1920 ...	16 years.
(ii) if laid down after 31st December, 1919 ...	20 years.
(*d*) Light surface vessels, sub-category (*c*)	16 years.
(*e*) Submarines	13 years.

ANNEX III.

It is agreed that, of the three over-age training ships, as indicated below, belonging to the Japanese Fleet, two units may be allowed to visit ports in the Straits at the same time.

The aggregate tonnage of these two vessels shall in this case be considered as being equivalent to 15,000 tons.

	Date when laid down.	*Date of entry into service.*	*Standard displacement (tons).*	*Armaments.*
Asama ...	20–X–1896	18–III–1899	9,240	IV × 200 mm. XII × 150 mm.
Yakumo ...	1–IX–1898	20–VI–1900	9,010	IV × 200 mm. XII × 150 mm.
Iwate ...	11–XI–1898	18–III–1901	9,180	IV × 200 mm. XIV × 150 mm.

Annexe IV.

1. Les classes et sous-classes de bâtiments à comprendre dans le calcul du tonnage total des flottes des Puissances riveraines de la Mer Noire, visé à l'article 18 de la présente Convention, sont les suivantes :

Bâtiments de ligne :
- sous-classe (*a*).
- sous-classe (*b*).

Bâtiments porte-aéronefs :
- sous-classe (*a*).
- sous-classe (*b*).

Bâtiments légers de surface :
- sous-classe (*a*).
- sous-classe (*b*).
- sous-classe (*c*).

Sous-marins

suivant les définitions de l'annexe II à la présente Convention.

Le déplacement dont il doit être tenu compte dans le calcul du tonnage total est le déplacement type, tel qu'il est défini à l'annexe II. Ne seront pris en considération que les bâtiments qui ne sont pas "hors d'âge," tels qu'ils sont définis à ladite annexe.

2. La communication prévue à l'article 18, alinéa (*b*), doit comprendre en outre le tonnage total des bâtiments des classes et sous-classes mentionnées au paragraphe premier de la présente annexe.

Annex IV.

The categories and sub-categories of vessels to be included in the calculation of the total tonnage of the Black Sea Powers provided for in article 18 of the present Convention are the following :—

Capital Ships :
sub-category (*a*).
sub-category (*b*).

Aircraft Carriers :
sub-category (*a*).
sub-category (*b*).

Light Surface Vessels :
sub-category (*a*).
sub-category (*b*).
sub-category (*c*).

Submarines :

as defined in Annex II to the present Convention.

The displacement which is to be taken into consideration in the calculation of the total tonnage is the standard displacement as defined in Annex II. Only those vessels shall be taken into consideration which are not over-age according to the definition contained in the said Annex.

2. The notification provided for in article 18, paragraph (*b*) shall also include the total tonnage of vessels belonging to the categories and sub-categories mentioned in paragraph 1 of the present Annex.

Protocole.

Au moment de signer la Convention portant la date de ce jour, les plénipotentiaires soussignés, engageant leurs gouvernements respectifs, déclarent accepter les dispositions ci-après :

1. La Turquie pourra remilitariser immédiatement la zone des Détroits telle qu'elle est définie dans le préambule de ladite Convention.

2. A partir du 15 août 1936, le Gouvernement turc appliquera provisoirement le régime spécifié dans ladite Convention.

3. Le présent Protocole prendra effet à dater de ce jour.

Fait à Montreux, le vingt juillet mil neuf cent trente-six.

N. P. NICOLAEV.
PIERRE NEÏCOV.
J. PAUL-BONCOUR.
H. PONSOT.
STANLEY.
S. M. BRUCE.
N. POLITIS.
RAOUL BIBICA ROSETTI.
N. SATO
(*ad referendum*).
MASSA-AKI HOTTA
(*ad referendum*).
N. TITULESCO.
CONS. CONTZESCO.
V. V. PELLA.
Dr. R. ARAS.
SUAD DAVAZ.
N. MENEMENCIOGLU.
ASIM GÜNDÜZ.
N. SADAK.
MAXIME LITVINOFF.
Dr. I. V. SOUBBOTITCH.

Protocol.

At the moment of signing the Convention bearing this day's date, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries declare for their respective Governments that they accept the following provisions :—

(1) Turkey may immediately remilitarise the zone of the Straits as defined in the Preamble to the said Convention.

(2) As from the 15th August, 1936, the Turkish Government shall provisionally apply the régime specified in the said Convention.

(3) The present Protocol shall enter into force as from this day's date.

Done at Montreux, the 20th July, 1936.

N. P. NICOLAEV.
PIERRE NEÏCOV.
J. PAUL-BONCOUR.
H. PONSOT.
STANLEY.
S. M. BRUCE.
N. POLITIS.
RAOUL BIBICA ROSETTI.
N. SATO
(*ad referendum*).
MASSA-AKI HOTTA
(*ad referendum*).
N. TITULESCO.
CONS. CONTZESCO.
V. V. PELLA.
Dr. R. ARAS.
SUAD DAVAZ.
N. MENEMENCIOGLU.
ASIM GÜNDÜZ.
N. SADAK.
MAXIME LITVINOFF.
Dr. I. V. SOUBBOTITCH.

CORRESPONDENCE.

No. 1.

Dr. T. R. Aras to Lord Stanley.

Délégation de la République turque,
Montreux, le 18 juillet 1936.

Mon cher Lord Stanley,

Vous m'avez dit l'autre jour que l'opinion publique anglaise avait quelque appréhension au sujet du sort réservé, après la conclusion de la Convention des Détroits, aux cimetières militaires de la presq'île de Gallipoli.

Par une déclaration faite spontanément en séance privée aujourd'hui, j'ai fait connaître à cet égard la politique du Gouvernement de la République.

Je suis heureux de vous transcrire ci-après les termes de la susdite déclaration :

"On a manifesté quelques inquiétudes au sujet des rapports existant entre la Convention que nous allons signer et le Traité de Paix de Lausanne. Pour dissiper tous malentendus, la Délégation turque fait la déclaration suivante qu'elle vous prie de faire consigner dans le procès-verbal :

"L'article 23 du Traité de Lausanne a trouvé son application dans la Convention que nous avons élaborée. D'autre part, il va de soi que la Turquie continuera comme par le passé à être liée par ledit Traité de Lausanne et fera intégralement honneur à ses engagements, nonobstant les changements à intervenir, par la Convention, dans le régime des Détroits. Par exemple, les mêmes facilités que par le passé en ce qui concerne l'entretien, la surveillance et les visites des cimetières et l'application de l'article 124 seront évidemment maintenues par le Gouvernement turc."

Je vous prie, &c.
T. R. ARAS.

(Translation.)

Delegation of the Turkish Republic,
Montreux, July 18, 1936.

My dear Lord Stanley,

You mentioned to me the other day that public opinion in your country felt some uneasiness regarding the effect of the conclusion of the Straits Convention upon the position of the military cemeteries on the Gallipoli Peninsula.

In a spontaneous declaration which I made during to-day's private session I stated the policy of the Government of the Republic with regard to this matter.

I am happy to furnish you in the present letter with the terms of that declaration :—

"Some uneasiness has been expressed regarding the relationship between the Convention which we are about to sign and the Treaty of Peace of Lausanne. In order to dispel any possible misunderstanding, the Turkish Delegation make the following declaration, and they ask that it may be recorded in the *procès-verbal* :

"Article 23 of the Treaty of Lausanne has found its application in the Convention which we have elaborated. It goes without saying, however, that Turkey will continue as in the past to be bound by the said Treaty of Lausanne and will fully honour her obligations notwithstanding any changes which may be brought about in the régime of the Straits by the Convention. For example, the Turkish Government will continue to maintain the same facilities as in the past in regard to the upkeep and supervision of, and to visits to, the cemeteries, and in regard to the application of Article 124 of the Treaty of Lausanne."

Believe me, &c.
T. R. ARAS.

No. 2.

Lord Stanley to Dr. T. R. Aras.

United Kingdom Delegation,
Montreux, July 20, 1936.

My dear Dr. Aras,

In reply to your letter of the 18th July, 1936, concerning the desire felt in certain quarters for a reassurance with regard to the situation of the war graves on the Gallipoli Peninsula following the conclusion of the Convention which we are about to sign relating to the régime of the Straits, I am happy to thank you sincerely for the declaration which you made in the private plenary session of the Conference on the 18th July in the following terms :—

"Some uneasiness has been expressed regarding the relationship between the Convention which we are about to sign and the Treaty of Peace of Lausanne. In order to dispel any possible misunderstanding, the Turkish Delegation make the following declaration, and they ask that it may be recorded in the *procès-verbal* :

"Article 23 of the Treaty of Lausanne has found its application in the Convention which we have elaborated. It goes without saying, however, that Turkey will continue as in the past

to be bound by the said Treaty of Lausanne and will fully honour her obligations notwithstanding any changes which may be brought about in the régime of the Straits by the Convention. For example, the Turkish Government will continue to maintain the same facilities as in the past in regard to the upkeep and supervision of, and to visits to, the cemeteries, and in regard to the application of Article 124 of the Treaty of Lausanne."

Believe me, &c.

STANLEY.

In reply refer to
NE 767.68119/960

August 15 1936

767.68119/960

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of the Navy and, with reference to previous communications regarding the Montreux Conference, transmits a copy of a British White Paper entitled "Turkey No. 1 (1936) Convention regarding the Régime of the Straits with Correspondence Relating Thereto, Montreux, July 20, 1936", received under cover of a despatch dated July 28, 1936, from the Embassy in London.

Enclosure:
British White Paper.

NE:RAH:FMC:SS 8/14

AUG 15 1936.

A true copy of the signed original.

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

767.68119

767.68119/961

SEE 841.00 P.R./450 FOR #2371

FROM Great Britain (Johnson) DATED July 20,1936

TO NAME

1—1127

REGARDING:

The Dardanelles. Differences composed of members of Straits Conference at Montreux. Agreement prevented on use of Dardanelles and Black Sea. Comment from TIMES regarding-.

rc

The Dardanelles.

Towards the end of last week the members of the Straits Conference at Montreux composed their differences rather quickly. The British Delegation gave way on many of these contentions, theoretically rather than practically important, which had prevented agreement on the use of the Dardanelles and the Black Sea.

The/

The over-riding thought from the beginning, and on all sides, seems to have been that an agreed convention should be safely brought about, as an example to contemporary treaty breakers and as an encouragement to those who still put their faith in treaties. Italy, of course, is not represented at the Conference, and whether she will sign the agreement is conjectural. Failing such signature it is obvious that any convention relating to the Eastern Mediterranean must be unsound.

Encouraging comment, however, is made by both THE TIMES of this morning and the DAILY TELEGRAPH of July 18. The former says that the Turkish Government deserve to the full the credit for setting an example of international good manners. * * * Yet, though the correctness of the procedure adopted by Turkey has been universally recognized and deservedly praised there is no justification for regarding the new convention as a great improvement on its predecessor. * * * Its satisfactory conclusion still leaves open the question whether the powers not represented at Montreux will subscribe to the new convention. Italy * * * possesses the right to adhere to the convention, but seems disinclined to exercise it at present. * * * The Government of the Reich could not have expected to be invited to participate in the Conference (Germany not being signatory to the Lausanne Treaty), but this circumstance has not prevented German newspapers from giving vent to

some/

some cold criticism of the Conference."

To the DAILY TELEGRAPH the cardinal change established by the new convention is that Turkey will henceforth be the authorized keeper of the straits. "What is no less significant is that the framers of the new Convention have limited its duration to twenty years, with opportunity of revision at the end of each quinquennial period. Here the lesson has at last been learnt, at great cost, that permanent political settlements are impossible in the state of flux which now prevails. * * * On the other hand, the concessions which Turkey herself has made for the facilitation of commerce through the straits encourage the confident hope that she will take a continually progressive part in the peaceful development of the Eastern Mediterranean."

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

767.68119

SEE 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee/68 (Mediterranean) FOR #1799

FROM Italy (Kirk) DATED July 23,1936
TO NAME

1—1127

REGARDING:

Italian position toward Montreux agreement. Department informed there has been no statement of any kind as to the-. Comment concerning-.

767.68119/962

rc

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
AUG 10 1936
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
AUG 10 1936
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FS FROM GRAY

Istanbul

Dated August 8, 1936

Rec'd 8:50 a. m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AUG 8 1936
DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Secretary of State,

Washington.

41, August 8, noon.

Law ratifying Montreux Convention passed by Assembly, July 31, and published in Official Gazette and effective August 5.

HPD SHAW

767.68119/963

FILED
AUG 11 1936

867.044

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Aug. 18, 1936.

RCM.

There is nothing new of interest in this despatch. I don't think it need go to SKH

→ RAH

EAD

May want to read all of Montreux, pp 1, 2, + 3.

Sato

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
AUG 11 1936
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AMERICAN EMBASSY
Tokyo, July 22, 1936.

No. 1953.

SUBJECT: NAVAL DISARMAMENT.

Copy to Navy (Canaga Turn Copy) by messenger
Copy in WE 8/10/36
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1936 AUG 10 PM 3 35

767.68119/964

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AUG 19 1936
NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DIVISION OF EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
SEP 3 - 1936
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
COPY IN EE

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 18 1936
Department of State

767.68119

FILED
SEP 8 - 1936

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

The developments of the Montreux Conference regarding the future of the Dardenelles continued to be the most important naval topic featured by the local press during the past two weeks. Headlines reported at first that Japan might be forced to leave the Montreux parley; and then that Japan's requests regarding equal rights for all nations to send warships through the Dardenelles, avoidance

of

of all connection with the League, and reservations regarding notification would be considered by the other nations. Later reports from Montreux stated that although Japan's non-membership in the League of Nations would necessitate several reservations, the Japanese delegate on advice from Tokyo believed that the provisions of the Treaty would be acceptable to Japan. In signing the Treaty on July 20, the Japanese delegate is reported to have presented Japan's reservations which were apparently accepted by the other Powers. Those reservations, according to the press, are twofold, namely (1) a general reservation to the effect that various stipulations provided in the new pact shall not modify in any way the position of Japan as a non-League Power, and (2) more specifically, Japan will reserve freedom of recognizing and interpreting the following developments separately: (a) the closing of the Straits and restriction of the passage of warships by Turkey in case it is recognized by the League of Nations that there is danger of war; (b) the right of navigating warships through the Straits for performance of duties under mutual aid treaties between Turkey and other Powers.

Japan was at first reluctant to sign the Montreux Treaty, according to reports, because of its fear of discrimination in favor of League members. Moreover, Japanese naval circles appeared to be disappointed in the alleged Soviet victory over the British stand to keep the Straits open to all belligerent Powers. However, the local press in summarizing the concessions granted

to

to obtain Japan's signature expressed the opinion that on the whole being a party to the Treaty would accrue more benefits to Japan than would refusal to sign. The prohibiting of the passage of submarines through the Straits, restriction of egress from the Black Sea by the Soviet fleet and immediate notification to Japan of any movements of the Soviet fleet were considered by the press as distinct advantages for Japan.

Although Japan has not been particularly eager to sign the Montreux Treaty it has apparently begun to feel the pressure of various international alliances to which it is not a party and to fear that if it becomes too isolated from the other leading Powers, the diplomatic position in Europe, which it has gained since the war might suffer, and as a result of complete detachment from political contact with European nations its East Asia policy might become jeopardized. As a consequence, Japan seems to have decided that its best move is that of cooperating with European Powers so long as its independent stand may be maintained. That attitude was hailed by the press as a turning point in Japanese diplomacy in contrast to the policy it pursued in withdrawing from the League of Nations.

Great Britain notified Japan officially on July 15 that it would invoke the escalator clause of the 1930 London Naval Treaty in order to retain excess destroyer tonnage. While not yet confirmed it is nevertheless understood that Japan will shortly also take advantage of the escalator clause in retaining submarines in excess of the 1930 Treaty. Britain's

announcement

announcement appeared to be the signal that Japan was awaiting in order to begin its construction program, although every announcement and press commentary has stated that Japan will avoid competition with the United States and Great Britain in naval building and will merely adhere to its own expansion program which has been termed one of "autonomous and economic armament". The press has reported that an outline plan has been drafted covering a five-year period of naval construction which will cost two billion yen. As previously reported, the Navy Department will no longer publish details regarding vessels to be built. In fact it has stressed the point that greater secrecy regarding naval affairs is a national necessity. Naval authorities are understood to feel gratified that with the termination of the 1930 Treaty no further naval information need be communicated to the other Powers. Moreover, their announced plans include suppressing detailed construction data even in Cabinet meetings.

The press has been able, however, to ascertain that the naval expenditures during the coming fiscal year will not exceed ¥700,000,000. Only a small part of that, it is understood, will be chargeable to the extraordinary five-year budget of ¥2,000,000,000 which is said to be a sum in addition to the ordinary annual naval expenditures. The program for the coming year, according to the YOMIURI, includes an increase in capital ships, aircraft carriers, and auxiliary vessels, extension of the naval air force and perfection of land and sea equipment.

Newspaper editorials have attempted to justify the plans for enormous naval and military expenditures by pointing

ing to the greatly increased budgets of other nations and to the anticipated treatyless situation which will leave Japan in a precarious position if it does not maintain adequate defense weapons. The tone of the press articles indicates that Japan does not intend to adhere to the 1936 Tripartite London Treaty, and one editorial observed that the United States and Great Britain well knew that Japan would not accept the provisions of that Treaty when they invited Japan to sign. The article stated further that the collapse of disarmament agreements should really be blamed upon the United States and Great Britain rather than upon Japan because of their refusal to recognize that changing times require changes in international agreements, and that agreements of fifteen years ago should not be expected to prove satisfactory today. Therefore, the editorial concluded, in the light of attempted oppression by foreign Powers Japan's only course is that of arming itself sufficiently to maintain its position as a leading Power and a guiding influence in the Far East.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew.

500
MNH:C

Copy to Embassy, Peiping;
" " " Moscow.

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 114. RECEIVED Bucharest, July 25, 1936.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1936 AUG 11 AM 11 54

Subject: Comment of Bucharest Press on Montreux Conference.

767.68119/965

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith, in translation,
1/ various extracts from the press of Bucharest which seem to typify Rumanian reaction to the proceedings and outcome of the Montreux Conference for modification of the Straits Convention.

Rumania's reaction, as reflected in the press, found its original impetus in the speech of Mr. Titulescu of July 9th, in which he valiantly opposed the British thesis and supported Mr. Litvinov's contention in favor of the riparian states of the Black Sea and the exigencies of the several pacts of mutual assistance. (Please

see

see despatch No. 110 of July 13, 1936). The Rumanian press has expressed general satisfaction at the successful outcome of Franco-Russian collaboration against the British stand, attributed largely to Mr. Titulescu's efforts, amd, above all, over the victory which it represents for the present system of alliances on which Rumania's security is based.

With eyes closed to Turkey's scarcely concealed intention to proceed, in any case, with the militarization of the Straits, Rumanian commentators eulogize her conciliatory procedure in seeking an abrogation of the old Straits Convention through legitimate channels as an exemplary contrast to other methods, notably Germany's in re-militarizing the Rhineland, of bringing about modifications in the post-war treaty system. There has been apparent, moreover, a zealous stressing of Rumania's great friendship for Turkey, both as an individual State and as a member of the Balkan Entente, which harmonizes significantly with Titulescu's frequent and perhaps monotonous references to his "dear friend, Rustu Arras". Turkish friendship, it is pointed out, will now be generally sought, and the conclusion of a Franco-Turkish pact in view of the new situation is hopefully seen as a desirable eventuality.

It is noted, as a final point, that general comment betrays some satisfaction with the Conference's indifference to Italy and points out that, with Germany amd Italy absent, the various powers, having differing interests and at times conflicting points of view, were able effectively to collaborate in the interests of

peace

peace and a respect for international engagements.

In fact, newspaper comment faithfully reflected the general sentiment voiced in well-informed circles. The most possible was probably obtained at Montreux since it was evident that there was no one prepared to prevent re-militarization. Undoubtedly Rumania would have preferred some form of joint control of the Straits such as that originally proposed at the time of the negotiation of the Treaty of Sévres. That being unobtainable, Titulescu has made the best of a difficult situation, and in this respect must see to it that a strong and close friendship with Turkey is ensured for the future.

2/ There are also enclosed translations of the speech by which Rumania accepted the new Convention, delivered by the Rumaniam delegate, Mr. Contezcu, on July 18th in the absence of Mr. Titulescu, and of the remarks made by Mr. Titulescu on July 20th on the occasion of the signing of the Convention and the termination of the Conference.

Respectfully yours,

Leland Harrison.

Enclosures: 1- Translation of extracts from the press.
2- " " speech and remarks.

710.
t.
LH/CKH/EMS.

Copy of despatch to: Istanbul, Paris, Moscow, Geneva.

In translation

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 114 of July 25, 1936 from American Legation at Bucharest, Rumania.

EXTRACTS FROM BUCHAREST PRESS

REGARDING THE MONTREUX CONFERENCE

L'INDÉPENDANCE ROUMAINE (official French organ of National Liberal Party), July 14, 1936.

Rumania has maintained since the war-----let us be exact: since the Treaty concluded in 1916 by John Bratianu with the Allied Powers-----a perfectly straightforward and unvarying attitude; this policy one may call "the policy of frontier defense." Everything else derives from this preliminary aim and is in accord with it: maintenance of the French alliance, creation and development of the Little Entente, fidelity to the Balkan Entente, military alliance with Poland, friendship with Russia. Under no circumstances has the Rumanian policy been inconsistent or contradictory under whatever Government and no matter what statesman had charge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This policy has proved itself on many occasions. It has just now done so again at Geneva and at Montreux. Every time that peace is menaced by some maneuver of its adversaries or by an excess of zeal on the part of its friends, the voice of Mr. Titulescu, clear and eloquent, makes itself heard in order to put things in their proper place and prevent harm being done to the juridical instruments designed to ward off European war.....

LUPTA (independent, unofficially National Peasant), July 21, 1936.

The signature of the Straits Convention at Montreux may be considered, without exaggeration, as an historic event as regards both international politics and the special interests of Rumania as a riparian state on the Black Sea.

In the speech given at the opening of the Montreux Convention, Mr. Titulescu, our Minister for Foreign Affairs, said, among other things, that the Straits are the "lungs" of Rumania.

The vigilance and energy of Mr. Titulescu have assured the normal functioning of the "lungs" of Rumania, exacting, in every detail, a respect for the legitimate and vital interests of our country. On the other hand, it was demonstrated on this occasion how useful as a guaranty of Rumanian interests have been the alliances established through the farsightedness and perseverance of Mr. Titulescu between our country and the States of the Balkan Entente, as well as our good-neighborly relations with Soviet Russia. Diplomatic collaboration with these powers and with our faithful

ally,

ally, France, has enabled Rumania to achieve a definite and practical victory for the idea of regional security, which forms one of the bases of our policy and of that of our allies.

Furthermore, the new Straits Convention opens the way to an extension of the actual framework of our system of alliances, through the probable conclusion of a Franco-Turkish pact.

The Montreux Convention provides, then, a powerful support for the work of the consolidation of peace in this part of the continent and offers a shining example of understanding between peoples, through loyal collaboration and through a respect for international undertakings.

DIMINEATA (independent, democratic), July 23, 1936.

The fact that England finally accepted and signed the Montreux Convention according to the text sponsored by Soviet Russia, by France, and by the Balkan Entente, constitutes an event of the highest importance from the point of view of Franco-Russian cooperation, on the basis of the Mutual Assistance Pact concluded between the two countries, in the eventuality of a European war.

It is useless to point out the leading rôle that Mr. Titulescu played, personally, in this international conference. We cannot forget that the adherence of England to the Franco-Russian point of view was obtained by Mr. Titulescu, thanks to his energetic intervention with the English delegation, which had up to this time sustained a different point of view.

But the true importance of the new statute regulating the control of the Dardanelles will, from now on, be recognized, just as our Minister for Foreign Affairs indicated in his speech of Monday evening when he said "there shall be supplementary security pacts to facilitate still more a respect for Rumanian interests." For this reason the signature of the Treaty of Montreux constitutes, without doubt, an event of the highest importance in the organization of our security.

LE MOMENT (independent, in French) July 23, 1936.

The Straits Convention is signed. Mr. Titulescu made on this occasion a very important speech, in which he manifested his satisfaction with the new regime given to the Dardanelles. He affirmed that the interests of Rumania had been safeguarded.

The

The adherence of Rumania to the new convention is not due so much to its stipulations as, particularly, the confidence of our country in the loyalty of Turkey. Relations between our two countries are of long standing.

Our Voevod Stephen the Great of Moldavia advised us on his deathbed, in case we should be obliged to contract an alliance with any one of our adversaries, to choose the Turks, who are the most loyal.

Today Turkey is no longer our adversary, but a faithful and loyal friend on whom we can depend. It is for this reason that the attitude of Rumania on the question of the Straits was so straightforward and sincere, and the solution which this gave international problem has found has received our entire approval.

ADEVERUL (independent, democratic), July 23, 1936.

From the point of view of the general interests of peace in Europe, the Convention at Montreux carries for the first time, in a practical domain, the categoric adhesion of England in the fulfillment of the idea of organized collective security. Following the well-known intervention of Mr. Nicolas Titulescu, the English delegation, after consulting with its Government at London, adhered to the Franco-Russo-Rumanian point of view that the new status of the Straits must be an instrument which facilitates the integral application of the existing obligations by the respective signatories to the present pacts of mutual assistance and those which are to be signed in the future.

It is needless to stress that all those pacts are of a purely defensive character and their purpose is to guarantee, through previously established technical collaboration, the territorial status of today. It should be known that anyone who attacks one of these states will find himself automatically faced by a true steel wall, by a common military front of all those bound by the pacts of mutual assistance.

The Convention at Montreux assures, in case of European war, the provisioning of the French fleet in the Black Sea with Rumanian and Russian oil. At the same time, it guarantees free passage of transports of armaments, munitions and any other materials of war destined for the allies of France in the Black Sea. Also, the war fleet of Russia has liberty of passage into the Mediterranean Sea to collaborate, if necessary, with the French war fleet against anyone who may launch a war of aggression.....

Under these conditions Mr. Titulescu was able to point out in his speech at the close of the

Conference

Conference that "from the wording of the text it is seen that all of Rumania's interests, especially those deriving from the treaties of assistance at present in force, will always be respected."

And concerning the future, he added:

"We have confidence that in view of the identity of the objectives pursued by our peaceful policies, supplementary accords of security will help to obtain further and greater respect of Rumania's interests."

And the official organ of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, LE TEMPS, while eulogizing this declaration of Mr. Titulescu, emphasizes that the "new convention leaves the way of negotiations open, by a Franco-Turkish Pact, to the creation of a union between the Franco-Soviet Pact and the Pact of Balkan Understanding."

These, therefore, are the true, impressive prospects which the Convention at Montreux opens up for the "respect of Rumania's interests in Europe." Aside from the positive results obtained by the convention, which bears the signatures of England, France and Russia, that is, of the three great powers who are working together for the guarantee of peace, a completion of the network of pacts of mutual assistance is provided for in such a manner that no one will be in a position to dare to start a war of acquisition on our continent. LIVIU P. NASTA.

PREZENTUL (National Peasant economic organ), July 24, 1936.

While the German Government is tearing up at Danzig another part of the Treaty of Versailles, at Montreux the Treaty of Lausanne was revived through good understanding. Although some of the discussions were very fiery, still the desire of all the countries represented to reach an accord permitted the finding of solutions to satisfy Turkey as well as the other interested nations, and particularly England, Russia and Rumania.....

It is interesting to analyze the tendencies manifested by the contracting parties in the discussions at Montreux:

1) Great Britain set up the greatest difficulties, desiring to assure herself the possibility of sending her fleet into the Black Sea for "humanitarian motives" and doing everything to prevent the exit or the entry of the Soviet fleet in the Dardanelles. It is a way of showing that the great Anglo-Soviet antagonism is far from being liquidated, a fact which also explains the attitude of Great Britain toward Germany:

2) France and the Balkan Entente gave proof of a greater solidarity than expected, especially if we think of the dissatisfaction provoked in Russia by some of the pretensions of Turkey;

3) Italy not having participated in the conclusion of the accord, has henceforth nothing else to do but to accept the decisions at Montreux;

4) Turkey becomes a power whose alliance will be sought by all the interested powers in the Black and Mediterranean Seas, a position which cannot but serve her usefully. She becomes, in the complex of Mediterranean forces, a more significant force than that represented by her military strength alone.

To sum up, the Conference at Montreux has clearly stated once again the tendencies manifested in the last two years in European policy. Although some of the states have conflicting interests, the States attached to the League of Nations succeeded in reaching an understanding without Germany and Italy upon a central problem.

Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 114
of July 25, 1936 from the American
Legation, Bucharest.

SPEECH OF MR. CONTEZCU CONVEYING RUMANIA'S

ADHERENCE TO STRAITS CONVENTION.

(Translated from L'INDEPENDENCE ROUMAINE, official
French organ of the National Liberal Party,
of July 21, 1936.)

Taking note of the statements made at the Conference by Mr. Tewfic Rustu Arras and by the other chiefs of delegations, statements evidencing that assistance due to Rumania, both by virtue of the Covenant of the League of Nations and by virtue of the other Assistance Pacts now concluded or which may be concluded in the future, is assured by the provisions of Article 16, the Rumanian delegation hereby declares its acceptance, and withdraws the reservations made at the meeting of July 15, last.

STATEMENT OF MR. N. TITULESCU AT THE CLOSING SESSION

OF THE MONTREUX CONFERENCE

July 20, 1936.

(Translated from DIMINEATA,- independent, democratic,-
of July 22, 1936.)

Gentlemen, as I was not present at the moment when the text of the new Straits Convention was unanimously accepted, permit me at this instant when we are proceeding to the solemn act of signature, at which I wanted to participate in person, to pay homage to all the delegates who worked at the drafting of this diplomatic instrument which will mark an epoch in international life.

Permit me to mention first the delegation of Great Britain, which once again has shown its concern for the general interest, its practical sense and will to succeed which characterizes the British people.

But I could not mention Great Britain without associating her immediately with France and the U.S.S.R., whose delegations have given proof of a generous understanding and a spirit of conciliation which assured the success of the accord.

I should like also to pay homage to all those who, without exception, have collaborated in the accord at

Montreux

Montreux and whose rôle was not always easy.

But permit me particularly, upon the authorization of my August Sovereign, H.M. King Carol II, and by the Royal Government, to affirm that the principal motive which determined this adhesion is our unlimited confidence in the loyalty of Turkey.

From a reading of the text, from the declarations of His Excellency Mr. Rustu Arras, and from those made by the other delegations at the Conference, it may be concluded that all of Rumania's interests, especially those deriving from the existing treaties of assistance, will always be respected.

We have confidence that in view of the identity of the objectives pursued by our pacific policies, supplementary accords of security will help to obtain further and greater respect of Rumania's interests.

If my country opens an unlimited credit to the loyalty of Turkey, it is only executing the will of the reigning prince, Stefan cel Mare, who in the sixteenth century said: "If at any time it becomes necessary to come to an understanding with one of your enemies, choose the Turks as they are the most loyal."

It is so much easier to come to an agreement with Turkey today, who is not our enemy but a dear friend and on whose fidelity we greatly count.

I wish to express at this moment to the Turkish Republic, to His Excellency the President of the Republic, Mr. Ataturk, to His Excellency the President of the Council, Mr. Inonu, and to His Excellency Mr. Rusdu Arras, the sentiments of confidence with which we intend to sign the new accord of the Straits.

If I add to this the great affection which I have for you, my dear Rustu Arras, you will understand the entire situation of Rumania.

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

To Navy 8/17/36 NE-RAH/SC.

Istanbul, Turkey, July 27, 1936.

No. 87

SUBJECT: Turkish Press Comment on Montreux Conference (II).

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
AUG 24 1936
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AUG 12 1936
DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
AUG 19 1936
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

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To the Field
In U. S. A.
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" " M.I.D. } Confidential

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AUG 20 1936

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
AUG 25 1936
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

Sir:

1/ I enclose a further summary of Turkish Press Comment on the Montreux Conference prepared by Ali Nur Bey of the Embassy staff. The comment is interesting chiefly as showing the critical attitude taken towards the British during the darker days of the Conference when the outcome seemed in considerable doubt. I do not believe, however, that the close relations with Great Britain which have been one of the principal features of Turkey's foreign policy for the past year have been in any way altered. With the success of the Conference in sight, the Turkish Press Comment promptly changed and the withdrawal of British demands was described as "a noble action" which "would not escape the attention of the Turkish people".

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SEP 8 - 1936

No

No mention was made in the Press Summary of the celebrations in Turkey which followed upon the signature of the Convention. At Istanbul, Ankara, and Canakkali there was a certain amount of parading, speech-making, and much flag-flying and illuminating of public and other buildings. Turkish soldiers when marching into the demilitarized zones were embraced by enthusiastic Turkish girls and the whole proceeding was photographed and the photographs appeared in the papers. My impression is that the populace was rather apathetic which is perhaps to be ascribed to the extreme and unusually sultry weather and also doubtless to the fact that Turkish crowds are not as a rule demonstrative. In more thoughtful circles I believe there is a very real satisfaction that the last vestige of foreign control in Turkey has been done away with and that in the procedure chosen to bring about this result Turkey can justly claim to have been a shining example to the rest of the world in general and to Europe in particular.

Respectfully yours,

J. V. A. MacMURRAY.

Enclosure:
1/ Summary of Turkish Press Comment.

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GHS:mej

Copies sent to Embassies in Berlin, London, Moscow, Paris, Rome, Tokyo; Legations in Athens, Belgrade, Bucharest, Sofia; and Consulate in Geneva.

Enclosure to Despatch No. 87 dated July 27, 1936,
from the American Embassy at Istanbul, Turkey.

TURKISH PRESS COMMENT ON THE MONTREUX CONFERENCE (II).

Practically all articles which appeared in the Turkish Press between July 11 and 14, regarding the Montreux Conference consist mainly of a criticism of the British counter-project. The terms used in this connection are far from being moderate. Especially the CUMHURIYET excels in the use of qualifications such as 'tactless', 'selfish', 'hostile', 'aggressive', et cetera. What irritates this journal especially is the official substitution of the British counter-project in place of the original Turkish project. "This action is entirely devoid of tact", states the editorial of the CUMHURIYET of July 11. "The Montreux Conference was convoked by Turkey and consequently her demands should have constituted the basis of discussions throughout ... The British project, apart from undermining Turkey's fundamental demand for security ... endeavors at the same time to hit the Black Sea countries over Turkey's shoulders... It is this aggressive attitude of Great Britain which renders progress at Montreux so difficult..."

Another article in the same paper signed by Abidin Daver bluntly states that the British project is unacceptable "as it is absolutely detrimental to Turkey's safety...." "Furthermore", states the same author, "it has not escaped our attention that Great Britain always wishes to be able to maintain in the Straits a naval force strong enough to fight the Turkish fleet...."

The editorial of the CUMHURIYET of the following day continues attacking the British project by characterizing it as "totally unfriendly". "While the Turkish project" states Yunus Nadi, "relegates the possibility of a war to the background...the British plan is impregnated through and through with a warlike spirit... its main object being to maintain at any cost a control over the Black Sea...a plan incompatible with the safety of Turkey and that of the Black Sea States. Especially the British Demand for a free utilization of the Straits by belligerent States in the case of Turkey's neutrality, is in direct conflict with the Turkish demand for safety and security which is the basic thought underlying Turkey's endeavor for a modification of the regime of the Straits..."

Falih Rifki Atay in the ULUS of July 14, after drawing a parallel between the policy of the defunct Ottoman Empire and that of new Turkey states: "The countries surrounding the Mediterranean...can be assured of the fact that no menace of war will ever emanate from the Dardanelles... We now wish to assure the same safety to the countries bordering the waters on the other end of the Straits... We firmly believe that the Great Britain of today can not reason as the Great Britain of the 18th and 19th centuries and that therefore she must be one of the first to appreciate the establishment of absolute security over one of the outlets of the Mediterranean..."

Muharrem

Muharrem Feyzi Togay, in an article on general political developments, describes the struggle at Montreux as "a new manifestation of the traditional rivalry between Great Britain and Soviet Russia" and referring especially to the steadily growing rapprochement between Italy and Germany predicts early changes in the foreign policies of Great Britain and France. The SON POSTA of July 14, and finally the CUMHURIYET of July 16, express a similar view and more directly point out the possible effects of this 'change of policy' on the Montreux Conference. "The formation of a Central European block under Italy's aegis," declares the SON POSTA, "denotes the beginning of a new phase in the politics of Europe...which will certainly affect also the pourparlers at Montreux..."

"The violent repercussions" states two days later the CUMHURIYET, "caused in many European capitals by the recent understanding between Germany and Austria promoted by Italy, have at last induced the diplomats to come to reason and to grant Turkey the security which she demands over the Straits... We record with pleasure the wise and correct course which European politics is finally taking..."

"Logic and common sense" states another editorial of the CUMHURIYET, "seem at last to have gained the upper hand at Montreux... Recent developments in the political life of Europe, completely disregarding the existence of a League of Nations, such as for example the recent rapprochement between Italy, Germany and Austria, have made the adoption of adequate counter-measures imperative... By becoming the sole guardian of the Straits, Turkey will at the same time be the vigilant guardian of peace over a large part of Europe including the Balkans and Russia..."

In fact, beginning with July 14, a more optimistic tone prevails throughout the entire Turkish Press. Faith in the successful outcome of the conference is stronger. A new argument advanced in favor of the success of the conference is not devoid of interest and force.

"The failure of the Montreux Conference", states again an editorial of the CUMHURIYET, "would be tantamount to the legalization of the German policy of confronting the world with accomplished facts... This point seems to have been realized at last at Montreux."

The SON POSTA uses a similar language. "European peace" points out this newspaper, "will be the principal loser should the Montreux Conference fail... for this would mean the bankruptcy of the policy of legally modifying out of date international pacts... As an inevitable result, nations, dissatisfied with existing treaties, will choose to follow the German example of unilaterally denouncing international agreements... a course of action which will certainly not contribute to peace and good will in Europe."

Definite news reporting the successful termination

of

of the Montreux Conference reached the Turkish Press on July 17. The articles which appear after this date aim at counteracting, in the first place, certain adverse criticism formulated in previous articles especially in regard to Soviet Russia and Great Britain.

"The success of the Montreux Conference" states Abidin Daver in the CUMHURIYET of July 18, "constitutes a brilliant diplomatic success of the joint foreign policies of Turkey and Soviet Russia..." In a later article the CUMHURIYET says: "The Montreux Conference constituted a test for Turco-Russian relations... The successful outcome of the Conference proves that these relations have stood this test brilliantly... There can be no doubt that they have gained thereby..."

On July 21, the same journal emphatically underlines "the gentlemanlike manner in which Great Britain withdrew her demands in the presence of Turkey's vital and pressing needs." "This noble action", states the editor of the CUMHURIYET, "has certainly not escaped the attention of the Turkish people... The Turkish Nation, famed for its faithful friendship and gratitude will continue to appreciate this cordial gesture coming from Great Britain in the final solution of the Straits question."

In an article entitled "The Second Dardanelles Victory" the AKŞAM of July 21, states as follows: "The first Dardanelles victory was obtained by the bayonet, faith and energy of the Turkish people... The second victory which we are celebrating today is due to the high humane qualities of the Turkish nation, its exemplary correctness and its far-sighted and wise policy... Although we call the Montreux Conference a victory we do not wish to imply thereby that this victory was obtained at the cost of another nation... On the contrary all the States which participated in the Montreux Conference, fully appreciating the correctness, loftiness and pacific nature of Turkey's foreign policy, have without exception extended to Turkey a cordial and helpful hand."

Another apology of a general nature appears in the CUMHURIYET of July 21, where the editor of this newspaper states: "During the fierce debates at Montreux...which no doubt were due to the magnitude of the question discussed... we had bitterly criticized the attitude of certain delegations. In view of the sound and logical result arrived at...we now wish to tender to all delegations without exception our most heartfelt thanks and gratitude."

Great pride is taken in the "pacific and legal" manner of the solution of the Straits question. In the ULUS of July 18, Falih Rifki Atay states: "At a time when practically no faith at all is left in international meetings and conferences...we insisted on taking our case before an international gathering because we see no salvation for humanity except in the success of the system of international collaboration."

The leading article of the CUMHURIYET of July 20, declares: "Montreux proves that international difficulties can actually be solved in a pacific manner... on the condition that the claims advanced are really justified and devoid of selfish motives... The result obtained at Montreux would seem to indicate that a return to the lofty principle of collective security and peace is still possible... Thus by taking our case to Montreux we believe to have at the same time rendered a service to entire humanity."

Discussing the international repercussions of the agreement reached at Montreux, the CUMHURIYET of July 23, states that they are without exception most favorable and that "even the objections raised by Italy and Germany are purely formal and determined by certain political considerations...for neither of these two countries can in reality refuse to see the vital necessities which induced Turkey to request a modification of the regime of the Straits." The same journal expresses the hope that Italy will not delay in adhering to the Convention concluded at Montreux "which constitutes the beginning of a Mediterranean pact of security."

The ULUS of July 21, on the occasion of the signing of the Montreux Convention, formally emphasizes the pacific intentions of new Turkey and her sincere desire to further and develop international collaboration. "Every peace-loving nation" states Falih Rifki Atay, "must rejoice over the solution of the Straits problem... for Turkish arms do not imply a menace...but bring safety and peace."

Turkey's foreign policy "under Atatürk's wise leadership" naturally constitutes the subject of numerous eulogistic articles. "Even as recently as twenty years ago", states the TAN of July 18, "we used to envy the far-sighted and conscious foreign policies of the Occidental powers... In these days of chaotic European politics it is now the turn of the European powers to envy the wise and sound foreign policy followed by Turkey...of which Montreux constitutes another success..."

Falih Rifki Atay in the ULUS of the same date states: "The prestige which we enjoyed at Lausanne was due to our military victory...our prestige at Montreux is due to the success of the Turkish revolution... In both instances we must invoke with endless gratitude the name of Atatürk."

The AKŞAM of July 21, describes Montreux as "the reward of the sound course followed by Turkey in the interior as well as abroad since Lausanne."

E. Talu in the SON POSTA of July 20 states: "The demilitarization of the Straits was one of the concessions which the national government consented to make at Lausanne in order not to endanger the principal object in view... Montreux now completes this deficiency..."

The

The SON POSTA of the same date contents itself with a mere enumeration of the series of successes achieved by Turkey during the last fifteen years on the battle field as well as in the domain of diplomacy: "The victorious battles of Inönü, Sakarya, Dumulupinar, Izmir...then the armistice of Mudanya, the peace of Lausanne and now Montreux! No nation in the world can claim victories in such a rapid succession... Just as no nation can boast of having a leader such as Atatürk...!

Finally, the CUMHURIYET of July 23, comparing the present status of Turkey with the past regimes states that "history will record the era of Atatürk...as the glorious era of victories..."

August 18 1936

In reply refer to
NE 767.68/966

119

CONFIDENTIAL

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of the Navy and, with reference to previous correspondence on the Montreux Conference, transmits a copy of a despatch on that subject dated July 27, 1936, which has been received from the Embassy at Istanbul.

767.68/966

Enclosure:
Despatch No. 87,
from Istanbul.

NE RAH/GC

A true copy of the signed original.

AUG 18 1936.

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Istanbul, Turkey, July 29, 1936.

No. 90

SUBJECT: Straits Convention.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AUG 12 1936
DIVISION OF
NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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To the Field
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DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
JUN 29 1937
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

Sir:

Referring to previous correspondence regarding the Straits Convention of Lausanne and its recent modification by the Convention signed at Montreux on July 20th, I have the honor to enclose herewith a memorandum of a conversation which I had on July 25th with Dr. (Tevfik Rustu) Aras, Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

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JUL 2 - 1937

What seems to me to appear most significantly from this conversation is that, despite the impatience and irritation against Great Britain which the Turkish controlled press was permitted to propagate during the Conference at Montreux, the present intention of this Government is to manifest an attitude of complete satisfaction, and indeed of solidarity, with that of Great Britain.

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Britain. It is not yet fully apparent whether this is due to the favorable results finally attained at Montreux, or to what extent it may be induced by a feeling of common cause with Great Britain with relation to the apprehended pretensions of Italy in the Eastern Mediterranean.

With respect to certain phases of the latter question, I am reporting by separate despatch certain comments of Dr. Aras, made in the course of the same conversation, concerning the status of the understanding between Turkey and Great Britain as to mutual support in contingencies arising out of Article XVI of the League Covenant.

Respectfully yours,

J. V. A. MacMurray

J. V. A. MacMURRAY.

Enclosure:
Memorandum of conversation,
as stated.

Copies sent to Embassies in Berlin, London, Moscow, Paris, Rome, Tokyo; Legations in Athens, Belgrade, Bucharest, Sofia, and Riga; and Consulate in Geneva.

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MacM:mej

4 Carbon Copies
Received

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH DR. (TEVFIK RUŞTU) ARAS, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, JULY 25, 1936.

SUBJECT: Montreux Conference on the Question of the Straits.

Having asked for an appointment in order to present my felicitations to Dr. Aras, who had returned from Montreux on the 24th, I was one of a number of Chiefs of Mission whose visits he received on the afternoon of the 25th, at the Pera Palace Hotel. He was in a very triumphant mood, and scarcely allowed me to speak my word of congratulations before bursting forth into jubilations that Turkey had got from the Conference every substantial thing that she had wanted - which satisfactory result had been achieved in spite of very serious difficulties.

Quite in contrast with the attitude of the controlled Turkish press, which during most of the Conference had been protesting against the obstructiveness of the British, he emphasized that this happy outcome was in large degree due to the constant friendly support of the British Delegation. He was so insistent on this point as even to convey the impression that there might well have been a rift which he was now zealously trying to repair.

Without specifically blaming either France or Russia, he enlarged upon the difficult situation created for Turkey by their insistence upon keeping the Straits open for the uses of the Franco-Soviet combination while closing them to the naval forces of other Powers. Turkey, he said, could never have accepted such a situation, in which she would have been compelled to compromise her neutrality as guardian of the Straits. Happily, a way

out

out of the impasse had been found by the formula that Turkey should allow the passage of naval forces acting either under mandate of the League or under the terms of a mutual assistance treaty to which Turkey herself might be a party. The latter alternative was altogether out of the question, as Turkey has no present or imaginable intention to become a party to such a treaty; so the proviso was based upon a condition contrary to fact and therefore meaningless save as it was acceptable to the French and Soviet Governments because enabling them to make it appear to their home constituencies that the Conference had given them some additional element of security.

Dr. Aras further spoke rather bitterly of the Italian abstention from the Conference, saying that Italy not only had responded in terms favorable in principle to considering the revision of the Lausanne Convention but had also accepted the invitation to participate in the Conference on a given date at Montreux, but had later reconsidered that acceptance. He protested he was broad-minded enough to consider that there might be sufficient reasons for Italy's abstention to explain it as not actually unfriendly to Turkey, but he could not bring himself to regard it as a friendly thing to do.

At various points in the course of his rather discursive comments, Dr. Aras reiterated that the new Convention fully and impartially preserves the free commercial navigation of the Straits, and indeed further facilitates it by a slight alleviation of the

existing

existing charges for certain services to navigation.

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(The comments made by Dr. Aras on the subject of the Anglo-Turkish agreement for mutual assistance, in the event of attack consequent upon the enforcement of "sanctions" against Italy, are covered in a separate memorandum).

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JUL 2 - 1937
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

THE UNDER SECRETARY
AUG 19 1936
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AUG 19 1936
DIVISION OF
NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Memorandum

August 19, 1936.

U - Mr. Phillips:

Our Ambassador to Turkey reports having found the Turkish Foreign Minister, upon the latter's return from the Montreux Conference, in a jubilant mood because of the successful outcome of the Conference from the Turkish point of view.

Dr. Aras was particularly effusive in his praise of the friendly support of the British Delegation and gave the impression that the present policy of the Turkish Government is to exhibit complete satisfaction, and even solidarity, with Great Britain. This is in marked contrast with the rather extreme expressions of impatience and irritation against the British in the Turkish government-controlled press during the Conference.

Dr. Aras was most happy over the formula found to meet Russia's insistence that the Straits be kept open in order to facilitate Franco-Soviet naval cooperation. Under this formula Turkey, when a neutral, must allow the passage of belligerent naval forces only when the Powers concerned are acting under mandate from the League or under the terms of a mutual assistance pact, to which Turkey is a party. Dr. Aras states,

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states, with reference to the latter condition, that Turkey has no intention of becoming a party to a treaty which would link her to Franco-Soviet naval cooperation.

Dr. Aras complained bitterly regarding the failure of the Italians to attend the Conference particularly inasmuch as they had previously indicated their willingness to consider revision of the Lausanne Convention.

Frequent references were made by Dr. Aras in the course of his discussion to Turkey's intention to preserve free commercial navigation of the Straits.

Wallace Murray

767.68119/967

NE:RAH:FMC:SS

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 261 Sofia, July 27, 1936

DIVISION OF EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
AUG 21 1936
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
AUG 20 1936
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AUG 12 1936
DIVISION OF
NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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AUG 11 1936
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE

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Yes No
To the Field
In the U. S. A.
AUG 17 1936

Subject: The Montreux Conference.

767.68119/968

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the Legation's despatches Nos. 933 243 and 934 244, dated June 22 and June 24, 1936, respectively, reporting the departure of the Bulgarian delegation to the Montreux Conference,

1/ and to enclose a translation of an article published in MIR under date of June 21, 1936, regarding the Bulgarian reservation to Article 19 of the Agreement

2/ signed at Montreux, a translation of a statement made to a representative of the newspaper ZORA by Mr. Nikolaeff, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.....

FILED
AUG 25 1936

Affairs and Chief of the Bulgarian delegation to the
3/ Conference upon his return to Sofia, and a translation of an interview given to the representative of ZORA by the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Tewfik Aras, on his arrival at the Bulgarian frontier upon his return from Montreux.

The Bulgarian reservation is explained by the fact that the signatories to the Balkan Pact have adopted the definition of aggressor as formulated in London, while Bulgaria insists that pacts of mutual assistance come under the jurisdiction of the League of Nations and that as the League of Nations has not adopted a general formula for the definition of aggressor, the League must decide in each single case the aggressor state according to the procedure fixed in the Covenant. By reasserting this point of principle, Bulgaria protects herself from any application of the London formula which may be made to her detriment in the event of a Balkan conflict.

The Bulgarian Government appears to be well satisfied with the new Straits Agreement and considers that on certain points it is more favorable than the Lausanne Agreement.

Respectfully yours,

K. de G. MacVitty
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

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Enclosures:
Translations of
three statements.

KGM/MM

Copy to Istanbul.

ENCLOSURE No. 1 ACCOMPANYING
DESPATCH No. 261 OF July 27 1936

TRANSLATION OF ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN MIR UNDER DATE OF JUNE 21 REGARDING BULGARIAN RESERVATION TO ARTICLE 19

Before the closing session of the Montreux Conference the Bulgarian delegation made certain reservations which throw light on the real meaning of some clauses of the Convention. The reservations were made in connection with Article 19 of the final text which settles the question of the rights of belligerents in time of war, Turkey being neutral. According to Article 19 naval forces belonging to belligerents have no access to the Black Sea, except in two cases: 1) when a decision of the League of Nations is to be carried out, and 2) when assistance is to be given to a country which has been the victim of aggression and which is a member of a pact of mutual assistance to which Turkey is a party.

There is not much to say on the first point. The present Convention on the Straits is signed under the auspices and in the framework of the League of Nations. Although the Montreux Conference has settled some points of detail, the problems in their main lines remain under the jurisdiction of the League; it is natural, therefore, that when collective international interest are imperilled, the League of Nations should be able to impose its authority by admitting certain exceptions to the existing international treaties.

The second point may bring about difficulties and confusion because if it is to become effective, a very precise definition must be given as to which state is the aggressor and which the victim of aggression. The League Covenant contains certain provisions about aggression. They have failed, however, to satisfy all states and we have seen in recent years many efforts to find new formulas giving a definition of the aggressor. Treaties, open and secret, contain new and sometimes very peculiar definitions of that idea. Some of these treaties have secret clauses which, under the pretext of giving a definition of aggression, simply justify inadmissible interference in the internal affairs of foreign states.

The Bulgarian reservations emphazise that the Covenant alone must be taken into consideration when a definition of aggression is given; it is the only authority under present international law. It was necessary to reassert it as we have recently had the case where a regional pact which was to be registered with the League of Nations contained secret clauses about the definition of the aggressor which were in contradiction with its open clauses as well as with the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Bulgarian point of view as expressed at Montreux is that the procedure of the Covenant alone can lead to a positive and impartial definition of the aggressor. To leave it to the states, even when they are tied up by some regional pact, would mean to introduce complete insecurity and disorder in international life.

ENCLOSURE No. 2 ACCOMPANYING
DESPATCH No. 261 OF July 27 1936

-TRANSLATION OF STATEMENT MADE TO REPRESENTATIVE OF ZORA BY MR. NIKOLAEFF, SECRETARY GENERAL OF MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

We left for Montreux with a sincere desire to make our contribution toward the success of the conference; we wanted to manifest on this occasion the feelings of friendship of the Bulgarian nation and government for our neighbor Turkey, and also to take part in the elaboration of a new procedure for the revision of treaties which have become inapplicable. In my opinion our mission has been successfully carried out. The Bulgarian delegation feels that it contributed toward the strengthening and developing of Bulgaro-Turkish friendship; Mr. Rustu Aras asked me to convey to the Bulgarian Government his gratitude for the precious assistance of Bulgaria at Montreux. On the other hand, my declaration at the closing session of the conference that Montreux has inaugurated a new method of settling difficult international problems and represents an example to be followed, met with the support and approval of almost all delegations, and particularly of the French delegation and the delegations of the Balkan states. Owing to the efforts of our delegation, the cooperation of other delegations and the atmosphere of mutual confidence and conciliation which prevailed at Montreux, the new agreement establishes for our commercial and war ships in the Straits and the Black Sea a regime which in the opinion of our naval experts is more favorable than the regime of the Lausanne Conference.

In Montreux as well as in Geneva the Bulgarian delegation pointed out the peculiar position of Bulgaria on account of the Peace Treaty and of the fact that she has not joined in any pacts of mutual assistance; her security depends entirely on the League of Nations. In the many interviews which I had with foreign ministers and representatives of great and small powers I was given the assurance that our situation is properly understood and that the great powers as well as our neighbors take into consideration the vital needs of Bulgaria. With tactfulness, moderation and perserverance she can arrive at results on which she has a right to count.

ENCLOSURE No 3. ACCOMPANYING
DESPATCH No 261 OF July 22 1936
AMERICAN LEGATION SOFIA.

TRANSLATION OF INTERVIEW GIVEN TO THE REPRESENTATIVE OF ZORA BY THE TURKISH MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs was met at the station on the frontier (Dragoman) by the Prime Minister Mr. Kiosseivanoff. He made the following statements to press representatives:

"The best news from Montreux is that we have been able to come to a solution of the Straits problem which is satisfactory to all countries. I take this opportunity to express the gratitude of Turkey for the attitude of the Bulgarian delegation on all questions which were discussed. I sincerely declare that in the history of our two nations their relations have never been so cordial, friendly and full of mutual confidence as at the present moment.

The Montreux Conference was a brilliant manifestation of friendship and consideration for Bulgaria on the part of all members of the Balkan Entente. Turkey, Yugoslavia, Greece and Rumania successively declared that they had no hostility toward Bulgaria and that their desire was to cooperate with her for the consolidation of peace in the Balkans. We are very gratified that the wise policy of H.M. the King and Mr. Kiosseivanoff's Government leads to a rapprochement with all your neighbors in the Balkans; it has the full support and sympathy of all Balkan States."

To the question as to whether any special reservations had been made, Mr. Tewfik Aras replied: "No reservations exist for us. The Straits problem is definitely settled without any reservations."

"I think" Mr. Tewfik Aras said, "that the Montreux Conference will also have an excellent effect on the settlement of pending greco-Bulgarian litigations of a financial and economic nature. My impression is that Bulgaria and Greece may definitely solve them before long and that in this respect the Montreux Conference has been an encouragement for the two countries. We are happy that the conference has set a new stage in the clarification of Balkan problems and in the strengthening of friendship and peace in the Balkans."

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SEP 16 1936

CONFIDENTIAL VOLUNTARY POLITICAL REPORT

Article by Kemal Atatürk

From: M. K. Moorhead,
American Consul General.

American Consulate General, Istanbul, Turkey.

Date of Completion: July 28, 1936.

Date of Mailing : July 29, 1936.

CONFIDENTIAL VOLUNTARY POLITICAL REPORT

Article by Kemal Atatürk

There is enclosed an English translation of an article signed by Yunus Nadi, a prominent journalist of Istanbul and a close friend of the President of the Turkish Republic, which was published in the leading daily newspaper in Turkish, the "Cumhuriyet" (Republic) on July 10, 1936. This article also appeared in the French edition of the same paper, "La République".

It has been learned on very good authority from a member of the staff of the "Cumhuriyet" that the article was actually written by Kemal Atatürk himself.

This article is chiefly important as representing the actual opinion of the President of Turkey in regard to the Sovereignty of Turkey over the Straits (Dardanelles, Sea of Marmora and Bosphorus).

The real meaning of this article is that alien control of the Straits constitutes a real danger to the safety and Sovereignty of Turkey and if this Sovereignty and control is not restored to Turkey then Turkey will declare that her doors are locked and she shall open them to whom she may wish and in the manner she may wish and that she has the power to do so.

Although the powers attending the Montreux Conference have acknowledged Turkey's complete sovereignty over the straits, Italy according to a radio message has announced that she will not recognize the Treaty of Montreux. Italy is Turkey's greatest danger due to the heavy fortifications on the Italian islands off the coast of Anatolia.

Turkey is apparently fearful of the failure of the League of Nations to protect a small nation and to enforce sanctions and of the resulting return to pre-war alliances in Europe.

Recent events have practically brought back to life the old Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria and Italy. To which Alliance Hungary and probably Bulgaria will be attached and Bulgaria and Turkey are on no too friendly terms. Poland would probably also throw in her lot with this Germanic-Italian Alliance, especially if Germany, when she takes over Danzig, grants free port facilities to Poland. This probable alliance will, therefore, constitute a powerful block of nations extending from the Baltic to the Mediterranean against the strong Soviet State, leaving Czechoslovakia isolated and surrounded.

Turkey would theoretically then be forced to join the French-Soviet pact both on account of geographical position, fear of Italy and strong friendship with the U.S.S.R. Next to the U.S.S.R. Turkey is on most friendly terms with Yugoslavia. The Balkan Entente States (Turkey, Roumania, Yugoslavia and Greece) in theory would on account of geographical position and self-protection tend to throw their lot in with the U.S.S.R. and France.

Through various pacts of non-aggression and agreements Europe may now be divided into two main groups:

1. U.S.S.R. and France along with the Balkan Entente - Turkey, Greece, Roumania and Yugoslavia;
2. Middle Europe - Germany, Austria, Hungary, Poland. Bulgaria and Italy would probably also join this group in case of a war with group 1. Czechoslovakia, being

being isolated and surrounded, would have to join the Germanic nations or be submerged.

Great Britain and Belgium would probably join in case of a threatened war the group which would most likely insure peace and preserve the integrity of the British Empire.

In case of war between Germany and the U.S.S.R. it is not certain that all of the nations mentioned in the two groups mentioned above would become belligerents.

Turkey does not want war or any more territory. Her policy is one of self-sufficiency, to hold what she now has and to be left alone to develop her own territory and to live at peace with the whole world, and to make her defenses strong enough to prevent any one attacking her country.

In case of war between Germany and the U.S.S.R., if Italy should join the Germanic group, the position of Turkey would be very vulnerable. Italy could attack from her fortified islands the Dodecanese, off the coast of Anatolia and Bulgaria from the north into Thrace. The U.S.S.R. could furnish Turkey with very little assistance as the Soviets would be fully occupied in repelling the German invasion through Poland and Japan might take the opportunity of attacking Russia in the Far East. Turkey, therefore, notwithstanding her friendship and pact with the U.S.S.R. would probably remain neutral. It would be poor policy to go to war against Germany who is the best customer of Turkish products.

Greece, Yugoslavia and Roumania in case of war between the U.S.S.R. and the Germanic-Italian combination would

would be in too dangerous a position to join forces with Russia and France against the Central European block; Greece on account of its exposed position to an attack from Italy and Albania, as well as unpreparedness for war; Yugoslavia due to a probable attack on four fronts, i.e. by Italy from the Adriatic and Trieste, by Albania from the south, by Austria-Hungary from the north and by Bulgaria from the south east. Also internal conditions in Yugoslavia would compel neutrality as Croatia might very well take that opportunity of declaring her independence; Roumania, bounded in part by Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and the U.S.S.R. would be much safer as a neutral, especially as her mixed population would be much divided as whether to side with the Central powers or with the U.S.S.R.

The French-Soviet pact may be the determining factor to prevent a general European war provided France stands loyally by that agreement. There is, however, the possibility that French public opinion worked up to a fever heat by the National Party and other groups on the "Right" would prevent France from joining in any war on the side of the Soviet Republics.

If France should remain loyal to the pact or the Central European powers should believe her to be loyal, Germany and her associates would hardly dare to make an unprovoked attack on the French-Soviet combination. Such a war on two frontiers would be too dangerous an experiment. On the other hand the U.S.S.R. would hardly venture into such a war on account of the danger of a Japanese invasion from the east. Therefore, it is probable that the

Central

Central European block (Germany, Austria, Hungary, Italy and Poland) and the French-Soviet pact will tend to prevent any European war. Any such war will be made more impossible as soon as the position of Great Britain is clarified, and if the pending negotiations between Great Britain, France, Belgium, Germany and Italy are brought to a successful conclusion.

Italy appears at present to be the worst danger spot in Europe. Having defied successfully the League of Nations, she may be tempted to try again for further accession of territory. Turkey is, doubtless, very nervous in regard to Italy on account of the fortifications on the Italian islands along the coast of Anatolia and the failure of Italy to sign the treaty of Montreux. The Turkish law of May 22, 1936, authorized the expenditure of Turkish liras 67,000,000 ($53,600,000) for the purchase of war materials. The Legislative Assembly in the extraordinary meeting called for August 30, 1936, will probably vote large credits for the fortifications of the straits.

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Enclosure:
Translation of newspaper article.

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TRANSLATION OF LEADING ARTICLE IN "CUMHURIYET" (REPUBLIC).

We, Turks, have gone through uneasiness and anxiety resulting from the danger which the Straits Convention gradually began to constitute for Turkey's safety. The whole world knows perfectly well that our forces are likely to take the necessary steps for doing away with this unrest.

In spite of that, we decided to submit the righteousness of our viewpoint to the appreciation of the civilized world which we thought was able to identify in common with us, the reality of facts.

We have considered that our attitude was a very loyal consequence of our peaceful policy which has always been acknowledged as such by the world. Likewise, we have thought that if the civilized collectivities are peace-loving, and we continue to believe it in good faith, they would be eager to admit our thesis which is inspired by the purest intention in approving and in applying it.

Did we err, by chance? Turkish public opinion does not believe it, because it never accepted or shall accept that the republican government which is entrusted with its welfare, should be so ingenuous. In fact, the government of the Turkish Republic, its Grand Assembly and its Chief of State have not and shall never be considered as such.

If, in the Straits problem, the correct and humanitarian step of Turkey is not recognized in all its characteristic sincerity and one or more interested parties try to abuse of her good faith in procrastinating, it is impossible that the Turkish nation does not take that into account. In that instance, the world should know that the republican government could not admit what is considered as dubious by

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the Turkish nation.

In this question we overtly submit the following to our friends: so long as steps safeguarding entirely the security of the nation and the fatherland shall not be taken in the new Straits Convention, steps which could not be detrimental to a friendly country or any other country, they may be sure, from now on, that such a convention, whatever it be, shall not be accepted by the Turkish people.

The Turkish nation considers the following points relating to the Straits question:

a. The Straits and its waters mean the independence and complete sovereignty of the Turk. The Turk alone must be the unreserved and unconditional master. However,

b. Turkey is a social body imbued with such a modern mentality that she is far from desiring to shut her door to the civilized and commercial world. She is much above such an idea.

c. We only want to ascertain whether the grandeur of our humanitarian step is appreciated and we expect that those who acknowledge it shall set it in a formula.

Otherwise:

d. If everybody assumes the right to cross as he pleases the doors of the house, the holy home of Turkey which is the Straits, then the Straits question shall be completely solved.

In that case:

e. THE TURK DECLARES: MY DOOR IS LOCKED; I SHALL OPEN IT TO WHOEVER I SHALL WISH AND AS I SHALL WISH AND THAT POWER I HAVE.

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

767.68119/970

SEE 841.00 P.R./451 FOR #2383

FROM Great Britain (Johnson) DATED July 27,1936
TO NAME 1—1127

REGARDING:

Problems of Europe. Statement by Mr. Eden that Montreux Conference had enabled the Turkish Government to set an example to high-handed.Comments on result of Conference.

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Montreux.

On his survey of the problems of Europe in the House of Commons to-day Mr. Eden said that the Montreux Conference had enabled the Turkish Government to set an example to the high-handed. It had been proved that revision by negotiation could lead to a generally satisfactory settlement.

To the NEW STATESMAN's mind the happy ending of the Montreux Conference seems almost too good to be true, and although pessimists will say that all anybody has got is another piece of paper, still this is one of the better kinds of paper. THE STATESMAN, commenting favorably on the result of the Conference, says that the Straits are now in the hands of an East European bloc of non-aggressive minded countries, -- the Balkan Entente, the Little Entente, and the Soviet Union. "Through the Straits, these countries hope to keep open their communications with France in case they all find themselves at war with Germany. Between France and the Straits, however, stands Italy; and it remains to be seen what Italy will say. The Turkish

Government/

Government have invited Italy to accede to the new Straits Convention, notwithstanding her non-participation in the Montreux Conference; and at the same time they are reported to have informed her that, in their view, the Anglo-Turkish mutual assistance agreement under Article XVI of the Covenant has lapsed with the abandonment of the application of Article XVI against Italy. Italy is thus 'sitting pretty'. She can put her goodwill up to auction; and either Germany on the one hand, or the Franco-Russian group on the other, will bid for it."

(See Embassy's despatch No. 1267, July , 1936).

Central File: Decimal File 767.68119, Political Relations Of States, Relations; Bi-Lateral Treaties., Political., War. Peace. Friendship. Alliance. Non-Aggression., Turkey And Greece, Termination Of War. Mediation. Armistice., July 9, 1936 - Oct. 19, 1936. July 9, 1936 - October 19, 1939. MS Turkey, Greece, and the Balkan States: Records of the U.S. Department of State, 1930-1944: Records of the Department of State Relating to Political Relations of Turkey, Greece, and the Balkan States, 1930-1939. National Archives (United States). Archives Unbound, link.gale.com%2Fapps%2Fdoc%2FSC5111387033%2FGDSC%3Fu%3Domni%26sid%3Dbookmark-GDSC. Accessed 21 June 2025.